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PREFACE 
It seems the least I can do to mollify ruffled opin¬ 
ions is to offer a word of explanation as to how a medical 
student comes to write an essay in philosophy for his medical 
school thesis. Without disclosing the argument that is to 
follow in t.he text, perhaps I can nevertheless prepare the 
way a bit by ashing the question, "What should such an exer¬ 
cise as a thesis accomplish for the student?" My answer, and 
admittedly not the only possibility, was as follows: the the¬ 
sis should provide an opportunity to return to certain fun¬ 
damentals and explore a field at a depth which the student 
may not again enjoy for some time. Again and again my class¬ 
mates and I were told, "Do not rush so fast to master the 
clinical; you have your whole lifetime to do that. Take ad¬ 
vantage of your studenthood and immerse yourself in thinking. 
You may never again get such a golden chanceS" And so I took 
my advisors at their word, returning for nearly a year "to the 
books." Only my books were not biochemistry, statistics, 
neurophysiology, or even psychometrics. For it seemed to me 
that if we indeed were to "return to the basic sciences," then 
a thought! 1 analysis would reveal rhat philosophy was the 
proper basic science of psychoanalysis, my chosen medical 
specialty. My text will defend this point of view in detail; 
I offer it now without further comment by way of setting the 
, I merely wish to put on record that I see no radical 
- i - 
tone 

” ii 
discontinuity between the educational aims of my thesis and 
a more traditionally conceived one. This project has afforded 
me the occasion to think deeply about things which I trust 
will influence the whole of my future professional career as 
a doctor, and I regard that as neither irrelevant to, nor 
avoiding the issues of, medical school. On the contrary, it 
is probably one of the most valuable) things about the freedom 
at Yale, and for which I am greatly thankful. 
I would like to take this opportunity to express my 
gratitude for the numerous friends and teachers who have 
helped me over the past year. To Dr. Theodore Lidz I owe 
much of my above-mentioned freedom, as he saw fit to give me 
a carte blanche with my time, trusting me to find my own way, 
even if bemusedly sceptical of the outcome. Professor Karsten 
Harries, who introduced me to philosophy eight years ago, 
helped to guide me though the interstices of Being and Time 
this year with his accustomed clarity and honesty. Many friends, 
especially Humphrey Morris, Flip Kur.sberg and Donna Avedisian, 
goaded me to clearer thinking in our frequent conversations. 
And Adrienne Kols and my parents die' me the tremendous favor 
of editing and proofing. Finally, my deepest debt is owed ta 
Professor Edward S. Casey, whose encouragement and interest 
were there from the very beginning, and whose broad reading 
and thoughtfulness were the perfect stone against which to 
sharpen my argument. To them all I say a thousand thanks, 
knowing that whatever shortcomings that are to be found within 
are not of their doing, but are mine alone. 
New I-Iaven 
21 February, 1977 
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INTRODUCTION 
The concept of symbol lies eit the very heart of 
C. G. Jung's system of Analytical Psychology. A fundamental 
understanding of the term as Jung uses it reveals the entire 
Gestalt of his work, and clarifies at once his divergence 
from Freud, Structuralism, and contemporary medical psychi¬ 
atry. For many academic psychiatrists, however, the notion 
of Jung's symbol has remained all too obscure. In a period 
dominated by Freudian ego psychology, revolutionary break¬ 
throughs in psychopharmacology, and a growing interest in 
clinical behaviorism, symbolism has seemed esoteric, remote, 
and capriciously arbitrary. Isolated from the mainstream of 
the American psychiatric community as it has been, the Jungian 
symbol is often regarded suspiciously by psychiatrists as a 
curious and confused aberration of Freud's earlier formally 
defined and accepted concept, unable to rise above mere idio- 
syncracy, and lacking claim to an intellectual consensus. 
The thesis of this essay is to prove that such is not 
the case. In the following pages we will demonstrate the ex¬ 
tensive similarity and correspondence with Jung's concept of 
symbol that exists in much of 19th and 20th century European 
philosophical thought. The first part of our argument will 
consist of m extensive hermeneutical analysis of all the 
pertinent material which Jung wrote on the subject of symbolism. 
1 
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In this section we will attempt to bring together various 
strands of Jung's thinking in such a way as to reveal the 
broader implications of this one concept. At the same time 
we shall endeavor to clarify some ol the more persistent mis¬ 
conceptions which have hampered a properly dispassionate eval¬ 
uation of Jung's thought. 
In the second part we shall turn our attention to the 
intellectual antecedents of Jung's ideas on symbolism. Staying 
within the German metaphysical tradition, we will seek to trace 
the concept's heritage from Kant through Schopenhauer to Nietzsche, 
pausing to consider the contemporaneous work of Cassirer, and 
ending finally in the present-day thinking of Martin Heidegger. 
If it appears that this heritage leads more directly to Hei¬ 
degger than to Jung, that is as it should be. For our claim 
in this second half of the essay will be that Heidegger is 
unquestionably the philosophic counterpart of Jungian psycho¬ 
analysis, Jung's and Binswanger's protestations to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 
As a disclaimer by way of anticipation, let me hasten 
to add what this paper is not. Representing as it does an 
attempt to locate Jung's thought in the general intellectual 
dialectic of this century, it has little interest in defending 
his ideas by detailed comparisons with antithetical systems. 
Rather, I hope only to further ciar.fy them by revealing their 
ancestry and searching out their kirdred. Hence, I shall only 
passingly touch on Freud and Structi.ral.ism, to name but two 
alternatives. As Thomas Kuhn points out, the task of trans¬ 
lating between scientific systems is thankless, and all the 
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the more so for pre-scientific onesi 
Each group uses its own paradigm to argue that paradigm's 
defense. . . . The status of a circular argument is only 
that of persuasion. It cannot be made logically or even 
probabilistically compelling for those who refuse to step 
into the circle.^ 
Moreover, were I to attempt a systematic analysis of the cor¬ 
respondences of two competing theory systems, I would probably 
lose what Michael Polanyi calls the comprehensive meaning of 
the system I was trying to elucidate. Hence, all that is asked 
of the reader is that he approach this topic through the eyes 
of the protagonists, that he indeed "step into their circle" 
and try to apprehend their Gestalt of the world so as to see 
reality in their terms. Would that he be surprised? 

PART 15 
A DISCOURSE ON SYMBOL 

JUNG'S EARLY THOUGHTS ON SYMBOLS 
At first glance, it might seem somewhat arbitrary to 
single out the notion of symbol as being distinctive of Jung's 
thought. After all, was it not Freud who first showed us the 
meaning that lay hidden in dreams? And is not Jung better 
known for archetypes, psychological typology, and the individ¬ 
uation process? Surely the question of symbolism is what Ju.ig 
held in common with his psychoanalytical contemporaries. 
And yet, that is only at first glance. For Jung in 
fact shared only the word's hollow shell, and instead went on 
to develop a meaning for symbol that rested on a unique epis¬ 
temological foundation. This new meaning stemmed from his 
profoundly different visioning of the unconscious as ontologica 
prior, and it was that insight which led him to explore the 
instinctual roots of spiritual life. His concept of symbol, 
elaborated as early as 1912, was the seminal expression of such 
a re-visioning. Although it is common to hear the Freud/Jung 
break described as a disagreement over the libido theory, we 
shall show that what was fundamentally at issue was Jung's 
different conception of symbol, by which all of his later ideas 
were made possible. Viewed in this way, the libido controversy 
itself becomes symbolic of the deeper debate over symbol. 
Jung first appeared on the European psychoanalytical 
scene in 1907, with the publication of his Psychology of 
' 
. >- ■ ■ 
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Dementia Praecox, This early work won the admiration of Freud 
immediately, for it marked oneof the* first attempts to demon¬ 
strate intentionality and meaning in the symptoms and speech 
of psychotics according to psychoanalytical principles. Jung 
was clearly under the sway of Freud*s intellectual tutelage 
at this point, and the book argued for a direct application 
to psychosis of concepts developed by Freud for hysteria and 
neurosis. As a result, Jung paid little attention to symbolism 
in and for itself. Quoting Pelletier, he merely passed it off 
as "a very inferior form of thought" due to a "deficiency in 
the power of discrimination." A symbol stood for a thought, 
but was made of "indistinct, subsidiary associations" which 
"obscure rather than clarify it." In contrast, allegory was 
conceived as "an intentional interpretation of a thought, re- 
1 
mforced by images." 
Ordinary dream symbols were also postulated to be the 
result of such a deficiency. Sleep was induced by a mechanism 
called "sleep-suggestion," which emptied the mind of the crowds 
of thoughts whose presence constitutes the state of being awake. 
This was accomplished by withdrawing attention and, as a con¬ 
sequence, depriving the thoughts of clarity. Since the thoughts 
themselves remained, hox^ever, they were still expressed, only 
now without benefit of attention -- hence symbolically and 
2 
vaguely. Kith this explanation, Jung had come up with a 
suitable alternative to Freud*s censor (some youthful inde¬ 
pendence needing to be manifested, after all . . .), while 
still accepting an essentially impoverished notion of the 
symbol. 
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To this youthful formulation the later Jung might 
well have levelled the criticism he so freely directed at 
others, namely of succumbing to the fallacy of ’'nothing but.” 
As William James put it in Pragmatism: 
What is higher is explained by vhat is lower and treated 
forever as a case of 'nothing but' — nothing but something 
else of a quite inferior sort.^ 
In Dementia Praecox Jung had failed to recognize that this 
phenomenon, the symbol, lacked intelligibility precisely 
because he, the observer, was not ecual to it. 
By the next year Jung was moving to correct this error. 
In "The Content of the Psychoses” (1908), Jung began to show 
his first inklings of just what the unconscious ultimately 
would imply to him about human existence. He no longer rested 
content with the facile explanation of the symbol as the mere 
withdrawal of attention. There was something special behind 
symbols which claimed being in its own right: 
We healthy people, who stand with both feet in reality, 
see only the ruin of the patient in this world, but not 
the richness of that side of the psyche which is turned 
away from us. Unfortunately only too often no further 
knowledge reaches us of the things that are being played 
out on the dark side of the soul, because all the bridges 
have broken down which connect that side with this.^ 
Two crucial insights emerge from this passage. First, Jung 
now saw the unconscious as having ar autonomous existence, 
5 
albeit of a still fairly personal nature. He no longer 
defined it in terms of consciousness. The unconscious was 
"that” world, on equal footing with "this” one. It even took 
on a certain "richness.” Both consciousness and the unconscious 
were subsumed under soul, whose two sides they formed. 
But if the unconscious ceased to be defined perjora- 
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tively as "not consciousness," some explanation still had to 
be given for its apparent obscurity. And so Jung placed new 
emphasis on the expression of unconscious contents in conscious¬ 
ness, and the difficulties inherent in such expression. The 
obscurity became a question of knowledge and communication. 
There was an epistemological barrier, an obstacle to our con¬ 
scious knowledge of "the things that are being played out" in 
to 
the unconscious. The barrier seemed not/be insurmountable, 
however, for there existed "bridges" over it. These bridges 
were made by meaningful symbols. 
The plight of the psychotic patient thus lay at least 
partly in the breakdown of a symbol system which would ade¬ 
quately bring unconscious material to consciousness. "The 
patient," said Jung, "can spare only a fev; mysterious symbols 
for the dim, dismal realm of reality? they need not be under¬ 
stood, for our understanding has long ceased to be necessary 
for her." But implicit in this failure was the assumption that 
symbols were supposed to be understood. To be successful, they 
had not only to bridge the gap to the unconscious, but to be 
expressed in imagery which transcended idiosyncraey, and which 
was intelligible intersubjectively to others. Hence symbols 
were rooted, at the level of consciousness, in the phenomena I. 
world which we all share and call reality. And the patient* 3 
incapacity to generate such intelligible symbols represented 
for Jung, at this stage of his thinking, a loss of the ego*s 
mastery of this phenomenal world, For it was the intact ego 
that function of the psyche so well adapted to manipulating 
the images of external reality, which accommodated the indi- 
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vidual to the demands of collective, social existence. The 
ego assumed the task of insuring that the psyche*s communi¬ 
cations were expressed understandably. Therefore, it was as 
significant that others failed to understand a psychotic*s 
productions, as it was that her ego fragmented and withdrew 
from reality. The former was both symptomatic of, and further 
conducive to, the latter. 
The next few years found Jung actively engrossed in 
trying to elucidate the meaning of his psychotic patients* 
stymbols. In the course of this work, he came to a realiza¬ 
tion which led, with the publication of Wandlunqen und Symbole 
der Libido (Symbols of Transformation), to his break with 
Freud in 1912-1913. Jung began to regard the unconscious as 
ontologically prior to consciousness. He acknowledged, of 
course, the phenomenological immediacy of consciousness which, 
on account of its continual perceptual input, appeared to be 
the ground of human existence. But Jung recognized this im¬ 
mediacy for what it really was: an illusion. Consciousness was 
not the ground of existence, but was itself grounded, and 
grounded ir. the unconscious at that. Jung expressed this 
philosophical metaphor of "groundedness" with a similar trope: 
Individual consciousness is onl/ the flower and the fruit 
of a season, sprung from the perennial rhizome beneath the 
earth; and it would find itself in better accord with the 
truth if it took the existence of the rhizome into its 
calculations. For the root matter is the mother of all 
things,^ 
But although Jung defended this concept of the ontological 
priority of the unconscious as empirical, and supported it 
with innumerable clinical examples, it was in fact a philosophical 
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interpretation, based on a particular metaphysical point of 
view. 
Novi metaphysics, Aristotle's ‘'first philosophy," is 
O 
the elucidation of the being of being. Heidegger expands 
this compact definition for us by calling metaphysics "the 
questioning beyond the things that are, in order to regain 
them as such and _in the whole, for the purpose of comprehension." 
The ultimate task of this "questioning beyond" is allotted to 
that branch of metaphysics called ontology, which addresses 
the question, "How does it stand with being?"1^ For Jung, 
this "beyond" —• that is, being, the very object of the onto¬ 
logical endeavor -- was the unconscious. Only in the uncon¬ 
scious was the whole, and not just the ephemeral part, to be 
found. It is for this reason that ve characterize the uncon¬ 
scious as ontologically prior. 
Jung's eittitude toward the unconscious was further influ¬ 
enced by a second philosophical conclusion. For Jung's meta¬ 
physics precluded the possibility of ever attaining any know¬ 
ledge of the unconscious, this ontologically prior ground of 
our being. Jung was a self-avowed Kantian -~ "I am old-fashioned 
enough not to have got beyond Kant"11 — and strenuously objected 
to any suggestion that the Ding an sich might be known: 
It is a thoroughly outmoded standpoint, and has been so 
ever si \ce the time of Immanuel Kant, to think that it 
lies wi ,hin the power of man to assert a metaphysical 
truth., 
The existence of a metaphysically conceived unconscious was 
not in doubl here. One had to assume a "nan-conscious psychic 
sphere, even if only as a ’negative borderline concept,' like 

11 
Kant’s Dina an sich," just on the face of Freud’s overwhelming 
evidence alone. But epistemologicajly, one could "not pretend 
to know or assert anything about the state of psychic elements 
13 
m the unconscious." 
The impact of these two metaphysical presuppositions 
had a profound effect on Jung’s interpretation of clinical 
data. It was Jung’s philosophy which denied even the possibility 
of sexuality as constituting the primary content of the uncon¬ 
scious. The unconscious was "mother of all things'* and as such 
its being embraced all "the fundamental facts of [one’s] own 
. 14 
being." To explain human existence in terms of sexuality 
(or the will to power, for that matter) represented a double 
error therefore. Not only did it single out as pre-eminent 
a characteristic which was both variable and only one among 
many, but it aimed at a level which was simply too superficial. 
The ontological cannot be explained by the ontic. It is a 
category mistake to call any phenomenal reality "fundamental." 
It behooves us to define here what is meant by funda¬ 
mental. Heidegger again comes to our aid by reminding us that 
the fundamental is what is broad and deep, which is to say, 
it takes in the whole of being and pursues it to its source, 
. 15 
its ground. Put in this way, we can pull forth the latent 
implications of Jung’s thinking without, we believe, doing 
violence to his ultimate intent. Jung’s metaphysics forced 
him to transcend the ontic level of individual phenomena. He 
sought the most originary structures of being, the a priori 
n r~ 
determinants of human existence. He tas much less concerned 
at this stage with the way particular psyches actually con- 
»■ 
_ 
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stellated themselves at the tangible level of external reality: 
some might express themselves through sexuality; others in the 
will to power; yet others in the creative drive. The possi¬ 
bilities were manifold, and no man could be reduced exclusively 
to any one trait. But these external characteristics were 
secondary. What Jung pursued was that which lay behind these 
phenomenal expressions, determined the ground of their exis¬ 
tence, and was common to all men. 
Now Jung himself certainly did not see his thinking 
process as covering this ontological territory. When Freud 
. . . . . . . L7 
accused him of hiding behind a "religious-libidmal cloud," 
Jung retorted by underscoring the objective and empirical 
methods by which he had arrived at his conclusions. At the 
end of Symbols of Transformation, a 450 page gloss on fifteen 
pages of a schizophrenic's fantasy, he defended his incredibly 
esoteric (but not on that account irrelevant) mythological 
researches as follows: 
I have tried to understand her situation to the best 
of my ability and have set down the results of my efforts 
as an example of the nature and extent of the problems 
about which any doctor who wants to practise psychotherapy 
should have scientific knowledge. He needs a science of 
the psyche, not a theory about it. I do not regard the 
pursuit of science as a bickering about who is right, but 
as an endeavor to augment and deepen human knowledge.^ 
The key here lies with the words "nature and extent." The 
nature of *he problem is deep: it plunges to the question 
of human existence. The tale that is told as Jung unravels 
Miss Miller's fantasies is the st.or]' of being itself, the 
meaning of her psychological existence. The extent of the 
problem is broad: it covers the whole realm of human experi- 
■ 
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ence, as expressed by the most varied mythologies from all 
times and all places. The nature and extent of these problems 
is indeed fundamental. 
But despite our interpretation, it was as a scientist 
and not a philosopher that Jung proposed to expand the scope 
of his study so as to include the whole man. He remarked to 
Freud on this account, "As you know, I always have to proceed 
from the outside to the inside and from the whole to the part. 
I would find it too upsetting to let large tracts of human 
. 19 
knowledge lie there neglected." By the outside he meant the 
phenomenal world, the world of appearances with which science 
deals. But note also the emphasis on the whole. All the phe¬ 
nomena were to be investigated, not just those which scientists 
were comfortable with or merely used to. Hence, any conclusions 
he arrived at were surely based upon a broad panoply of objec¬ 
tive facts, and did not derive from any philosophical precon¬ 
ceptions, or so he insisted. 
And yet, is this disclaimer entirely truthful? In his 
Theory of Psychoanalysis (1912), the theoretical counterpart 
to Symbols of Transformation, Jung reserved highest praise for 
Freud’s empirical acumen, but distinguished between a subjec¬ 
tive and objective element. Referring to Freud’s theory of 
the sexually latent period in childhood, with which he took 
exception, Jung noted; 
There his been no error of observation. On the contrary, 
the hypothesis of the latency period proves how exactly 
Freud observed the apparent recommencement of sexuality. 
The error lies in the conception. 
So apparently the question of object.ive facts was not quite 

14 
so simple. It is one kind of fact to take note of a develop¬ 
mental pattern in children. But this first kind of fact is 
transformed into another sort as we proceed to interpret it 
and give it meaning. For to name this objective observation 
"latency" is to imbue it with a set of associations that imme¬ 
diately places the fact within the subjective framework of 
the observer. It becomes someone* s conception, and to be 
appreciated, requires adopting that someone's point of view. 
Jung was adamant on this point, maintaining that "Freud was 
anything but a theorist. He is an empiricist as anyone must 
admit who is willing to go at all deeply into Freud's writings 
. 21 
and to try and see his cases as he sees them." Thus Jung 
expressly recognized the subjective quality of scientific 
perception itself. Even to observe the sequence of development 
in children requires a certain point of view, as millenia of 
misperception bear witness to. But if Jung was acknowledging 
the inherent presuppositions of any observing consciousness, 
then this must apply to himself as well. 
Jung argued that his psychology diverged from Freud 
because of his more inclusive data base, which permitted him 
to speak of the whole organism, man. But we see nox/ that he 
himself admitted that truth is not merely a matter of breadth 
and depth, a question of fundamental, facts. It is equally a 
matter of whose facts, and that is a function of insight, the 
capacity to perceive a fact. Freud's genius was to recognize 
in dreams and sexuality new facts which no one else had dis¬ 
cerned. Tney were his facts. So too Jung, cn this same per¬ 
ceptual level, perhaps even unknown to himself, transcended 
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the bounds of classical psychoanalysis by acquiring his own 
Gestalt and making a leap into a nevf world. That leap was 
not conditioned on amassing new data, however, though such 
data might later support the theory. Rather, those facts 
themselves which Jung chose to recognize as evidence could only 
have sprung into view after his insight into the ontological 
priority of the unconscious, which framed his whole vision. 
Thus we have seen how the first part of Jung's metaphysics 
led to a new definition of the phenomena pertinent to the study 
of the psyche, with the consequent downplaying of sexuality. 
The second half carried with it even greater implications, 
however, since the epistemological inaccessibility of the 
unconscious threatened to leave psychology high and dry, rele¬ 
gated to puzzling out meaning from symptoms and the recollec¬ 
tion of repressed material. Jung's broader conception of the 
unconscious, which went beyond contents that were once known 
but later repressed, wavered on becoming an empty hypothesis 
unless a way existed to bridge the chasm which separated 
totally unknown unconscious contents from consciousness. This 
bridge was the symbol. 
★ * * 
Let us recall how this conception of symbol differs 
from the bridge metaphor of 1908 cived earlier. At that 
point, Jung spoke of symbols as potentially clear channels of 
communication that offered to bring unconscious contents to 
consciousness. Now, however, he was returning to a gloomier 
notion of the symbol's intelligibility* 
' 
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We call these actions, vhose meaning and purpose are 
not immediately evident, symbolic actions, or symbols. 
On the basis of this reasoning we call a dream symbolic, 
because it is a psychological product whose origin, mean¬ 
ing, and purpose are obscure, and is therefore one of the 
purest products of unconscious constellation.22 
But this differs from the exasperated description of 1907 in 
one crucial respect, namely the source of this obscurity. 
It was no longer a matter of the symbol being somehow a 
degenerate form of knowledge. On the contrary, the symbol 
was the clearest approximation of something that in itself 
was obscure. "Symbols are not allegories and not signs," 
Jung maintained. "They are images of contents which for the 
most part transcend consciousness."^' 
This distinction of symbols from allegories and signs 
serves to clarify Jung*s wider understanding of the uncon¬ 
scious as hinted at above. Speaking in Symbols of Transfor¬ 
mation about phallic symbols (Tom Thumbs, Dactyls, Cabiri), 
Jung explained: 
In [no]] case should they be taken literally, for they 
are not to be understood semiotically, as signs for defi¬ 
nite things, but as symbols. A symbol is an indefinite 
expression with many meanings, pointing to something not 
easily defined and therefore not fully known • • •24 
The symbol thus stands as mediator between two mutually 
exclusive realms of being. Just as the unconscious forms the 
ground of being, sufficient unto itself and indifferent to 
consciousness, so consciousness, as the light of awareness, 
illuminates the phenomenal world, heedless of its own existential 
foundations. 
Since Jung evidently had aiieady formulated his defi¬ 
nition of symbols as opposed to signs in 1912, it will not dis- 
■ 
17 
tort the historical development of Jung's ideas if we quote 
from his more elaborate descriptions of these concepts found 
in Psychological Types (1921), in order to amplify this dis- 
25 
tinction. Here, Jung posited three classes of metaphorical 
expression. Semiotic expression served as "an analogue or an 
abbreviated designation for a known thing.*' Many of Freud4s 
dream symbols would then be classified as semiotic. For ex¬ 
ample, the rising flood of water in the nanny's dream repre¬ 
sents a situation which can be more accurately and fully ex- 
27 
pressed in other ways. Allegoric expression was "an inten¬ 
tional paraphrase or transmogrification of a known thing." It, 
too, can be viewed as semiotic, inasmuch as its functional 
utility lies in the eventual cognizability of that for which 
it stands. Allegories differ from simple signs, however, in 
that they are meant to obscure rather than offer succinct 
encapsulations. But here it is a question of audience: allegories 
permit things to be said that would otherwise be forbidden, 
because only a select audience knows the code. Allegories 
are therefore only apparently obscure. One thinks of Gulliver* s 
Travels or Freud's sexual symbols. In the latter, there is 
never any doubt as to establishing the meaning, hidden in 
order to escape the repression of the censor. It is only a 
question of breaking the code. 
Filially, there are Jung's symbols. Symbols occupy a 
unique place in his epistemology anc cannot be likened to 
signs A symbolic expression is "the best possible formulation 
of a relati,ve 1 v unknown thing, which for that reason cannot 
*■> O 
be more clearly or characteristically represented*"c Such 
, 
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a statement is senseless unless we postulate an unconscious 
which contains more than just repressed contents, since the 
repressed has at one time been only too well known. Moreover, 
this definition suggests that there are unconscious contents 
which in a certain sense are seeking to be known. To envision 
symbols as "the best possible formulation" hardly paints the 
picture of strife and antagonism which we have accustomed 
ourselves to regarding as typical of the unconscious. On the 
contrary, they would appear to be a positively constructive 
effort at communication. 
Jung goes on to note that symbols may either be living 
or dead. This distinction most assuredly resulted from his 
extended investigations into historical source material, 
which brought to light quite literally hundreds of examples 
of genuine symbols which today are quite meaningless. But let 
us be careful here. An ancient Mithraic symbol is dead, not 
on account of our ignorance before its hidden secrets, but 
precisely because we know too much about it. Living symbols 
. . 29 
are "pregnant with meaning": it is contained within them. 
Dead symbols have brought forth their meaning: it is now before 
us for all to see. As a result, we know it and can more 
clearly articulate it in the lucidity of consciousness. The 
death of a symbol thus represents a further advance of con¬ 
sciousness. Just as the creation of a living symbol signals 
the arrival of a previously unknown content at a kind of 
accommodation with consciousness, so too its death culminates 
the process of that content becoming totally incorporated into 
consciousness. Such a view implies a particularly historical 
vision of psychology. 
. 
*■ 
19 
If left at this stage of development, the theory 
would have remained incomplete. After all, in order to medi¬ 
ate between consciousness and the unconscious, there had to 
be something that was mediated. And recalling the last word 
of the title Symbols of Transformation, whatever was mediated 
also underwent a transformation, rendering what was proper to 
one mode, appropriate now to the other. That something Jung 
called libido. 
It suffices to say that libido was for Jung a sheerly 
heuristic concept. He posited only as the most empty of words, 
a kind of placeholder to denote the dynamic relationship 
. . 31 between consciousness and the unconscious. It m no way 
was meant to explain why and how relationship was possible, 
only that it was possible. It was for this reason that Jung 
later moved on to the word [psychic] energy, taking a cue from 
physics which also begs ignorance before the question of what 
32 
energy actually is. 
First and foremost, libido powers the ego. This idea 
results from Jung*s extensive work with psychotic patients at 
the BurghOlr.li. It fills a heuristic gap in the explanation 
of decathexis, i.e. the withdrawal of the psychotic ego's 
affective investment in external reality. As the energy which 
binds consciousness together into a unified experience, its 
absence causes fragmentation of consciousness and consequent 
maladaptive behavior toward reality. In this sense libido can 
be "measured’' quantitatively, as a function of how well the 
psychotic patient is able to detach himself from fantasy and 
reintegrate his consciousness around a self-consistent and 
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unified experience of reality. No cittempt is made here to 
describe ego functioning qualitatively in terms of libido. 
Secondly, libido potentiate.*; the instincts. It should 
not be confused with the instincts per se, which form the 
actual"substance" of the unconscious: 
Experience shows that instinctual processes of whatever 
kind are often intensified to an extraordinary degree 
by an afflux of energy, no matter where it comes from . . . 
One instinct can temporarily be depotentiated in favor 
of another instinct, and this is true to psychic activ¬ 
ities in general.23 
Libido, although conserved, waxes and wanes at any one partic¬ 
ular site in the unconscious, and brings into play now this, 
now that unconscious content. 
Libido therefore ranges throughout both consciousness 
and the unconscious, and supplies whatever it is that makes 
things work. As a concept it expresses more our explanatory 
needs than any reality. And while it is true that libido is 
also an unknown of sorts, this does not mean it should be 
likened to the unconscious contents themselves. It is crucial 
to distinguish here between two kinds of unknown. The uncon¬ 
scious contents, such as the instincts, are unknown because 
they are both incompatible with consciousness and hidden from 
view. Libido, on the other hand, is unknown because it de¬ 
scribes a functional, quantitative relationship which has no 
substance. 
This explication of Jung’s libioo-energy theory is neces¬ 
sary to clarify the particular role symbols were envisioned 
as playing in Symbols of Transformat ion. Let us recall that 
the ego’s contents are solely composed of bits of perceived 
reality. To be sure, the egc organizes. judges, relates, anj 
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distinguishes, but that upon which these operations are per¬ 
formed comes via the senses. The ego has no content itself. 
This is not an entirely sufficient description, however, 
because we know from the work in the psychology of perception 
that what we perceive is no simple natter of mere '’objective** 
reality, impartially registered. The meaning given by human 
beings to their conscious experiences is reflected in the very 
way reality is perceived. That is, the ego does not just pre¬ 
sent us with a uniform field of sensations from which we then 
choose the things that matter to us; rather the very field we 
are aware of is biased ahead of time by those choices the ego 
makes regarding which perceptions to make consciously aware. 
And what determines just which meanings will structure the 
ego*s choices is the libido. The libido may be said tc 
emphasize particular perceptions by focusing a greater quantum 
of energy upon them. It directs the ego*s ever present 
intentionality.3 4 
But as there are an infinite variety of meanings to 
be found in the world, even fora single individual, it might 
seem implausible that libido is this uniform, indifferent 
energy. That this is not so will be seen as soon as we 
remember that libido is relationship, and that which it relates 
can vary. On the unconscious side, libido can intensify or 
depotentiaue any one of a number of unconscious contents. 
Depending on which instinctual nexus is activated, the libido 
will correspondingly relate it to the appropriate subliminal 
ego orientation. The ego is then said to be cathected in a 
particular *r&y. 
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For example, one would be hard pressed to deny that 
a two year old is instinctively moved to explore his environ¬ 
ment. From the point of view of the ego, his entire consciois 
activity is geared to making instructive observations of, and 
manipulations upon, the surrounding physical world. The ego 
perceives reality in the way which will best facilitate learning 
certain basic relationships. Likewise, a neurotic, caught in 
the grasp of a powerful sexual instinct, misperceives reality 
according to the logic of his ego's expression of libido. 
And though his behavior be called maladaptive, it is the appro- 
priate ego counterpart to that particular instinct's potenti¬ 
ation. 
Ego functioning on this level is subliminal. We choose 
this word carefully, because we are trying to distinguish 
between two levels of what is usually subsumed under the rubric 
of ego consciousness. Of course the ego operates as a field 
of conscious awareness -- that by definition alone. And on 
a certain level the child and the neurotic are both conscious, 
or at least aware, of what they are doing. But at a deeper 
level they are not. For insofar as their particular orientation 
to reality goes, the choice has in a sense already been made 
for them. Reality has been screened before it gets to con¬ 
sciousness, and that screening process we characterize as 
subliminal. The specific nature of a subliminal screen at 
any given moment (since it changes over time, as do the poten¬ 
tiated instincts) is the ego analogue of a specific unconscious 
instinct. They are related by libido. 
The drawback of this subliminal relationship should 
be obvious enough. Net only does it deprive us of a certain 
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freedom which, however illusory, we deem our due, but from 
a practical point of view it also robs us of the fullest ad¬ 
vantages of consciousness. After all, the ego seems best de¬ 
signed to select optimal relationships and yet, as far as its 
association with the unconscious goes, it seems doomed to 
relinquish any determining robe. 
Here is precisely where symbols intervene. Let us 
not forget the magnitude of the problem. We were faced on page 
six with a two-foid dilemma. The unconscious seemed to con¬ 
sist of more than repressed material; it was the source of all 
meaning and the very ground for our being. But along with this 
realization came the additional discovery that the unconscious 
contents were essentially barred to conscious experience. We 
then posited a mediating function, but were at pains to describe 
what was mediated. Perhaps now, after this foray into the 
theory of libido, we can specify mere accurately why libido 
is a necessary hypothesis. For if, as Jung repeatedly insisted, 
consciousness and the unconscious were mutually exclusive, it 
would not be possible to argue that an instinct per se was 
somehow transformed into awareness. Consciousness and the 
unconscious must remain autonomous zones. They are so phenom¬ 
enologically and are defined as such. And yet some relationship 
between the two must be possible, otherwise Freud would have 
been at a loss to make his discoveries. Jung expressed this 
relationship metaphorically as libido, or psychic energy. Just 
as electrical potential energy is described as the mathematical 
function of charges separated in space (i.e. as the spatial 
32 
relationship of those charges), sc libido is described as 
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a function of the separation of consciousness from the uncon¬ 
scious In both cases no thing spans the gap between the 
two. In both a field effect is apparent. In the case of 
electrical energy, this field has a determining effect on 
the surrounding environment, as when iron filings assume a 
particular pattern when placed within range. And in the case 
of libido, the field structures our perceptual reality. So 
far the metaphor holds. 
Jung also declared the psyche capable of an additional 
property, namely the transformation of this energy. If a 
light bulb is attached to the two sides of an electrical 
potential (e.g. a battery), it will transform electrical 
3 6 
potential energy into light and heat. Similarly, Jung pro¬ 
posed that symbols were "the psychological mechanisms that 
37 
transform energy." These transformers functioned to "con- 
3 8 
vert libido from a * lower* to a*higher* form." This form 
was deemed higher because it was conscious. To be sure, we 
are still unaware of the ultimate reality to which the symbol 
gives expression, but like that light bulb, it now manifests 
energy in a form that we can perceive. As a transformer, the 
symbol must stand with feet in both camps. It is "always 
grounded in the unconscious, but its manifest forms are moulded 
39 
by the ideas acguired by the conscious mind." While con¬ 
sciousness ,nd the unconscious remain autonomous, antithetical 
realms related by a field of energy, that energy can be trans¬ 
formed by the dialectical interaction of the two. The result¬ 
ing transformation is dependent upor both, and yet expresses 
its own truth. And while we cannot fully reconstruct the 

25 
the unconscious side, yet we now have at least a hint of what 
it might be, since we have in the symbol a conscious exemplar 
of something which it has helped to form. It remains for us 
to imagine what kind of unconscious meaning (antithesis) could 
have combined with the visual imagery of consciousness (thesis) 
to result in the symbol (synthesis). The final answer eludes 
us, but in our imaginings we have at least now gotten underway. 
Jung fully grasped the impact that this conception 
of symbol would have on psychotherapy. First of all, one 
would have to deal with the patient as he presented himself 
to the therapist, an individual for the most part unaware of 
how the activation of basic instinctual dominants was express¬ 
ing itself intentionally but subliminally in complexes of the 
ego. As noted above, the libido would here still be of a 
"lower" form. It is not "converted into effective work, [but 
instead] flows off unconsciously [i.e. subliminally] along 
old channels, that is, into archaic sexual fantasies and fan- 
. . . 40 
tasy activities." The damaging effect of these fantasies 
stems from their not being recognized as fantasies by the 
patient. He suffers from a kind of literalism. A neurotic, 
for example, might attribute his difficulties with women to 
external circumstances (including tha women themselves), instead 
of recognizing those externals as "symbolic" of unconscious 
conflicts. By concretizing unconscious fantasies in a way 
that renders symbols into "an unsuitable form that offers 
. . . 41 libido too low a gradient," he fails to become conscious. 
So the first part of analysis takes m a reductive quality. 
Its object is to lyse, to dissolve as it were, these unconscious 
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concretions turned into habit, and allow the libido to regress 
back to the unconscious, v/here a new, more conscious rela¬ 
tionship between ego and instinct Ccin be constellated. Here 
Jung gives Freud full credit for the psychology he had thus 
far developed. 
With one exception, that is. For if we recall that 
Jung viewed the unconscious as totally unknowable, as wholly 
other, then the extent of regression would have to be total. 
Regression means a decathexis of the; ego*s object relations 
via a withdrawal of libido. For Freud, regression was inti¬ 
mately associated with fixation, and implied the reestablish¬ 
ment of cathexis at a lower, more infantile and unconscious 
42 ... level. But Jung found this unacceptable, insofar as it did 
not radically alter the problem of literalism. Where the 
libido freed itself from finding concrete expression in symp¬ 
toms, the fixation theory would bind it up again in another 
phenomenal reality -- the patient*s actual parents. 
This simply did not go far enough. Again, if we pos¬ 
tulate the priority of the unconscious and its fundamental in¬ 
accessibility, then to call regression to the real parents 
the end point would amount to falling prey to the same kind 
of subliminal projection that characterized the full-blown 
. . 43 
neurosis, albeit at a more primitive level. To take Jung*3 
vision of uhe unconscious seriously would necessitate the final 
withdrav/al of libido from all the eco's phenomenal cathexes. 
The ego must see at last that its entire meaning structure is 
dependent on the unconscious instincts, as mediated via libido. 
Every single phenomena1 image to which we attribute value 
' 
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derives that value from the unconscious. It will not do to 
attribute any objective component to phenomenal reality per se, 
at least as far as its meaning is concerned. This is not to 
argue for some kind of 19th century German Romantic idealism, 
. . 44 
which would literally make phantoms of us all. Of course 
reality is there, and operates lawfully. But what reality 
means to us is wholly a function of the unconscious. Jung 
expressed this to Freud metaphorically in a letter v/hich dealt 
with their disagreement over the incest taboo: 
The incest taboo does not correspond with the specific 
value of incest sensu strictiori any more than the 
sacredness of the totem corresponds with its biological 
value. ... In my opinion the incest barrier can no more 
be explained by reduction to the possibility of real 
incest than the animal cult can be explained by reduction 
to real bestiality. The animal cult is explained by an 
infinitely long psychological development which is of 
paramount importance and not by primitive bestial ten¬ 
dencies -- these are nothing but the quarry that provides 
the material for building a temple. But the temple and 
its meaning have nothing whatever to do with the quality 
of the building stones. . . . Like the stories of a temple, 
the incest taboo is the symbol or vehicle of a far wider 
and special meaning.^ 
Nothing in the phenomenal world, including the actual parents, 
has meaning by itself alone: 
. . . Therapy must support the regression, and continue 
to do so until the * pre-natal® stage is reached. It must 
be remembered that the ’mother® is really an imago, a 
psychic image merely. . . . Hence regression leads back 
only apparently to the mother; in reality she is the 
gateway to the unconscious, intc the ’realm of the Mothers. 
The message is clear. Jung took Kant seriously and called 
all psychological reality phenomenal. Hence everything with 
meaning was ’’symbolic,” i.e. acquired its meaning from the 
cathected libido. It simply was inconsistent to symbolize 
everything except the penis, vulva, breasts, etc. They, too, 
4fc 
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were phenomena like everything else: 
Thus a phallic symbol does not denote the sexual organ, 
but the libido, and however clearly it appears as such, 
it does not mean itself, but is always a symbol of the 
libido. . . . The tertium comparationis for all these 
symbols is the libido, and the unity of meaning lies in 
the fact that they all are analogies of the same thing. 
In this realm the fixed meaning of things comes to an end.^ 
And finally, even this very theory .itself becomes symbolic: 
We have formulated symbolical concepts in a manner 
analogous to our formulation of conscious concepts, 
and this terminology has proven its value in practice. 
Thus Jung proclaimed a radical relativism. Objective truth was 
to be found in the unconscious, a realm forever closed to us. 
If we were even to talk about the unconscious, it would have 
to be metaphorically. And any judgment of the validity of 
our metaphors would have to be based on their empirical use¬ 
fulness. Here is where Jung’s "scientific" attitude took on 
significance. Only in the acid test of therapy could he 
evaluate the accuracy of his metaphors. If a metaphor helps I 
a patient to understand himself, then it v;as real. For as 
Jung so often put it, echoing William James, "Wirklich aber 
49 
ist, was wirkt." 
We reach here a critical juncture. The reductive 
analysis, if successful, leaves us with an unstable situation. 
If all the old subliminal libidinal cathexes have been with¬ 
drawn, then judging from what was said before about the libido 
powering the ego, one might suppose that the ego would disin¬ 
tegrate at this point. That this does not happen in neurotics 
50 
is patently obvious. But equally obvious is the tremendous 
increase in fantasy production that occurs with regression. 
As energy is withdrawn from phenomenal literalisms, it is brans- 
* 
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formed into symbols with the active participation of a higher 
level of eco consciousness. Libido is therefore not withdrawn 
from the eco in toto, but rechanneled into a more purposeful 
level whose object (if one may speak teleologically here at 
all) is communication. Such symbols bring to consciousness, 
insofar as is possible, the meanings of the unconscious. The 
ego no longer labors under the illusion of freedom, all the 
while determined by the unconscious. Now it collaborates with 
the unconscious and seeks to aid the expression of the symbol 
with its wealth of phenomenal imagery. We embark here on the 
synthetic phase of analysis. 
But let us pause to reflect on where this line of 
reasoning has brought us. Surely it is far from the hysterical 
attacks, phobias, and repetition compulsions which first 
attracted Freud*s attention. The mood has changed. We sense 
a certain quickening, an infusion of energy which begins to 
pervade consciousness, finding meaning where there was none 
before. And in fact, as Freud implied in his comment about 
the "religious-libidinal cloud," Jung recognized that "this 
synthetic treatment of symbols brings [one]] to the religious 
5i question." We ought therefore to consider this appearance 
of religious imagery before plunging, into Jung's later meta- 
psychological theories, which more fully developed the concept 
of synthetic symbols. 
■ 
THE KELIGIOUS QUESTION 
In trying to puzzle out the peculiar twist in Jung's 
thinking which was to lead him so far afield from Freud*s 
carefully blazed trail, one returns again and again to Symbols 
of Transformation. This remarkable book stands as Jung's equi¬ 
valent to The Interpretation of Dreams, and on the weight of 
its evidence and arguments hinges the validity of the better 
part of Jung’s early psychological insights. Like The Inter¬ 
pretation of Dreams it is an awesomely erudite work, a master¬ 
piece of the scholarly historical humanism which flourished 
in Germanic cultures at the fin de sifecle. Also like The Inter¬ 
pretation of Dreams, it is an exciting and suspense filled 
adventure. In both there is an air of mystery that is marvel¬ 
ously counterbalanced by the persistent probings of the thinker’s 
reason and knowledge. Finally, the book shares with The Inter¬ 
pretation of Dreams a kind of passion. One senses immediately 
that these are men who have joined the hunt: they are on to 
something. 
Verturing to risk a personal opinion, however, I have 
found one crucial difference which distinguishes Symbols of 
Transformation from The Interpretation of Dreams. It is a 
qualitative difference, really, and one so intangible and 
indefinable as to be better stated as a matter of taste. Ani 
yet from this difference springs the subject matter of this 
30 
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section, the question of religion. 
The Interpretation of Dreams, with all its innovation 
and original insights, plays a curious trick on the reader, 
who is literally being initiated into a whole new and unex¬ 
pected world. He comes with questions and suspicions and 
counterexamples, but gradually the relentless logic and count¬ 
less examples which Freud propounds dissolve his hesitations. 
And then the reader, too, begins to see this new world as 
Freud did. But soon the pendulum of the reader's enthusiasm 
starts to swing the other way. As the examples continue to 
more 
pour forth, the explanations become^and more inclusive, the 
exceptions fall one by one -- so -that the reader's world 
begins to shrink, until at last he is left all alone with 
only a heavy book in his hands. That exciting vorld has closed 
up. At some point Freud has managed to explain it all away. 
Everything of importance about it is now catalogued and cross- 
referenced. The project was to make the unknown known in the 
present. And yet having done so, the known slips away into 
the past. For to know all about a world means to have lived 
through it already. Such a world will never again be open to 
us because it is over and done with. But this is not all. 
Even the future now closes before us. As Freud reminds us at 
the close of the book; 
By picturing our wishes as fulfilled, dreams are after 
all leading us into the future. But this future, which 
the dreamer pictures as the present, has been moulded 
by his indestructible wish into a perfect likeness of 
the past.^ 
The lights are turned on. It is tizre to get up again and 
face the oii world, reality. 
' 
32 
Symbols of Transformation takes us on a different 
journey. By way of archaic, atavistic fantasies, we are led 
straightaway into the past, and here, too, we encounter a new 
world. It, too, is a complex world whose meaning and relevance 
we at first doubt. But what convinces us here? Is it the 
force of Jung*s argument? This surely helps to guide us through 
the myriad of unheard of mythologies and foreign imagery. But 
his logic is not what persuades us. It is the power emanating 
from the very symbols themselves that takes hold of us and 
draws us into their realm. We are held captive by the fasci- 
nosum that permeates this world. 
And why is that? Paul Kicoeur would have us believe 
that it is simply a matter of the interpretation which we 
bring to the symbols. For him it is a question of attitude: 
For the philosophy of religion, symbols are the manifes¬ 
tation in the sensible -- in imagination, gestures, and 
feelings -- of a further reality, the expression of a 
depth which both shows and hides itself. What psycho¬ 
analysis encounters primarily as the distortion of ele¬ 
mentary meanings connected with wishes or desires, the 
phenomenology of religion encounters primarily as the 
manifestation of a depth or, to use the word immediately 
. . . the revelation of the sacred.^ 
And there is certainly some truth tc this opinion. As we 
shall see below, Jung was acutely alive to the problem of 
attitude. The subjective element should never be minimized 
in our analysis. 
Nevertheless, Hicoeur's account is insufficient 
insofar as it fails to address the specific nature of religious 
symbols. At least as important as the subjective element is 
the objective difference in religious symbols. There is some¬ 
thing about them that resists reductive analysis and flaunts 
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their impenetrability. We are never through with them; we 
cannot leave them in the smug self-satisfaction of having 
explained them away. They attract us like a magnet, and we 
are forever struggling for the secret of their meaning. 
But if they are always with us, then they are in the 
present, and cannot fade into the past. And moreover, in this 
struggle to penetrate the symbol, we are in turn led into the 
future. This world of past, ancient images continues to open 
up as men try with each new generation to bring fresh insights 
of interpretation. The end of Symbols of Transformation is 
a beginning. 
In order to substantiate our claim that religious 
symbols are somehow objectively unique, we must recall the 
different sort of unconscious material with which Jung worked 
as compared to Freud. This is not to restate the tired clich£ 
about the Freud/Jung variance mirroring the distinction between 
psychosis and neurosis. After all, what little psychotic 
fantasy there is in Symbols of Transformation is hidden away 
in an appendix at the rear. Rather, we are speaking of the 
unconscious material of myth and religious imagery, which 
makes up the myriad historical examples in the text. Jung's 
. . . . . . 3 
patients merely set him m the right direction. His real 
accomplishment was to thoroughly trace out the similarities 
between the infinitely less well articulated psychotic fanta¬ 
sies and the profoundly complex religious symbols of antiquity. 
Jung was fascinated not so much by the schizophrenic*s symbols, 
which may w2ll have lent themselves to a reductive interpre¬ 
tation. These were only signposts on the way toward another. 
' 
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very different kind of symbol, which was able to move people 
and influence entire cultures. 
Nevertheless, Jung found himself struck by the odd 
identity of many psychotic and religious symbols. Why, after 
all, should the study of patients whose libido had regressed 
all the way back to the infantile mother lead him to the 
highest cultural achievements of the ancient world? There 
must surely be some connection between the psychotic ego's 
decathexis, with its subseguent invasion by unconscious con- 
4 
tents, and the formation of these great collective symbols. 
Jung postulated that these symbols accomplished in an orderly, 
articulated, intentional, and successful way what in psychosis 
was chaotic, vague, compelled, and failed, namely the transfor- 
. . 5 
mation of excess libido which had regressed into the unconscious: 
The concrete reality of religious figures assists the 
canalization of libido into the equivalent symbols, pro¬ 
vided tnat the worship of them does not get stuck in the 
outward object.^ 
Implicit in this conception lies a deep-rooted sense of histor¬ 
ical progress and teleology. Symbols, and the religious phe¬ 
nomenon in general, provide the most influential cultural im¬ 
petus toward raising consciousness: 
Here religion is of a great help, because, by the bridge 
of the symbol, it leads his [everyman*sj libido away fron 
the infantile objects (parents) towards the symbolic 
representatives of the past, i.o. the gods , . . ^ 
It thus functions to lyse the literal, concretized quality of the 
ego's relationship with the unconscious that was described in 
the first section. 
To this extent, therefore, religion frees the ego to 
be relatively more adaptive. And this is true even if the 
-A 
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religious symbols themselves are in turn hardened into idols. 
For when the libido gets stuck in a literalized religious fig¬ 
ure, the "outward object" as it were, 
it at least remains bound to the? representative human 
figure and loses its original primitive form, even 
though it does not attain the desired symbolic form.0 
o 
One need only think here of the difference between the Judeo- 
Christian and the "primitive" worlds. The former is a fairly 
neutral field, by and large, from which all the projections 
have been withdrawn and spiritualized, leaving a fair sem¬ 
blance of objective reality which the ego can manipulate unhin- 
9 
dered and mould into culture. Even if, as has been the case, 
the symbols of our tradition have long since frozen into solid 
form, the freeing effect remains. The primitive, on the 
other hand, condemned to contend not only with the obstacles 
of reality, but with the fears and obligations which he projects 
onto reality, can truly be regarded as operating at a lover 
level of adaptation. This is why Jung proposes that symbols 
are "purposeful": 
It is these inherent possibilities of 'spiritual* or 
'symbolic* life and of progress which form the ultimate, 
though unconscious, goal of regression. By serving as a 
means of expression, as bridges and pointers, symbols 
help to prevent the libido from getting stuck in the 
material corporeality of the mother. q 
It is only one short step from recognizing this purposeful 
quality in religious symbols, to translating it into modern 
psychotherapy. For within the analytic situation, the patient 
is cautiousLy allowed or encouraged to regress, and as a result 
to form a genuine symbol around the figure of the analyst. 
This is the transference. But the ley to this method*s effect- 
' 
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iveness lies in then demonstrating to the patient the 
symbolic nature of this projection, that is, in bringing the 
symbol to full awareness and letting him participate consciously 
in it. Oddly enough, it is through this symbolic fantasy 
that the patient gets back to reality. "The transference to 
the analyst," said Jung, "builds a bridge across which the 
patient can get away from his family into reality."11 The 
transference, however, is not a demythologizing. It is the 
first opportunity to consciously and effectively remythologize. 
And from this insight derives the second, synthetic phase 
of analysis. 
Jung was not the only psychoanalyst of this period to 
admit the need for a constructive analysis. James Putnam, 
the eminent Harvard neurologist who was so instrumental in 
introducing Freud and psychoanalysis to this country, also 
wondered about the "second half." Originally, of course he, 
too, shared the prevailing view that it sufficed for psycho¬ 
analysis to deconstruct and lyse complexes, but that 
it was not our business to instruct the patient, to 
supply the positive side of the re-education which 
he needed to undergo, but only to place him in a better 
position to obtain his education elsewhere.^ 
However, over the course of time, the ultimate implications 
of psycnoanalysis became clear to him. One could hardly jus- 
tify delving into the very depths o* a patient’s mind, only 
to then back out and say to him, "I am sorry, but no one knows 
what it all means." Instead, Putnam insisted that to explore 
the unconscious meant a commitment to searching out that meaning: 
The logical end of a psychoanalytic treatment, is the 
recovery of a full sense of one’s highest destiny and 
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origin and of the bearings and meanings of one's life.^ 
For this it was appropriate and even necessary that analysis 
continue beyond the reductive phase. 
Putnam differed from Jung in one crucial area, however, 
and this led to radically dissimilar conceptions of this second 
half of analysis. Immersed as he was in the "moral philosophy" 
that was then in vogue in the United States, Putnam found it 
reprehensible to allow a patient to escape the benefit of his, 
Putnam's, own personal moral vision. Whereas psychoanalysis 
was adequate to the task of disentangling "the numerous 
partial motives" of the unconscious, Putnam saw the ethical 
issues raised by reconstruction as "only thoroughly studied 
. 14 by philosophy." So it was that Putnam argued for imposing 
. . . . 15 his externally derived meanings and values on the patient. 
In the end the patient would not tell, but be told, his story. 
And however much it might aid the patient on a superficial 
level, perhaps even easing his way through life, the story 
would no longer belong to him. 
We need only think of today's infinitely more refined 
way of modifying behavior to suit society's whims in order to 
cringe at the potential for abuse with which this attitude 
was fraught. One can only admire the polite but cautious stance 
adopted by 7reud toward such suggestions. As he tactfully 
put it, 
it seemed more prudent to wait, and to discover whether 
a particular attitude towards life might be forced upon 
us with all the weight of necessity by the analytical 
investigation itself.,.- 
lb 
But this was precisely Jung's discovery, and it is 
what distinguishes him from Putnam. Jung did not leave the 
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bounds of the analytical setting to bring in extraneous 
values. He did not need to: they were all there before him 
in the patient's dreams and fantasies. And not only that. 
They were the patient's own values. Out of his unconscious 
came the authentic judgments about life: 
Escape from the state of reduction lies in evolving a 
religion of an individual character. One's true indi¬ 
viduality then emerges from behind the veil of the 
collective personality. . . . To do this he must first 
return to the fundamental facts of his own being, 
irrespective of all authority and tradition, and allow 
himself to become conscious of his distinctiveness.^ 
Freud was right to criticize Putnam so long as he insisted 
upon any one "particular attitude." And to that degree of 
wisdom Jung never aspired. But Jung did claim to be able to 
help each individual get on the track of meaning in his own 
life. Where it would lead, and whether the patient would 
follow -- that he could not say. True to his radical rela¬ 
tivism, he left that for the patient to find out for himself. 
This attitude toward the patient's future offers 
yet another explanation of Jung's turn to religious issues 
in Symbols of Transformation. For indeed, if we are truly 
to seek the fundamental facts of our own being, then surely 
we must address ourselves to that which has traditionally and 
preontologically responded to the question of Being. So it 
was hardly an accident, or a mere function of his patient 
population, that Jung took up the problem of spirit and 
God at this juncture. On the contrary, it was the logical 
development of Jung's whole metaphysical Weltanschauung. 
Yet we must finally wonder to what extent the religious 
question cane up as a natural consequence of Jung's personality 
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as well. We have hinted already of the enthusiasm that per¬ 
meates both The Interpretation of Dreams and Symbols of Trans¬ 
formation. Was it simply that, in Jung's case, his enthusiasm 
was of a more originary Kind, a true en theos, a being in God? 
One certainly feels something of this sort in Jung's more 
personal declarations. Writing to Freud in 1911, when well 
into the work on Symbols of Transformation, he observed: 
I, too, have the feeling that this is a time full of 
marvels, and, if the auguries do not deceive us, it may 
well be that, thanks to your discoveries, we are on the 
threshold of something really sensational, which I scarcely 
know how to describe except with the Gnostic concept of 
sophia, an Alexandrian term particularly suited to the 
reincarnation of ancient wisdom in the shape of psycho¬ 
analysis . 
Jung sought after wisdom. So we might say he was seeker of 
truth -- of that which lies revealed before us. Heidegger 
would therefore call him a thinker. But the question we have 
posed ourselves is, "Why was he a thinker?" Because, Heidegger 
would say, he was called. Called by what, you ask? And 
indeed, that is the question. We shall answer one question 
by another. Jung was called to ask the question, "What is it 
. 19 
that calls on us to think?" Further we cannot go. 

METAPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
Up to now we have tried to present a coherent com¬ 
mentary on the development of Jung's early thought. This 
extended through the period of his break with Freud, which 
may be broadly defined as lasting ur.til 1921, with the pub¬ 
lication of Psychological Types.1 The explication may v/ell 
have been hampered by our intentional forebearance in the use 
of more refined concepts which Jung later developed. If this 
has been so, it was only in the interests of aiding the reader 
to visualize the actual thinking process that went into the 
creation of Jung's ideas. Nevertheless, since we now are 
broaching the second half of Jung's career, it is readily 
apparent that we can no longer ignore the wider scope of his 
psychological theories. If we are to understand the ultimate 
ramification of symbol, we shall perforce have to touch upon 
such concepts as the collective unconscious, the archetypes, 
and the Self. 
Perhaps the weakest part of the theoretical system 
as elaborated thus far lies in the notion of instinct. The 
term strikes us today as quaint, a throwback to the days of 
social Darwinism, the Will to Power, and ^lan vital. We some¬ 
how regard ourselves as having moved beyond this issue which 
was so hotly debated in the past. Ethology has begun to ex¬ 
plain, behavior modification to control, and psychopharmaco- 
40 
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logy to alter that which once gave lie to man's illusion of 
power over himself. Why should we return to an uncomfortable 
reminder of our frailty when a brave? new world is just about 
to dawn? But return we must, if only out of historical cur¬ 
iosity. For the instinct theory lies at the very heart of 
psychoanalysis. As Freud remarked, his aim was to show men 
. . . . 2 
that they not only had spirit, but instinct as well. 
Freud's position on the matter of instincts is well 
known. He distinguished instinct from external stimulus 
"by the fact that it arises from sources of stimulation within 
the body, that it operates as a constant force and that the 
3 
subject cannot avoid it by flight." Instinct had a source, 
an object and an aim: 
Its source is a state of excitation in the body, its 
aim is the removal of that excitation; on its path 
from its source to its aim the instinct becomes 
operative psychically. 
Freud pictured instinct as "a certain quota of energy which 
presses in a particular direction." After an initial formu¬ 
lation of sexual and ego instincts, the latter was dropped 
since "this distinction itself lost its foundation" in the 
light of further research. But because Freud still felt 
obliged to explain what he called "a contrariety in instinc¬ 
tual life," he replaced ego instincts with "the aggressive 
instincts." And this is how the famous dichotomy of Bros and 
Thanatos is still framed today: 
The instincts that we believe in divide themselves into 
two groups -- the erotic instincts, which seek to combine 
more and more living substance into ever greater unities, 
and the death instincts, which oppose this effort and lead 
what is living back into an inoxganic state. From the 
concurrent and opposing action cf these two proceed the 
phenomenona of life which are brought to an end by death. 
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Although he speaks in the pleural ("erotic instincts"), it 
would seem that little attempt was made to differentiate 
within these classes. Rather, all ether instincts could be 
reduced to these two: "Every instinctual impulse that we can 
examine consists of similar fusions or alloys of the two 
classes of instinct." 
A different point of view was expressed by another of 
Jung*s contemporaries, William James, who deeply influenced 
4 ... 
Jung. James defined instinct as 
the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain 
ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous 
education in the performance.^ 
Such a view obviously stemmed from a more biological orienta¬ 
tion than Freud*s. Working within the framework of traditional 
19th century science, James ignored the realm of the uncon¬ 
scious by choice. In his definition he explicitly avoided 
the unknown quality of instincts except to characterize it as 
such, preferring not to hypothesize about that which he could 
not observe. This was in contradistinction to Freud, who 
sought to explain this unknown in the manner of a 20th cen¬ 
tury psychoanalyst, that is by way o: the unconscious. Secondly, 
James stressed the behavioral aspect of instinct. Not feel¬ 
ing himself competent to theorize about mechanisms, he focused 
only on repeated patterns of phenomenal events. Finally, toe 
also suggested that instincts have an innate content. They 
contained specific patterns of behavior which were not learned. 
From this starting point, James was able to make the bold 
proclamation that men, far from being impoverished of instincts 
as compared to lower animals, "possess all the impulses that 
/ 
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they have, and a great many more besides."6 He then went on 
to elaborate about infant reflex impulses, imitation, emula¬ 
tion, pugnacity, sympathy, the hunting instinct, fear, 
aquisitiveness, love, etc., etc. Where Freud simplified 
complexity, James compounded it. 
It is fair to say that Jung was influenced by elements 
of both these theories. In his essay "Instinct and the Un¬ 
conscious" (1919) Jung called instincts 
typical modes of action, and whenever we meet with 
uniform and regularly occuring modes of action and 
reaction, we are dealing with instinct, no matter 
whether it is associated with a conscious motive or 
not. ^ 
We immediately recognize the effect of James here. Instinct 
again is regarded as action, indeed predictable action, that 
does not require consciousness for its expression. Moreover, 
Jung, too, chose to emphasize the numerous, distinctive phe- 
ncHtnenal manifestations rather than the unified, generalized 
concept of Freud: "The instincts are not vague and indefinite 
by nature, but are specifically formed motive forces which, 
O 
. . . pursue their inherent goals." It follows that there 
are as many instincts as goals. 
This characterization still lacks clarity, however, 
because it fails to account for just how this most biological 
of behavioral phenomena translates itself into the world of 
meaning that we know as consciousne-is. The yucca moth, for 
example, knows exactly when and how to ovulate within the 
yucca plant without ever having seen this done before. It 
must therefore have some internal "image" which allows it to 
recognize the flower, the pellet it is going to form, the pistil. 
' • ' ■: • « . - : • j . . - 
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and the opening it makes m the pistil. By image ve do not 
mean to impute a developed occipital cortex to the moth! But 
as Karl Pribram has noted, the actuea performance of refined 
motor activity seems to require a cc?rtain kind of "pre¬ 
conception" of just what is coming next. He uses the term 
"Image-of-Achievement'* to describe a mechanism which is "com¬ 
posed of learned anticipations of the force and changes in 
force required to perform a task."1*"1 It projects a neural 
"mold" or "cast" of the next piece of complex movement in a 
sequence. Motion, then, becomes not only a matter of going 
from one position, but also of slipping into another. There 
is no question here of literal images: after all, blind people 
can move about, too. 
Jung recognized the need for just such a mechanism 
within the wider field of behavior in general. Something had 
to mediate between pure intention, "goals," and external real¬ 
ity. This mechanism he called the archetype. The archetypes 
are: 
the unconscious images of the instincts themselves, 
in other words, . . . they are patterns of instinctual 
behavior.,, 
Let us at once take note as to precisely how the word image 
is used here. Jung, no more than Piibram, means to imply a 
literal image: 
The archetypal representations .images and ideas) 
mediated to us by the unconsciois should not be con¬ 
fused with the archetypes as such.l2 
Archetypes, like the Image-of-Achievement, are rather better 
thought of as patterns of organization which translate pure 
intention into plastic form: images and patterns of behavior, 
: r : , * ) *•- 
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in the case of archetypes; bodily position in that of Image- 
of-Achievement. In and of themselves we have no knowledge of 
• 13 
them. Only through their phenomenal expression, can we 
guess of their existence: 
Archetypes, so far as we can observe and experience them 
at all, manifest themselves only through their ability 
to organize images and ideas, and this is always an 
unconscious process which cannot be detected until after¬ 
wards . 
This point is crucial, and at the risk of redundancy, we shall 
quote at length one of Jung*s most eloquent statements of it: 
Again and again I encounter the mistaken notion that an 
archetype is determined in regard to its content, in 
other words that it is a kind of unconscious idea (if 
such an expression be admissible.) It is necessary to 
point out once more that archetypes are not determined 
as regards their content, but only as regards their form 
and then only to limited degree. A primordial image is 
determined as to its content, only when it has become con¬ 
scious and is therefore filled out with the material of 
conscious experience. Its form, however, as I have ex¬ 
plained elsewhere, might perhaps be compared to the 
axial system of a crystal, which, as it were, preforms 
the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, although 
it has no material existence of its own. This first 
appears according to the specific way in which the ions 
and molecules aggregate. The archetype in itself is 
empty and purely formal, nothing but a facultas prae- 
formandi, a possibility of representation which is 
given a priori. ^ 
A biological analogy presents itself in the case of 
Konrad Lorenz and his ducklings. By now every schoolchild 
has seen the wonderful photograph of the grey head emerging 
from the water with a brood of ducklings trailing behind it. 
Lorenz* head, exposed to the ducklings at a critical period 
in the development of their central nervous systems, serves 
as a visual image around which an instinctual pattern of 
behavior crystalizes. The instinct lies latent in the duck¬ 
lings at birth, but at the proper moment it is expressed by 
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organizing itself around the particular perceptual field 
surroundinc the duckling. What, we call patterns of behavior 
result fron the specific way that this perceptual organization 
effects the attainment of instinctual goals. The fact that 
within limits, any percept, including the figure of a human 
head, can crystalize the behavior proves the accidental qual¬ 
ity of the phenomenal world. But that regardless of this the 
ducklings still exhibit the same pattern of behavior is prima 
facie evidence of its instrinsic formal structure. This pro¬ 
cess, called imprinting, is a well documented datum of ethno¬ 
logical science. The concept of the archetype is essentially 
no more mysterious than this. 
What distinguishes human being from ducks however is 
the further evolution of instinct in man. For what Jung calls 
"spirit" is not some additional construct to further compli¬ 
cate his theory of instincts, but a natural outgrowth of 
instinct itself, and of like nature. Spirit, the numinosum 
. 17 . 
before which we bow down, the highest aspirations of men 
-- in short, the gods -- these, too, derive from the brutish, 
stereotyped and unconscious constellations of the original 
animal instincts. So we may say with justification that it 
is as much a part of human nature to love as to copulate, to 
govern as to live in packs, and to worship as to paddle after 
a head bobbing in the water. And here, strangely enough, i.^ 
where Jung finds himself in agreement with Freud. That Freud 
so accurately noted the "contrariety of instinctual life" demon¬ 
strates once again his keen powers of perception, to which the 
whole of psychoanalysis owes its existence. The unconscious 
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is indeed the cauldron of "concurrent and opposing action" 
from which the phenomenon of life proceeds. But is it just 
conceivable that Freud stopped too soon in limiting this 
opposition to just one dyad? For everywhere one looks in 
the unconscious one finds contradiction. It will not do to 
try and reduce every opposition to Eros and Thanatos. There 
is meaning in each opposition as it stands, in and for itself 
Of course, this repetition of the same structure implies a 
certain kind of formal unity beneath the variegated phenomena 
So far the structuralists are correct. However, this by no 
means leads to the conclusion that the meaning is to be found 
at this structural level. Every protein follows the same 
pattern of peptide bonding between amino acids. But life 
evolved because it makes a difference which amino acids find 
themselves in the structure. One could almost say that Jung 
did nothing more than to accept the archetypes at face value, 
as they presented themselves to him. In an era bent on reduc 
ing the world to "first principles," that was a revolutionary 
accomplishment. 
We have posited a multiplicity of primary polar 
structures, each of which extends along a continuum from the 
lowest instinctual pole to the highest spiritual one. They 
function by determining the behavioral goals, objectives and 
intentions of men. They are translated into patterns of con¬ 
crete behavior and visual images by archetypes, which serve 
to organize, these intentions around phenomenal realities. 
(Nota bene; These two ideas, the instinct/spirit continuum 
and the archetype are very close, as Jung points out, and 
- 
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they are so carefully differentiated here only in order to 
demonstrate a theoretical point. In common usage one finds 
that the word archetype refers to both the continuum of goals 
and the translating mechanism. This is because phenomenolo¬ 
gically they are the same. We shall do likewise, noting 
only when necessary the theoretical differentiation between 
them by the terms "instinct/spirit continuum" and "archetype 
in itself.") Within the unconscious itself there reigns per¬ 
petual contradiction and opposition as psychic energy flows 
• 19 
now to one end of these continua, now to the other. Jung 
called this area of primary oppositions the Pleroma, a Gnostic 
term meaning the sphere of paradoxical existence. It is also 
known as the collective unconscious. 
We now find ourselves better prepared to elaborate 
upon the various levels of the unconscious alluded to earlier 
in the essay. When Jung says something is unconscious, he 
intends three possible modes. First, it can mean "an origin¬ 
ally conscious content that became subliminal because it was 
20 
repressed on account of its incompatible nature." This is 
the personal unconscious and accounts for a good deal of the 
material brought up in the reductive phase of analysis. Second, 
the unconscious can refer to a 
process that never entered into consciousness at all 
because no possibilities exist there for apperceiving it. 
That is to say, ego-consciousness cannot accept it for 
lack of understanding. . . . [[These are] contents that 
are not yet conscious. 
But this implies that they need not remain unconscious and 
can be mediated through symbols. We shall return to this 
point momentarily. 
. 
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Thirdly, there are unconscious elements which are 
ipso facto incapable of consciousness. It is not a matter 
of inattention on the ego's behalf; it is simply that ego 
consciousness cannot conceive of them directly. These elements 
Jung called psychoid. They include, by his account, the 
instinctual pole, the spiritual pole, and the "archetypes in 
21 . 
themselves." Such a view is not unique to Jung. Freud pos¬ 
tulated a similar level of unconsciousness in the essay on 
"The Unconscious" (1923): 
An instinct can never become an object of consciousness -- 
only the idea that represents the instinct can. Even in 
the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be repre¬ 
sented otherwise than by an idea.22 
But this leaves us dangling in midair: who, then, we may ask 
has this idea in the unconscious? For Jung there could be no 
doubt. It was the Self. 
The Self may be viewed as the first and fundamental 
polar continuum from which all others derive. It is repre¬ 
sented in images through symbols of unity and centeredness. 
Its two poles have been called metaphorically God and the 
Devil, and between them the whole of psychological being 
is encompassed. The special significance of the Self derives 
from its primary position. As the prima causa it is the source 
of direction in life. We have mentioned before that psychic 
energy moves over the instinct/spirit continuum, sliding not 
only from cne pole to other, but jumping from one continuum 
to another. It is the Self which determines just where the 
psychic energy will go. The Self orchestrates and articulates 
the various archetypes in that characteristic way which ren¬ 
ders every individual unique. Only the Self can select and 
' 
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emphasize which archetypes will predominate and how, for in 
themselves archetypes are equivalent and ambivalent, each 
containing a whole range of contradictory possibilities. 
We can now round out this description of Jung's most 
mature metapsvchology by returning to the second level of 
unconsciousness mentioned above. Here we recover our central 
theme, the symbol. It was in his essay "On the Nature of the 
Psyche" (1946) that Jung first pictured pairs of opposites as 
standing as the extreme poles of a continuum. At first glance 
the reader might find Jung's designation of the two poles as 
"psychoid," i.e. totally unknowable, to be capricious and 
contradictory. Why then call it a continuum if the two 
extremes have such a radically different nature? But once 
again Jung's talent for the apt metaphor comes to the rescue. 
For as with the electromagnetic spectrum, it is not the con- 
. , . 24 
tmuum which differs, but we, the conscious perceivers. 
In moving from ultraviolet into the visible spectrum, and from 
the visible spectrum into infrared, we encounter no discon¬ 
tinuity on the part of the energy. Only the phenomena change, 
and indeed, apparently vanish at the two poles. What makes 
them poles, therefore, is really the limitations of our senses, 
and for all the electromagnetic spectrum cares, what we call 
the infrared "pole" may be right square in the middle of its 
possibilities. So it is that we are unable to say anything 
about what lies beyond our consciousness, and indeed, must 
presume what we perceive to be totally relative to the limi¬ 
tations that define what we can know. This means, in the 
example of the spectrum, that the two poles are really an 
■ 
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illusion produced by consciousness. There is no contrariety 
in the reajm of the spectrum per se. We impose such polarity 
upon it. 
These limitations on our knowledge are not necessarily 
cause for despair, however, since there remains at least that 
part of the spectrum which does reveal itself to us. It 
matters little just how tiny a fraction of the range of total 
possibilities it represents. From the point of view of con¬ 
sciousness, that is the whole world, and it opens up to us 
an infinite variety by its infinite divisibility. It would 
seem Xeno's paradox can at long last redeem itself. Within 
the limited realm to which we are confined, there still is 
left more than we can ever hope to exhaust. 
In addition, by paying close attention to that fraction 
which does reveal itself to us, by caring for it instead of 
turning our backs to it and taking it for granted, we; may 
yet be able to at least guess at the possibilities that lie 
beyond the boundaries of our senses. To extend the metaphor, 
a scientist, by studying the wave properties of the visible 
spectrum, will surely reach a point where he can not only pre¬ 
dict the existence of infrared and ultraviolet, but their re¬ 
spective qialities as well. So inherent in the visible light 
which we dr- see are the secrets to x much wider world. It 
then becomes more a question of whether we choose to look 
deeply or rot. 
How does this all relate to the symbol? The symbol 
emerges from this middle ground of ;he continuum. In this 
zone of the- "visible spectrum” things are at the second level 
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of unconsciousness. At first they are unknown because we 
have our backs to them. But if we turn around and cooperate 
in the effort of communication, we will see them. And this 
visible light, arising from the middle of the continuum, trans¬ 
lated via the archetype in itself, and perceived by ego con¬ 
sciousness in terms of the phenomenal world ~~ that is a symbol. 
As Jung put it as early as 1929, 
the reflection and. formation of the Pleroma [the sphere 
of paradoxical existence] in the individual consciousness 
produce an image of it (of like nature in a certain sense), 
and that is the symbol.^ 
It becomes clear now why all symbols must by definition con¬ 
tain within them the potential for a conflict of opposites. 
For as each one symbol stands to communicate the visible 
part of the spectrum, the two poles, with their contradiction, 
are implied. But at the same time, stemming from the middle 
of the continuum as it does, the symbol also unites the 
opposites. 
Now what happens if the ego fails to turn around, 
and instead chooses to ignore the symbol? There are two pos¬ 
sibilities. First, the symbol may simply remain latent, ex¬ 
pressing itself, for example, subliminally, through projec¬ 
tions. A young woman's difficulty in relating to older men 
might be a case in point. She has failed to examine what 
these men mean to her, and the symbol goes unrecognized. 
Secondly, and far worse, the symbol may vanish. For to a 
certain extent the centering of the psychic energy on the 
middle of the continuum depends not only on the Self, but 
requires the efforts of the ego as well. When the latter 
fails to participate, the energy tends to drift to one end 
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of the spectrum or the other. When that happens, and it 
reaches the psychoid poles of instinct or spirit, it no longer 
has the potential of being communicated to consciousness. 
But this does not mean it will not affect us! On the contrary, 
we are now totally under its thumb, as it were. Just because 
it is psychoid we no longer have any say in the matter. Such 
a state of affairs Jung called symptomatic. One need only 
think of the compulsiveness of a phobia, or the fanaticism 
of a saint, to appreciate the behavioral extremes to which 
instinct and spirit can lead respectively. 
In summation, then, we can establish a two stage 
hierarchy for both consciousness and the unconscious. At 
the lower, simpler level, we find consciousness merely to be 
the function of awareness, that marvelously adaptive capacity 
which bends external reality to our wishes. Its counterpart 
in the unconscious is likewise mere unawareness. It is nothing. 
Only we must not make the error of presuming that nothing 
means no thing. It is just that we cannot know it: it is 
nothing to us. To itself it is something, namely the thing 
in itself, Kant*s Ding an sich. 
But Jung saw another, higher level. Consciousness has 
an ethical aspect as well. For millennia this has been pro¬ 
jected out into the world, but in fact, the calling is to 
turn around, to face inward and confront the unconscious wiuh 
awareness. This, on the other hand, requires something more 
of the unconscious than sheer nothingness. It requires a kind 
of moral intentionality on behalf o' the unconscious, a capa¬ 
city to reveal itself to us in a way that changes attitudes 
» 
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and generates creativity. In short, it requires the trans¬ 
cendent function of the Self. 
* * * 
We have been so insistent upon the figure of speech 
"turning around" that the reader may well wonder whether we 
have something quite specific in mind. We do. What we 
should like to consider now is the function of soul. This 
is a word fraught with hazard: at every turn it threatens to 
mislead us, to trick us into falling prey to some anachronistic 
conundrum. This need not happen, however. We have set out 
slowly, patiently, through the course of this paper, to make 
a clearing where the word can once more be understood in its 
proper, that is, its own relations. 
By soul Jung means: 
an organ of perception [which] apprehends the contents 
of the unconscious, and, as the creative function, gives 
birth to its dynamis in the form of a symbol. 
How is this? An organ of perception? We must follow James 
Hillman and explore just what it is we mean by perception. 
It is no longer enough to call it a faculty by which we 
"represent" reality. A great deal more is implied by perception. 
An etymological, but speculative, analysis in German may help 
us here. 
To perceive means to have mages or ideas (Vorste 1 li.ngen) 
of reality. The German verb for this function, sich vorstellen, 
. 28 
means literally, "to place oneself before oneself." ' Thus, 
for example, the sentence "Per Mensch stellt sich die Welt \or" 
(Man imagines or perceives the world) might be more freely 
translated as "Man places himself before himself [and thereby 
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out into]] the world.” 
This very translation, by attributing to consciousness 
an outside or “before," implies that there must be another 
side to perception. And indeed there is: the in-side. This 
aspect of perception, described by uhe German verb sich ein- 
stellen, does not actively represent, but passively allows 
things to "appear,” to "come,” or to "be there” ("da sein”). 
A literal rendering of this verb would be "to place itself 
within oneself." Note that our use of the double reflexive 
has changed here. The sich always refers to the subject of 
the verb. The prefix vor or ein always refers to the observing 
consciousness which the verb implies. In the case of sich 
vorstellen, these are the same. But in the case of sich ej.n- 
stellen, the observing consciousness cannot be the subject: 
it experiences the verb passively. So, for example, we might 
say, "Die Wirkungen der Psychotherapie stellen sich allmahlich 
ein." (The effects of psychotherapy take place or appear 
gradually.) Again, an interpretive translation might run, 
"The effects of psychotherapy [are only perceived when these 
effects]] place themselves within ourselves gradually." The 
effects "appear in us," but we have nothing to do with it. 
They place themselves there. 
The one exception to this i iterpretation of sich 
einstellen proves the rule. For suppose we say, "Der Arzt 
stellt sich auf den Patient ein, urn ihn zu verstehen." (The 
doctor puts himself in the patient* .5 place in order to under¬ 
stand him.} This can also be translated, "The doctor places 
himself within himself, but he is n3 longer at himself, he is 
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at his patient." The emphasis has shifted now to the movement 
to another consciousness. Nevertheless, the active role is 
finished as soon as the doctor has moved. The insight which 
he hopes to gain, however, is yet to come. The doctor com¬ 
pletely lacks control over what he will see after he has moved, 
because whatever appears or is revealed to him will come from 
beyond his consciousness, namely from the patient*s conscious¬ 
ness. The intent of the verb, therefore, the perception of 
meaning, remains passive: meaning will come to the doctor 
after he has moved over to stand in the patient’s place. 
It is of interest that in English this kind of psycho¬ 
logical perception is expressed in a similar, more readily 
intelligible metaphor. When a psychiatrist wishes to under¬ 
stand a patient, he does not concern himself overly with the 
patient's external appearance. Rather, he says colloquially, 
that he "wants to get inside" the patient's head. 
We may conclude, then, that these two words, Vorstellung 
and Einstellung tell us a great deal about perception. When 
we actively meet external reality with our senses and form 
an of it (sich eine Vorstellung davon machen), we say we 
have consciousness of it. Likewise., when we turn inward to 
meet the unconscious, ve assume a particular kind of passive 
stance which allows things to come to consciousness. We say 
we have a certain attitude toward the unconscious (eine Einstellung 
auf das Unbewrusstes haben). Then we have soul. 
This notion of attitude (Einstellung) is fundamental 
to Jung's whole psychology. By means of it we can at once 
clarify one particular difference between Freud and Jung. 
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Freud, in Chapter II of The Interpretation of Dreams, acknow¬ 
ledged the possibility of "symbolic” dream interpretation, 
where one "considers the content of the dream as a whole."29 
But he felt this was by and large an unhelpful method, because 
"it invariably breaks down when faced by dreams which are not 
merely unintelligible but also confused." And as one gleans 
from the repetitious insistence on the illogical nature of 
dreams in Freud*s 1901 essay "On Dreams," Freud found confusion 
to be a central feature of all dreams. 
Now it seems obvious that this problem of confusion 
is inextricably linked to the attitude of the interpreter. 
Freud’s argument is really inconsistent. He states that 
symbolic interpretation uses a different method, namely a 
holistic one, not dependent on logical sequences. But then 
he switches criteria, and judges dreams by how confused they 
are, i.e. how suitable they are for a non-symbolic, logical 
analysis by the ego. How "confused” a dream -- or a child*s 
story, for that matter -- is, depends on the attitude we take 
toward it. 
To drive home this point, let us recall Freud’s 
opinions concerning the nature of the manifest content. 
Surely his rejection of the apparent meaning of the dream is 
in no small way dependent upon his above-mentioned dismissal 
of the manifest content as "confuse:]." Nevertheless, he acknow¬ 
ledges that some manifest contents are more readily intelli¬ 
gible than others, and he attributes this to the greater 
effects of secondary revision, mediated by the preconscious. 
This is entirely compatible with a Jungian point of view, for 
' 
' 
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as we have tried to make clear, a genuine symbol for Jung 
always involves the collaboration of the ego with the un¬ 
conscious. The only difference is once again a question of 
attitude. Where Freud sees secondary revision as basically 
a variation on defense, a means of making the dream-work accept¬ 
able to the ego, Jung would attribute a positive aspect to such 
collaboration. For Jung, the proper attitude facilitates 
communication between the ego and the unconscious. And it 
is this conviction which allows him to dwell on the manifest 
content of the dream, treating it as Freud himself admits, 
"symbolically." 
Jung had already explicitly formulated this concept 
of attitude by 1921: 
To have an attitude means to be ready for something 
definite, even though this something is unconsciousj 
for having an attitude is synonymous with an a priori 
orientation to a definite thing, no matter whether this 
be represented in consciousness or not.^Q 
To have an attitude "signifies expectation" (bedeutet Erwartung) 
31 
and expectation means waiting for something (warten auf etwas). 
For what are we waiting? Heidegger has already told us: we 
are waiting for that which calls us, that which wants to be 
32 ... . . 
thought about. And why are we waiting for it? Why is it not 
already here? Eecause we have turned our backs on it and have 
failed to reach out for it. We have not taken the proper 
attitude. But moreover, we are waiting for if because it hus 
33 .... 
turned way from us. From the very beginning, it withdrew 
from man. What calls dung and Heidegger does not allow itself 
to be known. 
This does not mean that we should give up, though. 
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For we can hardly expect to refind that which calls us if we 
do not even try to meet it, and rest instead on the assumption 
that we know everything about the world from its Vorstellungen. 
We must reach out toward that which is withdrawing within us. 
And where will that leave us? Underway, that is, 'Inter vias, 
. 34 
between different ways." And this is really no more than a 
border zone; better yet, an interface, which exists only by 
defining the relation between two distinct realms. But no more 
is also no less: it is somewhere. It is soul. As Jung puts 
it psychologically, 
soul never loses its intermediate position. It must 
therefore be regarded as a function of relation between 
the subject and the inaccessible depths of the unconscious. 
. . . It creates symbols and images and is itself only 
an image. 
To have soul means to take the proper attitude, that is, the 
symbolic attitude, which is 
a definite view of the world which assigns meanings to 
events, whether great or small, and attaches to this 
meaning a greater value than bare facts.^ 
Heidegger states the same thing philosophically, when he says 
that "soul is not the principle of life, but that in which 
. . 37 
the spirit has its being." It is liemona, not simple memory, 
but the place where that which has meaning for us, i.e. that 
which is food for thought, is kept and reflected back for us 
to see. Relating/Keeping and Imagiig/Reflecting: these are 
the properties of the soul. 
It may be objected, however, that we go too far here. 
What is all this nonsense about "calling," "food for thought," 
and "keeping?" Are we trying to explain something or create 
a mythology? The answer is, we are trying to understand. 
"My soul," says James Hillman, 
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is not the result of objective facts that require expla¬ 
nation; rather, it reflects subjective experiences that 
that require understanding. « . To understand anything 
at all, we must envision it as having an independent sub¬ 
jective interior existence, capable of experience, obliged 
to a history, motivated by purposes and intentions. Vie 
must always think anthropomorphically, even personally.„ 
The soul does not perceive in the same way that our ego 
perceives external reality. The ego can quantify, order, 
and make abstractions. The soul, as Jung so often pointed 
out, can do none of this. It can only speak in images. Metaphor 
is the language of the soul. 
* * * 
If that is so, then let us conclude this section by 
exploring a metaphor. Let us see what insights can be had 
simply for the imagining. Thus far we have heard the boun¬ 
dary between consciousness and the unconscious described as 
. . . . . 39 
a kind of chasm, which required a bridge m order to be crossed. 
This implies, however, that the gap can be closed, that the 
two can be united as a whole. A better metaphor is the image 
of horizon. It goes under a variety of names. Nietzsche 
knew it as the "negative border"; William James called it "the 
fringe of consciousness" or the "transmarginal field"; Jung- 
40 
and Heidegger, by way of Husserl, used the word horizon. 
May I presume to ask the reader, when was the last 
time he sa.j a horizon? If he shares my misfortune of living 
in a city, it may have been quite a while indeed. All those 
buildings get in the way. Of course, my friends who live in 
the forest, they, too, (or so they tell me) seldom gaze upon 
a horizon. After considering this, I began, to feel a bit 
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better about a fact which had irked me since the day I first 
heard the expression "horizon" used in this way. That fact 
was that I could not easily visualize "horizon" and could not 
at first envision the relationship implied by the metaphor. 
Was I suffering from a poverty of imagination? Or was it 
simply that I had forgotten what a horizon looks like because 
I did not live in the right place? This is no small point, 
for it tells us that this phenomenon of soul cannot be con¬ 
jured up just anywhere. When we are preoccupied with what is 
close at hand, the buildings, the people, the highways, we 
cannot look up to see the horizon. Our view is obstructed. 
This is no less true for those in the forest who surround them¬ 
selves with nature. To see the horizon, one must be in a flat, 
open space -- that is, a clearing. Or by the sea. Or on top 
of a mountain. To see the horizon, then, we must situate our¬ 
selves within a grander scale. 
So what then is a horizon? Where the sky meets the 
earth or the sea. But what is that? It is nothing, it is a 
pure relation. Of course, it is not quite that empty, for it 
seems to be constantly taking things. We often say we "lost 
him at the horizon," meaning he disappeared. The horizon is 
also as far as we can see. But that does not mean there is 
no farther, no beyond. One other property. A horizon always 
moves with us. We can travel for 100 miles on the Kansas pxains 
and our horizon never leaves us. We cannot escape it, except 
perhaps by returning to the city. 
There is one instance, however, where we do seem to 
be moving in on our horizon, making some progress towards it. 
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That is when there are mountains on our horizon. What do 
mountains do but define the horizon, fix it fast to the earth 
so that it cannot escape us. And not just for us. For anyone, 
on any side of the mountain. Mountains are a landmark, a 
real, not illusory boundary. Hence, when we feel excitement 
upon approaching mountains, must we accept the standard expla¬ 
nation that it is because of their sheer size? Might it not 
just be because here we at last have grabbed hold of our hor¬ 
izon, and can soon, any minute now as we scurry to the top, 
peer over and discover what is on the other side? 
And yet, what do we find upon reaching the summit? 
Another horizon. Consciousness cannot escape its limitations. 
Still, mountains are a special place. For although 
we cannot see all the way into the other side, our vision now 
extends a much greater distance than before. And we see two 
things here that cannot be seen down below. We see an unbroken 
horizon that encircles us completely. It gives us an illusion 
of wholeness. Also, we see the mountain peaks themselves, 
emerging from the clouds below. Truly, the mountains are soul. 
They herald the horizon from afar, they remind us of it. And 
when we take the trouble to scale their peaks, they reveal 
new horizons to us. Here the gods,the archetypes dwell. From 
mountainous: heights, one can appreciate what Hillman calls 
depth. To be sure, they are dangerous: one can fall from such 
heights. Nevertheless, it is here that Holderlin, the poet 
of both Heidegger and Jung, mountain dwellers themselves, sought 
to returns 
Nah isl 
Urd schver zu fassen der Gott, 
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Wo aber Gefahr ist, wflchst 
Das Rettende auch. 
Im Finstern wchnen 
Die Adler, und furchtlos gehen 
Die Sbhne der Alpen liber den Abgrund weg 
Auf leichtgebaueten Brhcken. 
Drum, da gehauft sind rings 
Die Gipfei der Zeit, und die Liebsten 
Nah wohnen, ermattend auf 
Getrenntesten Bergen, 
So gib unschuldig Wasser, 
0 Fittiche gib uns, treuesten Sinns 
HinUberzugehen und wiederzukehren.^ 
So much for a metaphor, a single word. I have not inter¬ 
preted it; I have merely dwelled in it and experienced it. 
I could never hope to categorize, organize, analyze or 
systematize the soul and its contents. Nor would I want to. 
And that brings us to the final section of this first part. 
For wThat is the business of psychoanalysis if not the 
interpretation of dreams? 

THE ROLE OF INTER?RETATION 
We are treading on thin ice here. The reader, be he 
psychoanalyst or not, is perhaps starting to get a little tense. 
Where will this lead? And if he is anxious, it is because this 
is new territory for him. But it is not really accurate to 
say that it is we who are anxious. After all, our dreams and 
fantasies belong to us, too. Rather, it is someone within 
us. It is Apollo, our consciousness. It is he who would 
bring bright lights to bear upon the darkling field of images. 
It is Apollo who would find illusory comfort when, the visions 
having fled like the timid animals in a forest from discovery 
by his blinding light, he announces for ail to hear, '‘There 
was really nothing there at all, nothing but . . .,! We know 
better, however. Psychoanalysis has taught us this much in 
the last seventy-five years: Apollo is anxious for a reason. 
There is something there and he knows that it is there. But 
he also knows that he cannot know it, for by his very nature 
he cannot see it. And so he trembles: 
With what astonishment must the Apollonian Greek have 
beheld himj With an astonishment that was all the 
greater the more it was mingled with the shuddering 
suspicion that all this was actually not so very alien 
to him after all, in fact that it was only his Apollonian 
consciousness which, like a veil, hid this Dionysian 
world from his vision., 
JL 
If we are anxious, then, it is not without cause. But might 
we not choose a different response? To be sure, there are 
64 
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good reasons for heaving a sigh of relief upon hearing Apollo's 
pronouncement. If there is nothing there, if we have inter¬ 
preted everything and assigned it a reason, then we can go 
back to work. And that is useful. But if this anxiety keeps 
nagging at us, keeps insisting upon its presence, what then? 
Might we not try to get to know this other? Let us repeat, 
it, too, belongs to us. We have identified with Apollo and 
mistaken his anxiety for ours. Might we not identify with 
the other? 
We should not fool ourselves, though. There is a 
price to pay. We must sacrifice Apollo's intense light so 
that we may see more, if not better. In this dimness, we 
cannot expect to understand with rational precision. To be 
admitted to this realm, one must humbly leave his torch at 
the gate, as Aeneas did his golden bough. As Jung put it 
in 1915: 
Understanding [i.e. rational analysis]] is a fearfully 
binding power, at times a veritable murder of the soul 
as it flattens out important differences. The core of 
the individual is a mystery of life, which is snuffed 
out when it is "grasped." That is why symbols want to 
be mysterious; they are not so merely because what is 
at bottom of them cannot be clearly apprehended . . . 
There should truly be no understanding in this regard . . . 
True understanding seems to be one which does not under¬ 
stand, yet lives and works . . . 'We should be connivers 
at our own mysteries, but veil our eyes chastely before 
the mystery of the other, so far as, being unable to 
understand himself, he does not need 'understanding* 
of others.£ 
Again we must distinguish between phases of analysis. 
The solvent power of rational understanding has its indis¬ 
pensable uses in the reductive part of an analysis. Behaviors 
that are symptomatic, that is, subliminal, beneath our aware¬ 
ness, meaningless, habitual these must be exposed to a 
■ 
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clear light so that we can at last see them for what they 
really are. Understanding here would then serve as a much 
needed corrosive to strip away the tarnish we assumed to be 
. 3 
the natural color of things. 
But what Jung is describing above is something quite 
different. It is a sacrifice of clarity which soul demands 
of us if we are to change our attitude and turn around to 
meet that which calls us. No matter that it withdraws and 
eludes us. That is its privilege. We can find meaning 
enough in the images that it vouchsafes to us. 
This implies something quite extraordinary about 
those images. They can communicate meaning to us without 
a laborious hermeneutic, provided we adopt the proper atti¬ 
tude. Jung described this process eit work in the creative 
efforts of patient in art therapy: 
A dark impulse is the ultimate arbiter of the pattern 
[of the painting], an unconscious a priori precipitates 
itself into plastic form, and one has no inkling that 
another person's consciousness is being guided by these 
same principles at the very point where one feels utterly 
exposed to the boundless subjective vagaries of chance. 
Over the whole procedure there seems to reign a dim 
foreknowledge not only of pattern, but of its meaning. 
Image and meaning are identical; and as the first takes 
shape, so the latter becomes clear. Actually, the 
pattern needs no interpretations it portrays its own 
meaning.^ 
There is clearly something very special about this, however. 
We are speaking here of purely generated authentic symbols. 
By calling them authentic, we are making an explicit synthesis 
of Heidegger and Jung which we will fully elaborate in Part II, 
Suffice it for now to say that we intend by authentic symbol 
that aesthetic union of the collective unconscious with an 
actively participating consciousness which expresses the Self. 
' 
■ 
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It derives its authenticity from its origin, from that which 
calls: the Self. Authentic symbol formation is accomplished 
by the transcendent function. To live a life in the trans¬ 
cendent function, to thus be a dialogue between reality and 
the Self, that would mean living symbolically. As Heidegger 
puts it, "poetically man dwells." Being in this mode is as 
though 
We are a sign that is not read. 
We feel no pain, we almost have 
Lost our tongue in foreign lands.^ 
Like a sign, we point toward the meaning and need not speak 
aloud. 
Such moments are rare, however, and should not be 
misconstrued as life's sole value. Heidegger reminds us that 
the state of fallenness is an inescapable fact of the human 
condition, and claims its own validity. And it is this state 
of fallenness which is the defining characteristic of 
inauthenticitv, and if we may extrapolate, of inauthentic 
symbols as well: 
*Inauthenticity* does not mean anything like Being-no- 
longer-in-the-world, but amounts rather to a quite 
distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world -- the kind which 
is completely fascinated by the 'world* and by the 
Dasein-with of Others in the * they.• 
b 
Here, in this state of fallenness, ve refind the usefulness 
of interpretation. For it is precisely in that state which 
is so fascinated by the world, so totally given over to it, 
that the tool which was explicitly designed to explain that 
world -- rational interpretation can serve us best. 
Take dreams, for example. These usually lack, the 
transparency and authenticity of the: transcendent function. 
. • 
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Like all inferior forms of unconscious production, they are 
contaminated with personal contents, i.e. our inauthentic 
but nonetheless very real, "worldly" concerns. Moreover, 
they reflect a lower degree of participation by conscious¬ 
ness as compared with the transcendent function, which re¬ 
quires that a deliberate attitude be taken.' As a conse¬ 
quence, dreams often demonstrate a certain chaotic and capri¬ 
cious quality. The somnolence of dream consciousness -- or 
of any pharmacologically altered state of consciousness for 
that matter -- does not provide adequate guidance nor the 
necessary control to give the best expression to unconscious 
contents. Thus the ego must complete in waking life, deriva¬ 
tively, what it failed to do while asleep, directly: it must 
interpret the whole and finish the story that was begun the 
night before. Following the analogy we set forth on page 57, 
one might say that conscious, symbolic dream interpretation 
is the waking version of Freud's secondary revision. It is 
rational: it follows certain rules, is fairly orderly and 
thorough, and relies on principles of similarity, both to 
subjective associations and objective mythologies. And 
although synthetic in the sense of "filling in" the story, it 
is also aric-.lytic insofar as it intentionally seeks to inter¬ 
pret the meaning behind images as well. Of course, we all 
know from firsthand experience thav there are different kin;, s 
of dreams, "big dreams and little dreams" as Jung's African 
natives put it. And by and large big dreams fulfill our 
criteria for authentic symbols: the ego remembers them, and 
feels that it has been touched by them. Such dreams require 
. ■. • 
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much less interpretation, if any. But the everyday dream, 
inauthentic as it is, lacking that crystaline clarity which 
only a rare joining of the conscious and unconscious can 
accomplish, needs that further effort of consciousness making 
which only interpretation affords. Jung repeatedly urged 
that these everyday dream symbols must, "if they are to be 
effective, be 'understood* by the conscious mind; they must 
be assimilated and integrated. A dream that is not understood 
remains a mere occurence; understood, it becomes a living 
experience."0 There is no question as to the need for analytic 
interpretation here. 
It may be objected that it is all well and good to 
hypothesize the existence of interpretation-free symbols which 
we are calling here authentic, but where is the evidence? 
Foregoing the personal testimony of analysands themselves as 
perhaps biased, we nevertheless find this hypothesis creeping 
into much of the current literature on visual perception. 
Most of the corroborating opinions derive either directly or 
indirectly from the Gestalt school of psychology, whose impact 
on 20th century thought has yet to be fully exhausted. 
Rudolf Arnheim, for example, lays the groundwork for 
a radical critique of traditionally accepted "truths" about 
conscious thought. In his book Visi la1 Thinking (1969), he 
sets out to examine systematically the belief that thought is 
a form of consciousness limited to words and "pure" concepts. 
Beginning with a demonstration of the rudiments of organization 
implicit in every instance of visual perception (but seldom 
manifested explicitly as such without, specially designed 
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experiments), he soon moves to higher, more abstract levels. 
He shows hew actual thinking can take place visually, think¬ 
ing being defined by conceptualization, relation, sequencing, 
hierarchy formation, or whatever other rational criteria one 
might desire. He goes even further, however. Using an ab¬ 
stract painting by one of his students, he argues cogently for 
the intellectual processes at work in making such a creation. 
He •'interprets" the painting to the reader as a thoughtful 
commentary on the girl’s life at the time it was painted. 
But he insists that his interpretation is a secondary pheno¬ 
menon and that in itself "the constellation of the picture is 
also the solution of a thought problem, although there may be 
. . 9 
no words to tell about the finding." 
Arnheim realizes the implications of his thesis and 
does not shun to treat them. Ultimately, visual creations are 
expressions of a person’s inner being within the limitations 
of our phenomenal reality. To be effective, they must repre¬ 
sent an accommodation between the demands of the unconscious 
contents and the rigors of meaningful, intelligible imagery. 
Only the discipline of the latter can treat the unconscious 
thoughtfully-. When this happens, however, we have great art. 
Paul Klee has said, "I create pour re pas pleurer; that is 
the first and last reason." Arnheim takes this to mean that 
creation wcrks "only by clarifying for him what there was to 
weep about and how one could live with and infspite of, this 
10 
state of affairs." Art, then, takes on a profoundly psy¬ 
chological significance. To live symbolically or dwell 
poetically is an aesthetic mode of being. 
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We hear this same theme echoed by Thomas Kuhn in his 
influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Also 
taking his cue from Gestalt psychology, Kuhn demonstrates the 
fundamentally perceptual nature of scientific theory con¬ 
struction. He notes that scientists can resort to words and 
explanations in defense of their hypotheses only after a cer¬ 
tain ground, which he calls a paradigm, has been agreed upon. 
What that ground is, is never explicitly articulated and in¬ 
deed cannot be, for it is, as Michael Polanyi explains, "tacit 
11 
knowledge." But it is no less knowledge for its silence. 
Anyone who would seriously entertain that doubt would also 
have to disbelieve the manifest presence of a technology which 
is solidly rooted in such intangibles as paradigms. For it 
matters which paradigm is chosen, and as Kuhn amply shows, 
there have been innumerable bad paradigms in the history of 
science. These are not mere fantasies. Indeed, this initial 
image or Gestalt, this perceptual point of view, remains the 
irreplaceable first step, upon which all further elaborations 
of consciousness depend. 
Based on this concept of paradigm, Kuhn draws a dis¬ 
tinction between perception and interpretation. In the famous 
example of the rabbit-duck (see figure 1), we see, that is, 
we perceive, either the rabbit or the duck, never both simuJ- 
taneously. Now of course we can step back, and reflecting 
upon this curious state of affairs, return to the picture and 
carefully dissect it, picking out features which lead toward 
one or the other images. But this interpretive effort only 
comes aftei our initial perception. Not only that, but even 
■ 
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2 Rabbit or cluck? 
Figure 1 
when we have completely analyzed the picture, if we then 
return to gaze at it as a whole, we again confront either 
a rabbit or a duck. The interpretive process, being essen¬ 
tially different from perception, has no impact on the image's 
perceptual effect on us. Perception, the spontaneous and 
immediate recognition of meaning in a visual stimulus, can¬ 
not be reduced to merely an unconscious version of interpre- 
. 12 . . . 
tation. It has its own validity. 
As Kuhn has dared to apply this perceptual paradigm 
to the history of science, so may we, too, avail ourselves of 
its insights by putting it to use in psychiatry. We are 
suggesting here that the process of visual perception is a 
high order discriminator of meaning which modulates a contirnous 
arid tenuous interaction between unconscious processes and 
phenomenal reality. As such, it is primary, and prior to 
such further manipulations upon the world as the ego may chcose 
to exert. First we "recognize” reality by assigning it mean¬ 
ings, then we take it apart to see how it works. As concerr s 
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the symbolic process, what we have described in the section 
on metapsychology becomes nothing more than the inside of 
this perception. It faces the unconscious, but it is still 
perception. Only here it operates in the reverse direction. 
Instead of recognizing reality by projecting meaning onto 
forms, it recognizes the unconscious by providing forms for 
meaning. In both instances this transpires in the silence 
of the soul. 
We must now consider a final. counterargument from 
Lawrence Kubie. He notes the simple empirical fact that "art 
therapy," as clinically practiced in hospitals or as legitimate 
art, does not "work" very well. His explanation for this is 
complex, but we can isolate three basic points. First, he 
queries, "Why, if we cannot dream ou.r way to health, should 
we expect to write or paint or compose or invent or discover 
13 ... 
our way to health?" Coupled to this question is the obser¬ 
vation that "creative people in every field are often highly 
neurotic." Second, after disclaiming the utility of the 
"metaphor" of the word "sublimation," he points out that the 
"social value" of expressed behavior- has absolutely no influ¬ 
ence upon the unconscious "id" forces. Art, in ether words, 
despite the esteem in which it is hold by society, cannot 
reach down to its own unconscious sources. Hence it offers 
no solution. And as a concluding point, Kubie implies that 
the whole project for understanding artistic creativity, 
and indeed unconscious processes in general, is untenable as 
things stand at the present, because it rests upon mere 
metaphors like "sublimation, discharge, and abreaction." 
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He maintains that "concepts that are metaphorical analogies 
can never be used as explanatory principles." Kubie is sug¬ 
gesting that insofar as psychoanalysis is metaphorical and 
therefore like art therapy, it, too, will be doomed to failure. 
What began as an analysis of art therapy has ended with a 
re-evaluation of the whole psychotherapeutic enterprise. 
It should be apparent just how widely such a view 
differs from our position. In the first place, we question 
just what goals Kubie sets for the artist. Even without 
resorting to a critique of his dichotomizing the world into 
. 14 
the healthy and the sick (a nefarious practice in our view), 
we can still object to his expectations that art should some¬ 
how bring about resounding cures in order to justify itself 
psychologically. That Van Gogh or Nijinsky "did not get well" 
in no way impugns the meaningfulness of their creativity, 
nor does it inauthenticate its truly symbolic nature. We 
made no claim that the transcendent function leads us to per¬ 
fection; only that it best expresses our fate. And a man's 
fate may be tragic. 
Moreover, Kubie clearly takes a different view of the 
significance of artistic activity when he speaks of its "social 
value." We would agree that society's reaction to artistic 
creations las little impact on the artist's unconscious, but 
that is precisely because the "purpose" of art has nothing 
whatsoever to do with "sublimating" the unconscious to the 
appropriate "social values." The meaningfulness of art comes 
not from what society thinks of it, but what it means to the 
artist. It is only at this most personal level that we claim 
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an impact for the effects of artistic images and symbols upon 
unconscious processes. 
Finally, Kubie betrays his fundamental objection to 
art therapy by his discomfort with "metaphorical analogies." 
We will not tire the reader with a recapitulation of our 
thoughts on this topic. Suffice it to mention here the elegant 
distinctions that are currently being made within the philo¬ 
sophy of science with regard to this problem. Stefan Kbrner, 
for example, has urged that we must separate out matters of 
. . . . 15 prediction from those of explanation m our analyses. They 
represent two independent categories), and operate with different 
strategies. It would seem what Kubie is really asking for 
as he rankles over "mere metaphor" is a more "scientific" 
vocabulary. He wants precision, logic, quantitation, proof, 
reproducibility; in short, he wants what all science aspires 
to -- a mathematical model. And this is a worthy objective, 
to be sure. But such models, if Kbrner is right, serve only 
to guide our manipulations of reality. They help us to predict 
reality, which is the ultimate accomplishment of Freud's fore¬ 
most "institution of the ego," reality testing. A predictive, 
model, however, does not explain anything. For that, we do 
indeed need metaphors. And that is because, in this post- 
Kantian ere, we no longer aspire to some illusory "ultimate 
explanation." We have learned to accept the fact that we are 
dealing with something which will remain inexplicable. And 
with that in mind, we would sooner nave metaphors -- as deeply 
and as broadly extended as possible, with all the finesse of 
articulation that aesthetics provides us -- than nothing at all. 
I 
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If I have made any point in this chapter, it is this: 
Psychiatry deals not with the mind alone, nor the bodily in¬ 
stincts, although these are its principle objects of investi¬ 
gation today. We must again follow James Hillman, whose 
thinking in this area has proven so rich and thought-provoking. 
Psychiatry (and more properly speaking, psychology) is, as 
Jung observed in 1908, "the art of healing the soul."^ It 
thus finds itself between mind and body. But perhaps even 
Jung remained too much bound to Apollo the Physician in this 
pronouncement. For psychotherapy does not cure souls. You 
can sometimes cure the body, and sometimes educate the mind. 
The soul, however, you can only care for, as indeed the ori¬ 
ginal meaning of cure as cura suggests. And the word psycho- 
. . . 17 . 
therapy implies just that. To sit by and wait patiently, 
to watch its fragile images, however imperfect and however 
painful, in silence: that is our task. In it, we find our 
guidance, and encouragement, through symbols. 

INTERLUDE 

A WORD ON METHOD, 
AND A MEDITATION ON A WORD 
Before proceding on with the argument, let me take 
a brief pause and step back from the urgency of my concerns. 
The earnest tone of the first half of this essay -- not to 
be undone by the second -- tells the reader how seriously I 
take my thoughts. Thought acquires the force of conviction, 
and the prosaic but rhetorical expositi.cn molds the conviction 
into a claim And clearly, the claim is for truth. Cf course, 
to conceive a thesis and defend its truth with a coherent 
sequence of logical assertions, that, is the object of the 
exercise. 
Unfortunately, I myself am not so convinced about 
the generalized "truth" of my claim: I see no reason why it 
should carry conviction for anyone who has not shared my 
thoughts, which leaves me with my truth, important to me 
alone. Why then should I take up ary more of the reader’s time 
Thus I disclose a lack, and it is to this lack that 
the second half of this essay will respond. Now there are two 
ways of fin ling in this void which threatens to leave my 
argument so precariously ungrounded. One could set about 
to amass"data" in an attempt to prove by method of innumerable 
examples — appropriately interpreted to be sure! — the self- 
evident nature of my truth. But Jung and others have already 
collected volumes of clinical and rrythological instances whi eh 
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demonstrate this truth, and the power of their evidence and 
reasoning speaks for itself (assuming one reads it). The 
other way to handle such a void is to pass over the end- 
product of the argument, those crystalized and formulaic 
truths, and return to their source, to thinking. If one 
tries to insinuate oneself into the mind of another, and 
feels confident enough to let oneself be swept along by 
another*s thought, there opens the possibility of arriving 
at the necessary conviction of a thought's truth from within. 
This is what I propose to do. By "locating" Jung's 
thought on symbols within the context of 19th and 20th century 
metaphysical thinking, I do not presume to prove anything. 
Least of all do I want to intimate some proof-by-similarity 
(or by contagion, if you prefer), whereby the truth of one 
man's thought rests upon its resemblances to another's. What 
I have in mind is rather a kind of amplification. In asking 
the reader to think with me the thoughts of a few thoughtful 
men, I hope to entice him to think the thought of symbol as 
Jung did. I ask the reader to step into a discussion which 
may well be foreign to him. The intention is to urge him 
to reflect genuinely upon the thoughts of the first half of 
this essay, by exposing him to the dialogue from which those 
thoughts emerged. I confess that such a method of filling the 
void of tri th is an insidious shirking of my responsibility, 
because it leaves the ultimate task of thinking to the reader. 
I trust he enjoys working. 
As an initial instance of this method, then, let us 
conclude our interlude with a discussion of the etymology of 
. 
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the word "symbol.'* It pays at times to consider the history 
of words, especially ones which we use so frequently and yet 
diversely. This is an old practice in the psychoanalytic 
literature. Freud himself was intrigued by the "antithetical 
meaning of primal words,"1 and Jung frequently resorted to 
elucidating etymologies, contending that "it often happens 
that a word's history throws a surprising light on the nature 
2 
of the psychic fact underlying it." Such inclinations per¬ 
haps reflect the ever present need to seek out the roots of 
things, so intrinsic to the psychoanalyst's -- and philosopher's 
mind, a need which Freud dubbed "the predilection for the 
prehistoric." 
Ernest Jones was the first of many to research the 
3 
etymology of "symbol" in part of his 1916 essay on symbolism. 
Although seeking to connect the old meaning of the word with 
current Freudian concepts, he was forced to admit that he could 
not establish a valid correspondence. In fact, he specifically 
noted that the Greek sumballon did not carry the present 
Freudian interpretation of sign. In order to salvage his 
efforts, therefore, Jones had to go even farther back than 
ancient Greek, cind identify the root similarity between archaic 
and modern concepts in the Indogermanic stem bal, which derives 
from the even older Sanskrit gal, meaning "a flowing together 
of water." This imagery of streams converging on a river he 
interpreted as suggesting the multiplicity of significations 
which most dream symbols have. 
This explication is entirely tenable, especially since 
the verb sumballein was used precisely in that sense of rivers 
' 
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flowing together m ancient Greek as well. However, the 
depths of this remarkable word are hardly fathomed by this 
account alone. Sumballon is composed of two parts: sum (or 
sun), meaning together, common,simultaneous, with or according 
to; and ballon, meaning that which has been thrown (from the 
verb ballein, to throw.) Now this word, taken as a whole, has 
an extraordinary number of meanings. They can be divided into 
• s 
four classes, which are far from being unrelated thematically: 
1) Literally, sumballein means "to throw or dash 
together." Taken personally, it connotes "a meeting of the 
eyes," and generalizing from that we get "a coming together 
or meeting of men," and finally "a joining or uniting in afa¬ 
st racto ." The ultimate implications of this concept were not 
lost on the Greeks, who took it one step farther: to meet 
suggests speech, words, and so sumballein loqous means "to 
converse." 
2) Never ones to ignore the darker side of things, 
the Greeks knew that meeting means originally to meet the 
unknown, and that is always unpredictable. So in the spirit 
of Odysseus, wandering alone in a hostile world, sumballein 
could also mean "to come upon [someonej by chance," and fearing 
the worst, "to join in fighting," "to faring men together in 
hostilities." Thus we also have sunbole, meaning "a juncture" 
or "encounter," and "an engaigement" as in battle. 
3) In another context, sumballein could mean "to put 
together," and this was understood in the sense of "to corre¬ 
spond," "to tally." From this we get the word sumbo1on, mean¬ 
ing "tally," which as Leopold Stein explains in his fascinating 
- 
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article is 
two halves of corresponding pieces of bone, coin, or 
other cbjects which two strangers or any other two 
partners broke between them in order to have proof of 
the identity of the presenter of the other part.^ 
In a similar vein sumballein meant more generally "to compare 
one's own opinion with facts" and thereby "to conclude, make 
out, understand, infer, conjecture, or interpret." Hence 
the word sumbolos, meaning "augury" or "omen." 
4) Finally, sumballein could be used in a commercial 
sense, meaning "to agree upon [a price]," "to fix £a price]," 
or "to settle [a transaction]." In this way we arrive at the 
peculiar meaning of sumbolon as "a covenant" between two states 
for the protection of commerce. Note how here again we have 
characterized an ambivalent relationship. Commerce, the 
flowering of a meeting between strangers who have something 
to share, always threatens to degenerate into brigandage and 
theft, so little do men trust one another. The sumbolon, as 
tally or covenant, is precisely what permits discourse at a 
meeting of two strangers, at the confrontation of the known 
with the unknown. It alone points the way toward some as 
yet unclarified, but binding, relationship between known and 
unknown. It is this relationship which is at the core of this 
cluster of meanings. And lest it be judged that we have extra¬ 
polated too far here, let me complete my list with Jung's 
observation that sumbolon also came to mean the creed in the 
Greek Orthcdox Church, and as such represented the ultimate 
covenant between man and the unknown. 
If we muse upon this notion of the tally, we find a 
striking conceit for our theory of symbol. Imagine, if you will, 
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a dream about dreaming. There is the ego, a solitary figure 
walking through the dark forest, prey to the weather, the 
beasts, other men, and his own fears and frailties. Suddenly 
there appears a stranger, a man like him. He is the dream 
image, anthropomorphic as always. Why should our traveller 
trust him? What reason does the ego have for taking dream 
images as anything but a threat? Indeed, if our traveller 
knows himself as Odysseus did, he immediately suspects the 
other of the same unbridled egoism and selfishness which 
characterizes himself. What could possibly bring these two 
together? And then the stranger produces his sumbolon, he 
reveals, makes visible 
something perceptible that is the result of an activity 
which throws together such things as have something in 
common, and in such a way that one thing somehow accords 
with another not presented to the senses, and is synchronous 
with it.g 
That is, our traveller recognizes the visible sumbolon as the 
counterpart to his, and that implies a hidden relationship 
between the two: 
The symbol, the broken-off part* is not a separate element 
but carries with it, and points to, wherever it goes, the 
whole in which it participated as well as the situation 
in which it was broken in half. 
And so we again come by way of fanciful dream interpretation 
to a notion of the symbol as that which is thrown across the 
abyss separating consciousness and the unconscious, requirirg 
the participation of both sides to make a whole. 
That this interpretation of the two ’’sides" is correct 
may be judged by the further consideration of the related 
word diabalio, from which we get the words diabolic and devil. 
Here "the other side" is seen quite distinctly as violent and 
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unfriendly, and the invasion by the unconscious, as in "pos¬ 
session," is onesided. One thinks of Dostoevsky's The Possessed, 
which translates more literally as The Devils. it is when 
consciousness lacks the symbol and therewith the possibility 
of communication, just then do we succumb to devils, who 
throw synptoms across at us and disrupt our lives. The other 
side then remains dark and forbidding, and the potential for 
a creative relationship with it, as in a "trade agreement," 
requires the proper attitude of trust, as intimated by the 
clue of the symbol. 
Once again I will ask, "What right do I have in claim¬ 
ing etymology as proof?" And again I must confess, "None." 
But if my intention is to seduce the reader into thinking in 
a certain way, then all I claim to be doing is introducing 
him to the thinking of a people, the ancient Greeks. Such 
thinking is of course unself-conscious. Who can say how a 
language develops or who "intended" it? But if we credit this 
pre-reflective thinking which manifests itself in a word's 
history, we are doing no more than recognizing the power of 
intuition, something which ought not to be so foreign to 
psychiatrists. The mere fact that such pre-cntological think¬ 
ing, as Heidegger calls it, is not yet formally expressed, 
hardly invalidates it. I will grant, though, that it appeals 
to us on another level, and one from which we cannot too 
boldly draw conclusions. It is a dizzy business, listening 
for a voice in a word's history, and as Heidegger himself is 
quick to point out; 
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in citing such evidence we must avoid uninhibited word- 
mysticism. Nevertheless, the ultimate business of philo¬ 
sophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words 
in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common 
understanding from leveling them off to that unintelligi¬ 
bility which functions in turn 'us a source of pseudo 
problems. 
So it is probably going too far to suppose, as Stein does, that 
words "carry with them archaic meanings that survive in the 
. 11 
unconscious." Such a claim really does require proof. We, 
on the other hand, merely want to suggest that for the Greeks, 
word families were thought about, and such thinking, as prac- 
. . . . 12 
ticed by such as Heraclitus, often led to insight. And yet 
the similarity of their thought with Jung's is for us, truly, 
food for thought. 

PART II 
TH£ PHILOSOPHICAL HERITAGE 

PREDECESSORS 
The history of Germanic philosophy in the 19th century 
dramatizes a fundamental conflict within the European cultural 
psyche which only finally erupted into articulate conscious¬ 
ness with the work of Freud, Jung, and Heidegger. The conflict 
varied from thinker to thinker, but one side was always the 
same: reason was doing battle. Depending on the point of 
view, one can cite various examples to demonstrate what reason 
was struggling with. Freudians can point to the one-sided 
elevation of reason in Kant and especially Hegel as evidence 
of the repression of instinctual life. Jungians see in 
Zarathustra*s visions and dreams the confrontation of reason 
with the archetypal unconscious. And Heideggerians refer us 
to Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer to emphasize the impact that 
the "discovery" of Death had upon the reasonable man of that 
era. In all cases, reason encountered experiences that it did 
not understand, that were unfathomable in principle, and that 
threatened it ominously. We propose: to take as our guiding 
theme this conflict of reason with the unknowable. Following 
it from Kant through Schopenhauer ti Nietzsche, all of whom 
Jung had read deeply,1 we will try to unpack some of the key 
issues and assumptions behind the arguments and thereby arrive 
at the debate as it presented itself to Jung at the end of 
the century. 
- 87 
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Kant 
The Enlightenment produced the man who defined it, 
Immanuel Kant (1742-1804), and for him reason stood pre¬ 
eminently as the foundation of man's humanity. His best 
known work. The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) represented 
the most thoroughgoing attempt in the history of philosophy 
to determine the scope and power afforded to reason. Specif¬ 
ically, he set out to investigate human "understanding" by 
establishing the limits of "our faculty of knowledge." How 
much was human cognition bound to phenomenal reality, Becoming, 
and to what extent was it possible for reason to transcend 
experience and thereby attain Being? "That all knowledge 
. . . 2 begins with experience there can be no doubt," conceded Kant. 
"But it by no means follows that all [knowledge] arises out 
3 
of experience." Kant wondered whether there might be "a 
knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of 
all sensuous impressions." Such would be knowledge a priori, 
and "knowledge a priori is absolutely independent of all 
experience, not just of this or that kind of experience," 
The answer to this question marked a turning point in Western 
philosophy, and much of 19th century philosophy proved to be 
a commentary on it. Kant concluded that: 
our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the limits 
of possible experience; and yet this is precisely the most 
essential object of this science [metaphysics]. The esti¬ 
mate of our rational cognition a priori at which we arrive 
is that it has only to do with the phenomena, and that 
things themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie 
beyond its sphere.^ 
Here we have in its essence the epistemological abyss to which 
we alluded earlier in the paper. Such a pronouncement lays 
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the groundwork for the possibility of a conception of man 
in which human existence is deeply alienated from its Being- 
in- the-world . As Heidegger points aut cogently, far from 
being a creative turn away from Descartes, Kant*s ontology 
not only rested on the same basic assumptions about subject 
and object, but cleared the way for Descartes* vision, held 
up as it had been by the trappings of Christian metaphysics, 
to find its ultimate logical expression in Western technolo- 
• , • 5 gical science. 
And yet it is common knowledge that Kant himself did 
not see such dehumanizing consequences stemming from his work. 
Far from it. As Peter Gay observes, Kant was a humanist in 
the tradition of Rousseau.6 This naivete vis-^-vis his onto¬ 
logy was by no means a failure of insight, however. Rather, 
it derived from his wider conception of the human mind. For 
The Critique of Pure Reason could in no way be construed as 
his final word on the human condition, even if today it would 
appear as such, given our current relativization of morality 
(contra The Critique of Practical Reason) and our belief, with 
Hegel, that art is now a thing of the past (contra The Critique 
of Judgment). In these later works, Kant elaborated other 
structures which he thought would bridge over the chasm which 
he had revealed in his first Critique. And perhaps here we 
may find a clue pointing toward our theme. 
If The Critique of Pure Reason dealt with the limits 
of human "understanding,” we mast be quick to point out that 
this "understanding" was conceived in a very particular manner 
that is not to be equated with "reaeon." This is not to der.y 
the utter rationality of "understanding." But reason remained 
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for Kant a precisely defined word embracing two general 
faculties. Theoretical reason, the topic of the first Cri¬ 
tique, dealt with the rational faculty of cognition. Practical 
reason, on the other hand, denoted that structure, also rational, 
which expressed the faculty of desire. 
Thus the second Critique, The Critique of Practical 
Reason, was "concerned with the grounds of determination of 
the will" -- in short, with freedom, The first Critique had 
grappled with the problem of demonstrating by means of pure 
theoretical reason the a priori cognizability of God, freedom, 
. . . 7 . . 
and immortality, only to fail. The second Critique began with 
the explicit acknowledgement of this ungroundedness, and thus 
merely attempted to define the scope? of human freedom, postu¬ 
lating God and immortality along the' way. This theoretical 
ungroundedness did not undermine Kant's certainty about his 
arguments, however. By means of the: Categorical Imperative, 
the details of which need not concern us here, he thought he 
was still able to formulate a system of ethical absolutes 
which would escape any rational refutation. Nevertheless, 
from a contemporary standpoint we find little in this second 
Critique that speaks to our present-day problem of ethical 
rootlessness, which seems to scoff at any futile attempts to 
ground ethics in reason alone. 
There remains a third struc ture, hox^ever, which appears 
more promising. Kant acknowledged a curious middle ground 
between the faculties of cognition and desire, which he called 
"the feeling of pleasure and displeasure." The principle of 
judgment, standing between understanding and reason, expressed 
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this middle realm. It is here in The Critique of Judgment 
that we find a hint of how it might be possible to jump across 
the epistemological abyss of the first Critique, albeit in a 
very special context. In the discussion of art and genius 
(sec. 43-54), Kant introduces us to the irrational realm of 
the imagination, which constitutes a counterbalance to the 
understanding. In this realm of imagination we find, in an 
aesthetic sense, nothing less than that "spirit" (Geist) which 
is the very "animating principle in the mind." And this 
spirit is equated to "the faculty of presenting aesthetic 
ideas." With the aesthetic idea, Kant gives content to the 
imaginal and thereby offers a concrete structure to complement 
the concepts of understanding. Of a radically different 
nature by definition, this structure eludes understanding: 
By an aesthetic idea I mean, that representation of the 
imagination which induces much thought, yet without the 
possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. concept, 
being adequate to it, and which language consequently, can 
never get quite on level terms with or render completely 
intelligible.g 
Artistic genius consists in the power to unify "in a certain 
relation" the two realms of aesthetic ideas (imagination) and 
concepts (understanding): "Genius properly consists in the 
happy relation, . . . enabling one to find out ideas for a 
9 . ... 
given concept."' This unifying is not merely a barren corre¬ 
spondence, but a synthetic event which gives birth to the ex¬ 
pression of these aesthetic ideas, an "expression by means 
of which the subjective mental condition induced by the 
ideas as the concomitant of a concept may be communicated 
to others. The latter talent is properly that which is 
called spirit. 
Trie to his colors, Kant seemed determined to leave 
.. 
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at the very least a token priority to the understanding, insofar 
as the aesthetic idea comes as a response to the concept. But 
we see in his discussion of poetry, which "holds the first 
rank among all arts," just how much he was willing to valorize 
this irrational and un-understandable realm of imagination. 
Poetry, Kant tells us, 
expands the mind by giving freedom to the imagination 
and by offering, from among the boundless multiplicity 
of possible forms accordant with a given concept, to 
whose bounds it is restricted, that one which couples 
with the presentation of the concept a wealth of thought 
to which no verbal expression is completely adequate, 
and by thus rising aesthetically to ideas. 
Poetry reveals a transcendent world to us by 
regarding and estimating nature as phenomenon in the 
light of aspects which nature of itself does not afford 
us in experience, either for sense or understanding, and 
of employing it accordingly in behalf of, and as a sort 
of schema for, the supersensible. 
Poetry and the aesthetic idea from which it springs is, in 
short, disciplined intuition. 
Nov; we make no claim that Kant was any less the ration¬ 
alist for this view. Above all, we do not mean to suggest 
that this interpretation of the aesthetic should be expanded 
to include all aspects of Kant's epistemology. Nevertheless, 
it is no accident that Kant located this aesthetic function 
in the middle ground of judgment, which he conceived as "a 
means of connecting the two parts of philosophy in a whole."1'1' 
But it would, be up to later philosophers, especially Nietzsche, 
to give a "strong reading" to Kant's doctrine on poetry, and 
thereby emphasize the primacy of the aesthetic in a more 
general interpretation of epistemology. 
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Schopenhauer 
To Arthur Schopenhauer (1783-1860) fell the task of 
bringing Kant's philosophy into line with the prevailing 
spirit of post-Romantic Europe. To be sure, the powerful 
reduction of nature u la Kant to space, time and causality 
had become the predominant leitmotiv of 19th century techno¬ 
logy, so successfully blossoming in the industrial revolution. 
But at the same time the heirs of Napoleonic Europe were also 
beginning to come to terms with the weightiness of their being 
as animals: as animals with corruptible bodies (witness the 
rise of modern medicine from the 19th century foundations of 
histology and pathology); as animals with unruly, instinctual 
passions (witness the failure of rea.son in the demises of 
1830 and 1848, with the subsequent political cynicism); and 
as animals belonging to a species (witness Darwin's Origin of 
Species in 1860 and Mendel's Experiments in Plant Hybridiza¬ 
tion in 1866). Schopenhauer was the most eloquent philoso¬ 
phical spokesman for this new consciousness. In describing 
12 
man as the animal metaphysicum, ' Schopenhauer laid equal 
stress on animal, and we must rememlier this if we are to see 
what was new in his thinking, and how it was so in keeping 
with the spirit of his era. 
For Schopenhauer, Kant's metaphysics, with its over¬ 
valuation of reason, was no longer commensurate to the exper¬ 
iences and problems of the 19th century. Reason supplied men 
with forms and patterns, but Schopenhauer took strong exception 
to Kant's insistence in the Critique of Practical Reason that 
it supplied content, in the shape o:: human values, as well. 
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On the contrary, at the level of specific content, that is, 
of knowledge per se, Schopenhauer regarded reason as "feminine 
in nature; it can give only after it has received: 
To know means generally to have within the power of the 
mind, teady to reproduce at will, such judgements as 
have their sufficient ground of knowledge in something 
outside them, in other words, such judgements as are true.^ ~ 
True judgments were not to be located in the realm of reason, 
however. Where Kant offered us a rational alternative to the 
abyss of the first Critigue, Schopenhauer now dismissed such 
solace as reason misunderstanding itself. Instead, he offered 
a new solution. Schopenhauer *s creative contribution to West¬ 
ern philosophy lay in his re-introduction of the body as the 
source of human truth. The transcendental, and alienating Kant¬ 
ian abyss was not actually bridged, but made narrower, by giving 
renewed value to the experience of man's Being-in-the-world. 
True, the abyss remained. The thing in itself con¬ 
tinued to escape man's metaphysical questing, which Schopen¬ 
hauer practically accepted by definition: 
By metaphysics I understand all so-called knowledge that 
goes beyond the possibility of experience, and so beyond 
nature or the given phenomenal appearance of things, in 
order to give information about that . . . which is hidden 
behind nature, and renders nature possible.^ 
But Schopenhauer attributed the apparent elusiveness of such 
knowledge to the effects of sterile reasoning, which, he regarded 
as emptying out the content of human life by means of reduction 
and abstraction. To this reasoning he objected: 
Does it not seem positively wrong-headed that in order to 
solve the riddle of experience, in other words, of the 
world which alone lies before us, that we should close 
our eyes to it, and ignore its contents? , » , It is true 
that the task of metaphysics is not the observation of 
particular experiences; but yet it is the correct explana¬ 
tion of experience as a whole, its foundation, therefore, 
must certainly be of an empirical nature.^ 
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Essence, the thing in itself, "remains unknowable, at least 
. 16 
to the intellect." But this opacity of the world in the 
face of human reason could in no way be construed as a cause 
for nihilism, which alternative seems so much more plausible 
to us toda}. For Schopenhauer, it required the barest of 
efforts at regarding the world in its everydayness -- and we 
have the origins of phenomenology here — to realize that 
meanings and values were immediately available to man as a 
Being-in-the-worId: 
Therefore this thing-in-itself must express its inner 
nature and character in the world of experience; conse¬ 
quently it must be possible to interpret these from it, 
and indeed from the material, not the mere form, of ex¬ 
perience. Accordingly, philosophy is nothing more but 
the correct and universal understanding of experience 
itself, the interpretation of meaning and content. 1^ 
Note the words "correct understanding" and "interpre¬ 
tation." We must now give some content to his hermeneutical 
apparatus. Schopenhauer did so by turning to feelings as that 
bodily faculty in which the truth of our perceptions was grounded. 
He was acutely aware that from the point of view of reason, 
18 
"feeling has only a negative content." But Schopenhauer 
found reason to be rather perspectival and one-sided, "strange 
as it may sound," and guilty of a pride which fostered crude 
ignorance, 
since it classifies under the one concept of feeling 
every modification of consciousness which does not belong 
directly to its own method of representation, in other 
words, which is not abstract concept. 
The fact of the matter for Schopenhauer was that feeling con¬ 
stituted the ground "of all knowledge, of all truth, of which 
we are at first conscious only intuitively, but which we have 
2 0 
net yet formulated into abstract concepts. He rejected as 
■ 
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pedantry any theoretical maxims, rationally constructed and 
removed frcm the reality of daily living, which presumed to 
guide human conduct with absolute values (Kant’s Categories 
being a case in point.) Ethical behavior, maintained Schopen¬ 
hauer, as opposed to rigid and sterile dogma, 
happens in accordance with feelings, that is to say, net 
precisely according to concepts, but to ethical worth and 
quality. . . . Conduct in the end pursues its own course 
independently of [dogmas], usually in accordance not with 
abstract, but with unspoken maxims, the expression of which 
is precisely the whole man himself.^, 
This insistence on feelings and the whole man, of course, 
returns us foursquare to the body, the instincts, and the Will. 
With this move, Piantian metaphysics was regrounded, to extend 
the metaphor, in "earth." 
To take a concrete example of what Schopenhauer has 
in mind with this dichotomizing of reason and experience, we 
shall examine his categories of concept and Idea. This reminds 
us at once of the distinction Kant drew with his aesthetic 
idea, but it becomes clear that Schopenhauer broadened its base. 
"The concept," he tell us, 
is abstract, discursive, wholly undetermined within its 
sphere, determined only by its limits, attainable and 
intelligible only to him who has. the faculty of reason, 
communicable by words without further assistance, entirely 
exhausted by its definition.^ 
The concept is "dead," "barren," incapable of producing new 
knowledge, a mere, though not on theit account unhelpful, 
"receptacle." 
On the other hand the Idea, 
definable perhaps as the adequate representative of the 
concept, is absolutely perceptive, and although repre¬ 
senting an infinite number of irdividual things, is yet 
thoroughly definite.^ 
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By insisting on the perceptive nature of Ideas, Schopenhauer 
grounds them in experience and hence in the body, will and 
earth. It is only because Ideas derive from this fertile 
matrix that Schopenhauer can claim that an Idea "is like a 
living organism, developing itself and endowed with generative 
force, which brings forth that which was not previously put 
. . 24 
into it." Ideas can be the source of such creativity only 
because any phenomenal reality which we might constitute is 
only one possible combination of relations. But Ideas are the 
set of all possible relations. As the "permanent, unchange¬ 
able forms," Ideas make up "the sum of all relations of an 
object. 
The Idea is the root point of all these relations, and thus 
the complete and perfect phenomenon, the adequate objecti¬ 
vity of the will at this stage of its phenomenal appear- 
ance.25 
It should be understood, however, that for Schopenhauer Ideas 
were out of space and time, and in no wise could be envisioned 
as a tangible image of things. In this sense, they are very 
far from the Flatonic Ideas to which Schopenhauer ostensibly 
attributed them. Ideas are rather something purer, closer 
to the reality of the thing in itself. Examples include force, 
gravity and causality. Such entities are totally divorced from 
the particular because they include the possibility of all 
particulars. As Wittgenstein later observed, "the lav; of 
26 
causality .is not a lav;, but the form of a law," ' which is 
then filled out by the particulars of Newtonian physics. Never¬ 
theless, Ideas do not go so far in the opposite direction as 
to "reveal the being-in-itself of things, but only their ob¬ 
jective character, and thus a1ways uhe phenomenon."^' The 
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notion of Idea thus stands between the imagery of Platonic 
Forms and the ineffability of the thing in itself* One might 
even say that Schopenhauer’s Ideas are analogous to archetypes.20 
Let us recall how careful we were to specify archetypes 
as "patterns of organization which translate pure intention 
into plastic form." (supra, p. 44) The archetype, like the 
Schopenhauerian Idea, organizes and gives form to, just as the 
law of causality helps to structure our world. What is organ¬ 
ized, namely the pure intention or instinct, is just as inef¬ 
fable for Jung as the thing in itself was for Schopenhauer. 
And neither the archetype nor the Idea are in themselves con¬ 
crete images. Both must be filled out with a specific con¬ 
tent. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, the archetype of the child 
is not a psychology, but the form of a psychology, to be filled 
out by the particulars of Freudian theory. And neither New¬ 
tonian physics nor Freudian theory exhaust these fundamental 
forms which they embrace. 
By calling Ideas universalia ante rem (as opposed to 
concepts, which were universalia post rem), and thereby ground¬ 
ing truth in the possibility of bodily experience, Schopenhauer 
accomplished a revolution in European philosophical thinking 
about the locus of truth. In what Karsten Harries calls 
Schopenhauer’s "inversion" of the Platonic cosmos, the cate¬ 
gories of experience and truth were kept, but were now turned 
29 ... 
upside down. For the first time in the modern era, meta¬ 
physics entertained the possibility that truth might not reside 
in the higher, ethereal realm of the disembodied spirit, but 
below, in the dank morass of an instinctual body. 
' 
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What is especially remarkable about this move is that 
once again the philosopher found himself turning to art to 
best illustrate his claims. This time, however, art was not 
seen as a unique realm, to which the special status of idea 
was confined, as with Kant. Schopenhauer simply regarded art 
as most demonstrative of a basic relationship which governed 
all human knowledge. For the artist was merely that man who 
immersed himself most fully in experience. 
This immersion, this opening up to the world, revealed 
a certain truth. But such artistic truth remained suspect 
from reason's point of view, because it was somehow "virtual" 
and "implicit," or worst of all, unspoken; 
Just because the Idea is and remains perceptive, the 
artist is not conscious in abstracto of the intention 
and aim of his work. [Nor for that matter is the viewer!] 
Not a concept but an Idea is present in his mind; hence 
he cannot give an account of his actions. He works, as 
people say, from mere feelings and unconsciously, indeed 
instinctively. 
So we see that the artist, as unwitting interpreter of Ideas, 
stands in a privileged relation to his audience, the common- 
sense world of reason. He translates, as it were, artistic 
truth by giving form to Ideas. By rendering material expression 
to Ideas, he serves to remind us of our sources. It is the 
artist's genius to transcend his own personal point of view 
and allow himself to be guided by a deeper truth. And insofar 
as that truth escapes us in the ver_> mystery of our own body 
and instincts, of our own being, thus does it suggest a key 
step on the way to Jung's symbolic/archetypal truth. 
. 
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Nietzsche 
In 1872, a twenty-eight year old professor of philosophy 
at the University of Basel, who had never even written his 
dissertation, published a little book on Greek drama. His 
name was Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), his book was entitled 
The Birth of Tragedy, and despite its youthful exuberance and 
brevity, it launched him forthwith into the intellectual scene 
as European culture's most formidable critic. Unlike Kant 
. 8 2 
or Schopenhauer before him, to whom he was admittedly indebted," 
Nietzsche forewent a rigorous and elaborate metaphysical super¬ 
structure in which to couch his ideas. Instead, faithful to 
the theme of art which dominated his book, he relied from the 
start upon metaphor, specifically mythic imagery, to carry 
the weight of his arguments and speak with Authority. And 
what aspect of contemporary Western civilization was he criti¬ 
cizing? Fourteen years later he explained that the problem 
with which the book dealt was "the problem of science itself.’'''" 
How odd, in a book on Greek drama! 
To see how Nietzsche arrived at such a position, let 
us consider for a moment the book's characters and plot. We 
are introduced staightaway to Apollo and Dionysus, clearly 
intended to represent metaphysical categories. Apollo, god 
the 
of reason and/principium individuationis, is moreover god of 
(artistic) form. It is he that governs the world of imagery, 
of illusion (Schein), of dreams. He is the soothsaying god, 
and sees the truth by means of his "sunlike" eyes. His ele¬ 
ment is light; his affect, joy. 
Opposed to Apollo is Dionysus, god of chaos, drink, 
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and the dissolution of the individual. He is the god of 
matter, matter which resists ever yielding its ultimate se¬ 
crets to form and transparency. He is a dumb god whose truths 
are unspoken. He conceals; his time is the night. His art 
form is music, escaping all images. His affect is either 
terror or "blissful ecstasy." 
Nietzsche *s thesis, if we may make so bold as to sim¬ 
plify and psychologize it, is that something very special 
happened in the history of Western culture when Attic tra¬ 
gedy flourished. The Greek dramatists succeeded for the first 
time in uniting the instinctual, meaningful, unconscious side 
of human life with the necessary symbolic and artistic articu¬ 
lation of ego consciousness. Heretofore these two realms had 
been unequally related, the unconscious having literally to 
force itself upon the forms of ego consciousness and thus 
. . . . 34 
robbing consciousness of its potential autonomy. * The marvel 
of the Greek experience was the birth of the Apollonian ego, 
which no longer satisfied itself with the mere molding and 
manipulating of external reality by waking consciousness. 
Exercising a new found dream consciousness, the Apollonian 
ego now dared to approach the Dionysian realm as well, and 
actively participate in it. Such an Apollonian ego, coupled 
intimately with its own bodily Dionysian roots, constitutes 
the third character in Nietzsche’s story: the new artist. 
In such a man. 
Through Apollonian dream-inspiration, his own state, 
i.e. his own oneness with the inmost ground of the 
world [Dionysusj, is revealed to him in a symbolical 
dream miage.oc 
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What makes this new artist so unique is that he 
creates symbols consciously. Greek drama surpasses the 
earlier Dionysian rituals from which it derives just here on 
the touchstone of consciousness. For Greek drama is not a 
mindless ecstasy nor a mythology lacking an interpretation. 
Rather, it represents the triumph of consciousness in taking 
that first step toward joining with the unconscious collator- 
atively. Apollo, the dream-interpreter, makes possible the 
illusion (Schein), the symbolic representation, of a content 
which is otherwise incompatible with, and therefore unavail¬ 
able to, consciousness. That Dionysus 
appears at all, with such epic precision and clarity is 
the work of the dream interpreter, Apollo, who through 
this symbolic appearance interprets to the chorus its 
Dionysian state,^ 
Nevertheless, the Dionysian, the unspeakable, ultimately 
escapes our direct perception. To "perceive" the Dionysian 
directly would be to lose oneself and one's consciousness in 
it. It is in this sense that Nietzsche can maintain that "the 
symbolic image of the myth saves us from the immediate perception 
. . 37 
of the highest world-idea," For example, we as spectators 
are saved from the very horror that we witness as Fentheus 
and his mother lose themselves in the immediacy of the uncon¬ 
scious and the power of Dionysus. The symbol is that "glorious 
Apollonian illusion j_which! makes it appear as if. . ." 
Symbolic truth is "as if" we were returning to the source of 
all creativity without in fact regressing to the dissolution 
of the ego in the primary process. 
In order to appreciate fully the task which the symbol 
accomplishes, we must say something more about this Dionysian 
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realm besides characterizing it as dangerous, obscure, but 
creative. To begin with, it surely includes Freud's instincts 
(Triebe), if we hold the Dionysian to be the reality in which 
the Apollonian illusion is grounded, In Beyond Good and Evil, 
Nietzsche admonishes us about the true nature of reality: 
Let us assume that nothing is 'given* as real except cur 
world of desires and passions, that we cannot step down 
or step up to any kind of 'reality' except the reality of 
our drives (Triebe) --- for thinking is nothing but the 
interrelation and interaction of our drives. 
But this cannot be all there is to the Dionysian, for such 
an account fails to explain the tremendum, the speechless awe, 
the reverent silence, which is demanded before Dionysus. It 
also leaves unclarified that strange requirement that Dionysus 
only be experienced as illusion. What is so awesome and mys¬ 
terious about mere drives, after all? Have we not succeeded 
today in physiologizing them to the limbic system, mere circuits 
to be controlled at will? Surely they can still compel us, 
but do we not now truly see through them? 
We take as our clue here another passage in Beyond 
Good, and Evil, in which Nietzsche describes the body as "nothing 
40 but a social structure of many souls." This is not a mere 
metaphorical repetition of what he said about drives. Some¬ 
thing new has been added here. The metaphor reminds us of Jung 
and suggests a radical personificat Lon of the instinctual 
complexes into daimones. As is clear from the dream-visions 
of Zarathustra, as well as from his personal biography, Nietzsche 
constellated for himself a symbolic world of gods in which his 
ego, as ideal tragic artist, succeeded in confronting cooper¬ 
atively anc creatively the power of his drives (Triebe). Much 
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of Zarathustra in particular is reminiscent of active fantasy, 
in J ung * s specific sense. And as James Hillman stresses,41 
what makes such a confrontation of consciousness with the un¬ 
conscious possible is just this move; to the personified, to 
regarding complexes first as "souls," to use Nietzsche's term, 
then as souls in a community alien to the ego, next as souls 
in a community which includes the ego, and finally as gods, 
which in that peculiarly Greek manner, have discourse with men. 
Yet there remains an enigma. Despite the images, we 
know that something remains hidden. Indeed, as we learn from 
the theme of Metamorphoses, the gods- are forever changing form 
and disguising themselves. This seems essential to them, as 
Nietzsche intimates when he observes that "everything deep loves 
masks; the deepest things have a veritable hatred of image and 
42 . 
likeness." It is almost as though the bright light of 
Apollonian consciousness, which makes images possible, at the 
same time blots out some crucial truth. Nietzsche expresses 
this metaphorically: 
There are countless dark bodies which must be inferred 
to lie near the sun; we shall never be able to see them. 
Among outselves, that is a parable: a moral psychologist 
reads the whole language of the stars as only an allegor¬ 
ical and symbolic language. Many things can be kept dark 
with it.^2 
In Zarathustra Nietzsche again tantalizes us with another, 
similar trope. Addressing the sky, he once more speaks of 
how the stars are lost with the onset of the dawn's light: 
The [god's own] beauty veils the god: thus do you [the 
sky] hide your stars,A. 
What does it mean that god's beauty should veil him? Why 
should personifying a power and thus masking it be necessary? 
■ 
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Is it not precisely because we, as human beings 
capable of love, are fascinated by the other? And in such 
fascination fall prey to the other*s power? The genius of 
the god is not so much the fact that he hides behind the mask, 
as that we are compelled to look into it, seeking ourselves 
, 4 n 
and thus losing ourselves like Narcissus before his reflection. 
Only with masks can the gods, far from fleeing us, first come 
catch the attention and interest of consciousness. This is 
the import of Nietzsche’s description of Dionysus as never 
"looking a look in which there is not some hind-sight, 
some complexity of allure, whose craftsmanship includes 
knowing how to be an illusion -- not an illusion of what 
he is, but of what constitutes one more compulsion upon 
his followers to follow him ever more intimately and 
thoroughly. 
And yet once again we ask, given this need to disguise, 
what could it be that would exert such a claim on man? SureLy 
the concept of instinct, which exerts its will heedless of 
consciousness, is not enough here. Only man’s very being 
itself could, and needs to, compel nan* s consciousness so 
totally. To quote Heidegger, only man (Dasein) is that being 
for whom being is an issue. Only man is compelled to funda¬ 
mental ontology, which is the essence of metaphysics. And 
Nietzsche, too, gives us this answer. Even in The Birth of 
Tragedy he singles out the Dionysian dream image as belonging 
to "that mysterious ground of our being of which we are the 
47 , 
phenomenon." This remarkable passage substantiates our 
interpretation: the god*s claim on man rests most profoundly 
on the mystery of being. 
But further, Nietzsche makes an astonishing reversal 
\ 
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of the familiar mirror metaphor, where consciousness is 
usually depicted as seeking itself :.n the god»s mask, as 
though the mask were a mirror. The deeper truth is that 
consciousness is but a reflection of Being; "we are the phe¬ 
nomenon." Psychologically, this is what is meant when Jung 
says that the ego (consciousness) is really that complex 
which allows the Self to contemplate itself. The ego, Jung 
writes. 
Is a relatively constant personification of [the totality 
of3 the unconscious itself. . . the Schopenhauerian 
mirror in which the unconscious becomes aware of its 
own face.^g 
This echoes a similar interpretation by Nietzsche. Immediately 
after the passage in Beyond Good and Evil in which he describes 
the ego's desire for the illusion as a way of discovering its 
reflection, Nietzsche abruptly reverses the polarity of the 
dynamic. With the introduction of the "genius of the heart," 
he reconceives the ego, no longer as the active source of the 
image, but as the passive mirror in which the essence of being 
can be reflected. The image itself, the natural, illusion, now 
becomes the source, to be reflected in the mirror of con¬ 
sciousness, This is "the genius of the heart, 
which, renders dumb all that is loud and complaisant, 
teaching it how to listen, which smoothes rough souls 
and creates a taste in them for a new desire: to lie 
still like a mirror so that the deep sky might be 
reflected in them.^g 
Here we find at last an appropriate explanation for 
the long misunderstood nature of Dionysus. Truly he is mys¬ 
terious and unfathomable, unspeakable, hiding behind images. 
But this is not to be accounted for by facile analogies to the 
' 
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Gordian knot of the mind-body problem, or to the over-valuation by 
infantile love. The mystery of Being, "of which we are the 
phenomenon," cannot be dismissed so easily by adults. The fact 
is that we exist as Dasein. We are aware that we exist and 
are forever caught up in the co-mirroring of Dasein in Being 
and Being in Dasein. This is the unspeakable, "das Unaus- 
sprechbare," before which even a god blushes with modesty: 
the shame and modesty before the other, "die Sham zu zweien. 
* * * 
As a contrapuntal harmony to underscore our theme, 
let us return to the plot of The Birth of Tragedy where we 
left it. We had introduced Apollo, Dionysus, and the Tragic 
Artist, and had followed their triumphant synthesis through 
Nietzsche*s later works. But why did we need to use Nietzsche 
as the examplar? He lived 2300 years after the origin of 
Greek tragedy. If his thesis is correct, should there not have 
been a great deal of tragedy written in the ensuing ages? 
To explain this enormous hiatus, we must now take note of 
the last character's arrival on our stage: Socrates. For it 
is Socrates whom Nietzsche accuses cf having cut short this 
portentous flowering of Greek art. The greatest spirit of the 
West, the creator of the scientific attitude, is calumniated 
mercilessly by Nietzsche as the murderer of the tragic artisifs 
special soul. Though the scion of /.polio, Socrates did not 
understand him. He mistook Apollo*s light for the truth, 
and was therefore blinded by it. Socrates succumbed to the 
hubris of consciousness, and proclaimed that "to be good, 
■ 
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everything must be conscious." Far from admiring the 
synthesis of the ego and the unconscious achieved by the 
Tragic Artist*s soul, he derided him for practicing his 
craft "only by instinct." So long as poets relied on in¬ 
stinct, there remained a mystery and a threat to consciousness. 
But Socrates would have none of this. His hubris rested on 
his "faith in the explicability of nature and in nature as a 
panacea." Such pride was nonetheless a flight into fantasy, 
no matter how much it stressed consciousness, because it 
covered up the tenuousness which is the lot of ego conscious¬ 
ness. It covered up the anxiety of Dasein before Death with 
"the delusion of being able . . . tc heal the eternal wound 
52 
of existence (Dasein). 
How Nietzsche raged against Socrates! How he raged 
against modern scientism, Socrates* heir! And how he would 
have raged against any current psychology which dares presume 
to fill in the mystery of human existence with predictive 
formulae, chemicals, or even literalistic and concretized 
"symbols." All such attempts can only lead to a fundamental 
inversion of the natural order of things, an inversion which 
Nietzsche saw had indeed already come about in his time. 
Note his succinct description of a 20th century neurosis: 
While in all productive men it is instinct that is the 
creative-affirmative force, and consciousness acts 
critically and dissuasively, in Socrates it is instinct 
that becomes the critic, and consciousness that becomes 
the creator -- truly a monstrosity per defectum.^ 
And what indeed does happen as "instinct becomes the critic" 
if not the development of the symptom as Freud first identified 
it? The symptom, that remorseless if not humorous commentator 
■ 
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on our daily lives, gives lie to the illusion of omniscience 
and omnipotence of our ego consciousness. 
Nietzsche felt that in the long run Socrates, no 
more than any other man, could not escape death, and so would 
be forced to acknowledge the inauthenticity of his claim for 
the world*s transparency. In his groping attempts to learn 
to play a musical instrument, Nietzsche saw in the doomed 
Socrates a last minute turning towaid the unconscious. He 
began to express a dim insight into the richness which he had 
dismissed with such hauteur. "Perhaps," says Socrates, 
what is not intelligible to me is not necessarily unin¬ 
telligent: Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom from 
which the logician is exiled? Perhaps art is even a 
necessary correlative of, and supplement for, science?^ 
And yet in the end, what guarantee does Socrates have? 
Can it not be objected that all that, is proved by this fable 
is the crushing power of death that turns even the greatest 
of men into children? What basis dc we really have for be¬ 
lieving that the unconscious, the myth, the illusion are finally 
anything more than a thin gruel and sop to solace men in 
their despair? Can we not say with the disenchanted Faust, 
Welch Schauspiel! Aber ach! eir Schauspiel nur! ,_ . Ar 
\ JL , 1 . h J‘ 
This charge of mere aestheticism constitutes perhaps 
the most trenchant attack on Nietzsche's Tragic Artist, and 
on Jung's doctrine of symbolism as well. Nietzsche was acutely 
sensitive to the problem of aestheticism from the very begin¬ 
ning. In the first pages of The Biith of Tragedy he observed: 
But even when this dream reality is most intense, we 
still have, glimmering through it, the sensation that 
it is mere appearance (nur Schei n). ,-c 
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We shall refrain from dealing with this problem until after 
we take up the work of Heidegger. But we can only conclude 
this section by agreeing that thus far, in Kant, Schopenhauer, 
and Nietzsche, the aesthetic realm has served to ground all 
the objections and alternatives to the rationality of con¬ 
sciousness. Heidegger's poeticizing will only add fuel to the 
fire. It remains to be seen how we will ground "mere illusion" 
in what Karsten Harries calls the authentic "natural illusion." 

A CONTEMPORARY; ERNST CASSIRER 
The early 20th century may some day come to be known 
as "The Great Return to Myth." The disappointment and dis¬ 
satisfaction of modern man with the opulently hollow life 
passed on to him as the last century's heritage were irre¬ 
trievably compounded by the sheer horror of the two World Wars. 
Finding no comfort in the few remaining voices calling for yet 
more of the same, thinkers sought out their forgotten roots 
in the distant past. Freud returned to the myth of the child; 
Jung, to the myth of ancient gods; and Heidegger, to the most 
originary of all myths, the myth of beginnings: "Per Anfang ist 
noch."1 Common to all was a fascination with myth, and per¬ 
haps an unwitting tendency to indulge in myth-making as well. 
There was nothing capricious., fanciful, or self- 
indulgent in their return, however, if by that one intends to 
impugn these men with some infantile flight from reality. 
Rather, their return represented the- completion of efforts 
begun in the last century to rediscover (and it might be strassed, 
scientifically) the secrets of history in Greek antiquity, 
folklore, and classical philology. But although culminating 
this project, yet at the same time their work marked a pro¬ 
found transformation of the original program as outlined in 
the Enlightenment. For these new thinkers no longer suffered 
"the myopia of proximity": they did not seek explicit solutions 
111 
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from the past. The change so characteristic of the 20th 
century was a step back to a new, broader self-awareness, a 
recognition that mythologized history was not to be taken 
literally. Instead, the new consciousness perceived the core 
truth of myth not in the work itself, but in the very fact 
that rnan took that work so seriously; not in the perceived 
object, but in the motivated perceiver. 
We find an appropriate example of this transfcrmation 
in the Neo-Kantian philosophy of Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945). 
In his famous opus, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, he de¬ 
voted an entire volume to the question of mythology. A pro¬ 
digious scholar of the past century’s historical, philological, 
and anthropological investigations, he set out to reinterpret 
its findings in the self-conscious spirit of the new age. And 
although it may be unfair to saddle him with the assuredly 
unwanted epithet of "psychologist," I nevertheless hope to show 
how, in his attempt to understand myth "from the inside" as 
symbol, Cassirer essentially recapitulated the psychological 
move of Jung. A contemporary of Jung's, Cassirer stands out 
as the clearest philosophical parallel to Jung, operating with 
a more or less identical ontology. In his writing we find 
insights analogous to Jung's, only slightly altered by way o:: 
vocabulary and source material. It is this unspoken kinship 
of ideas which best illustrates the idea of Zeitgeist which 
we have been pursuing. 
* * * 
Cassirer began by stating the challenge posed by myth: 
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Myth became a problem for philosophy insofar as it 
expresses an original direction of the human spirit, 
an independent configuration of nan's consciousness^ 
To conceive of myth as an "independent configuration" imme¬ 
diately calls our attention to something unique in Cassirer's 
point of view. He takes exception with all interpretations 
that would reduce myth to primitive science (Max Mueller), 
social euhemerism (Graves), or the reflection of a particular 
collectivity (Durkheim). On the other hand, he does not 
relegate myth to the status of fiction, devoid of all reality: 
The philosophical understanding of myth begins with the 
insight that it does not move in a purely invented or 
made-up world, but has its own mode of necessity and 
therefore in accordance with the idealist concept of 
the object, its own mode of reality.^ 
Such a point of view leads to two alternative approache 
to the material. Either one can disengage from this "mode of 
reality" and try to place it in a wider context, or one can 
enter into it and experience it for itself. The first alter- 
. . . 4 
native leads, among other things, to structuralism. The 
second leads first to a mystical participation in the myth, 
and then subsequently, with greater self-awareness, to psycho¬ 
logy. It is this second move which will interest us here. 
Cassirer used the German Romantic philosopher Friedrich 
Schelling (1775-1854) to exemplify the preliminary stage of 
direct engagement in the myth. Schelling defined myth in a 
most thought-provoking way when he said that "mythology is 
recognized in its truth."*" He approached the myth by way of 
tautegorical interpretation, looking 
upon mythical figures as autonomous configurations of the 
human spirit, which one must understand from within by 
knowing the way in which they take on meaning and form.^ 
■ 
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The truth of a myth did not depend upon a rational translation 
of a meaning, bringing forth a dark secret into the light of 
day. On the contrary, the truth of myth was experienced imme¬ 
diately, in its own terms: 
The [mythological] process consists not merely of repre¬ 
sented potencies, but of those very potencies which 
create consciousness . . . and are actual powers. 
As Cassirer explains. 
The phenomenon which is here to be considered is not the 
mythical content as such, but the significance it possesses 
for human consciousness and the power it exerts on con¬ 
sciousness. The problem is not the material content of 
mythology, but the intensity with which it is experienced, 
with which it is believed -~ as only something endowed 
with objective reality can have . . . It is a real force 
that seizes upon consciousness in myth, i.e. a force thac 
is not within its control.^ 
We see here at once just how far such a vision differs from 
the structuralist alternative. First, there is the fundamental 
question of attitude as we have developed it earlier in this 
essay. Just as on the one hand L<§vi~Strauss seeks relentlessly 
to divest himself of the last shreds of tenacious meaning that 
might still cling to his perspective, so Schelling on the other 
hand plunges into the morass of personalizations, intuitions 
and insights which bind him inextricably to the immediacy of 
the myth. Second, there arises the issue of "the ego alien." 
Where L^vi-Strauss demonstrates the inexorable subordination 
of human and natural reality to the logical power of the human 
mind (translated here as ego), Schelling freely submits himself 
to the higher irrationality which compels man without his 
understanding it. Lastly, we confront the problem of affect. 
The world of L£vi-Strauss manages to reduce reality to the 
cold abstraction of dialectical thought, while Schelling con- 
. 
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cedes that to be real and to be emotionally effective amount 
q 
to the same thing, L^vi—Strauss fails to account for why 
myths should matter so much,, and this is precisely what 
Schelling's "proto-Dionysian" explanation is concerned with. 
As suggested above, the difficulty inherent in Schel¬ 
ling's understanding of mythical phenomena derives from his 
all too ready willingness to collapse myth and reality into 
a literal unity. His argument for the value of myth rests on 
the contention that "myth is a form of life," and life for 
Schelling "is neither subjective nor objective, but stands on 
the exact borderline between the two? it is a realm of indif¬ 
ference between subjective and objective."10 Life is an 
objectification, a necessary development of, the absolute: 
The mythic process is a theogonic process: one in which 
God himself becomes, by creating himself step by step 
as the true God,.^ 
With this move, Schelling threatens to abandon his status as 
critic for the more engaging role of mystic. 
This is of course not to denigrate mysticism per se, 
which is a perfectly valid form of thought. However, one 
cannot help but feel that Schelling strands his readers in 
a compromised position. Although promising in his role as 
philosopher to clarify, he in fact fails to take consciousness 
far enough, and instead sinks back into unconsciousness, or 
more precisely, the unself-consciousness which is the partici¬ 
pation mystique of the "savage mind," Genuine mythical con¬ 
sciousness leaves no room for reflection, for understanding, 
because the ego has dispersed itself in the world such that, 
. . . . . . ] 2 
as Cassirer puts it, "it is bound by its mere factxcity." 
. 
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The mythic world is so exceptionlessly concrete "because in 
it the two factors, thing and signification, are undifferen- 
. 13 
tiated." Schelling recognized the essence of the border¬ 
line concept, but neglected to lay emphasis on the indispens¬ 
able contribution of an actively collaborating self-consciousness. 
It was a fault of Romantics generally, and one for which the 
Apollonian side of Nietzsche justly took them to task.1^ 
Cassirer's own refinement of Schelling's groundbreaking 
work focused on this thorny issue of consciousness. Cassirer, 
too, regarded the history of mythology as the gradual unfold¬ 
ing and self-expression of human spirit. But he saw as its 
teles, not the mystical submersion of man into the oneness of 
the world, but the progressive differentiation and heightening 
of human consciousness, as befits a Neo-Kantian: 
Thus, although myth, language, and art interpenetrate one 
another in their concrete historical manifestations, the 
relation between them reveals a definite systematic gra¬ 
dation, an ideal progression toward a point where the 
spirit noh only is and lives in its own creations, its 
self-created symbols, but also knows them for what they are. _ 
A crucial move in Cassirer's interpretation was his 
insight that the very motivation for this differentiation 
toward consciousness lay with the mythic image itself. It was 
the power of the symbol which callec ego consciousness to 
itself and its own true task, that of self-ref3ection: 
The mythical image seems not solely to designate already 
existing differences, but also to fixate them for con¬ 
sciousness, to make them visible as such: it does not 
merely reproduce existing distinctions, but in the strict 
sense evokes distinctions., 
So Cassire:;, too, came out in favor of the priority of the 
unconscious, even while granting full credit to the higher 
goal of consciousness. Moreover, Cassirer, like Jung, inder- 
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tified the locus of this transformation out of the uncon¬ 
sciousness of the mythic world in religion; 
Religion takes the decisive step that is essentially 
alien to myth: in its use of sersuous images and signs 
it recognizes them as such —— a means of expression which, 
though they reveal a determinate meaning, must necessarily 
remain inadequate to it, which point to this meaning but 
never wholly exhaust it»17 
The function of symbols is consciousness making, 
understood with the proviso that, tc quote Heidegger, all 
revealing at the same time conceals. Cassirer clearly arti¬ 
culates this paradoxical function when he quotes from a con¬ 
temporary of HOlderlin's, Friedrich H. Jacobi (1601): 
Always there is something between us and the true essence: 
feeling, image, and word. Everywhere we see only some¬ 
thing that is hidden; but that hidden thing we see and 
sense. For what is seen and surmised, we set the "word, 
the living word, as a sign. There lies the dignity of 
the word. It does not itself reveal, but it shows reve¬ 
lation, consolidates it, and helps to disseminate it..Q 
lo 
The profound insight of this passage must not be lost to the 
reader. We have here an extremely condensed but complete 
expression of a whole metapsychology. As with Freud, Jacobi 
identifies affects and words as principal representatives of 
19 
the unknown. As with Jung, he also stresses the priority 
of the image, since we see first, ard only afterwards set into 
words. A paraphrase might run as follows: 
Consciousness is indifferent to the world except insofar 
as it is affected by it, as when instinct or external 
20 ... 
reality intrude upon it. Sucn intrusion "first of ala. 
and most of the time" takes the form of visual imagery, 
either real or fantasy. Only as the last and highest 
achievement of consciousness does the word come to fix 
such meaning-laden images in a referential context which 
makes it generally available to others. 
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Cassirer prepares the way in his own thinking for such 
a formulation when he identifies the specifically human qual¬ 
ity Oi consciousness as its capacity to be affected and moved 
by what is new. In his discussion of consciousness he explains 
the phenomena of mana and taboo, those two pre-eminently emo¬ 
tive structures of primitive life, as "a primary interjection 
of the mythical consciousness," a "cry of mythical emotion" 
originating from the discovery of something new, extraordinary, 
unusual or uncommon. The making conscious of what was previ¬ 
ously unknown and unconscious is first of all a felt experi¬ 
ence. To be sure, in lower biological systems, based on the 
reflex arc model, such experience is usually negative. The 
new is what interferes with equilibrium and is therefore un¬ 
pleasant. And thus far we are in keeping with Freud. But for 
Cassirer, what distinguishes the uniquely human quality of 
such an encounter is the possibility for a positive relation 
to the new, as opposed to simply repressing or otherwise 
avoiding it: 
When mere bestial terror becomes an astonishment moving 
in a two-fold direction, composed of opposite emotions 
fear and hope, awe and admiration -- when sensory 
agitation thus seeks for the first time an issue and an 
expression, man stands on the threshold of a new spirit¬ 
uality. It is this characteristic spirituality which is 
in a sense reflected in the ide£ of the sacred.22 
Cassirer then goes on to elaborate how next imagery and then 
verbalization follow in turn upon t.iis initial, affective, 
coming into consciousness. We can now begin to appreciate 
the deeper rationale for Cassirer*s above-mentioned emphasis 
on. religion. There seems to be something "wonder"-ful that 
devolves upon this coming into consciousness, something that 
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cannot be taken for granted, and it is in the context of 
religious symbols that the first explicit self-consciousness 
of this event finds expression. 
Cassirer takes great pains to give concrete examples 
of this symbolizing trend in religion. He notes that many, 
if not all, great religions began with a pointed and self- 
conscious rejection of the "natural," i.e. mythical, religions 
from which they sprang. Thus we find that the familiar insis¬ 
tence on destroying images in early Jewish, Persian-Iranian, 
Hindu and Buddhist doctrine, can be interpreted as an attempt 
to de-literalize mythological consciousness. (And as we have 
noted in Fart I, the Freudian emphasis on the word, at the 
expense of the dream-, obsessional-, or fantasy-image per se, 
also serves this same purpose of lysing frozen and misunder¬ 
stood representations, thereby making that which they stand 
for psychologically more accessible.) Cassirer notes that 
Christianity, especially in the form of medieval Catholicism, 
attempted an even more daring experiment in consciousness rais¬ 
ing, for instead of banishing its pagan roots, it celebrated 
them in the most glorious of artistic, architectural, and even 
litugical forms. In so doing, it risked possible misinterpre¬ 
tation by illiterate peasants, whose* mythological consciousness 
would continue to take Christian symbols literally. Thus it 
happened fcr example that a powerful anima symbol in the form 
of the Virgin degenerated into an unconscious pagan cult rooted 
in the Demeter myth of antiquity. Still, the risk was well 
worth it, because for those few who could transcend mythological 
consciousness, the rich and pregnant imagery of the Church 
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served as the nidus around which to spin genuine symbols, 
Dante*s vision culminated this episode of Christian symbolic 
consciousness-making, and is the most striking example of what 
Cassirer means by religious self-consciousness. 
Finally, again echoing Jung, Cassirer speculates that 
the function of myth and therefore of symbol might be inti¬ 
mately connected to the very essence of human being. It is in 
the nature of man to be fundamentally hidden from himself. 
Cassirer envisions human existence (Dasein) as a profoundly 
meaningful event in the history of Being, but one which is 
forever threatening to cut itself off from itself. Thus can 
he suggest that "the I," and here we might instead read 
Jung's "Self," 
creates for itself a kind of opposite in its own products 
which seem to it wholly objective. And it can contempla be 
itself only in this kind of projection. . « . Man can 
apprehend and know his own being only insofar as he can 
make it visible in the image of his gods. ... He draws 
from his spiritual creations - - language, myth, and art 
the objective standards by which to measure himself as aa 
independent cosmos with its peculiar structural flaws,^3 
With this statement, Cassirer transcends the literalism of 
Schelling and moves into the domain of psychology, or philc- 
24 
sophjcal anthropology, if you prefer (as Heidegger dees.) 
And so to conclude, we recognize a familiar theme in 
Cassirer's arguments. He, too, refuses to dismiss the fasci¬ 
nation with myth in the 20th century as mere atavism or cowardice. 
Cassirer valorizes mythology and religion as fundamental steps 
on the road to consciousness, and with Jung, never severs their 
vital link with the unconscious. And thinking these thoughts, 
he becomes another member in our growing family of thinkers. 

HEIDEGGER AND THE NEW ONTOLOGY 
In arriving at the figure of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) 
we come to the synthesis of this essay. The long discourse 
on the unknowable, the perplexing reservations about inter- 
pretaion, the historical account of antecedent philosophers — 
all this should now be reconsidered in the light of our dis¬ 
cussion of Heidegger's work. It will become apparent that in 
many respects Heidegger's thinking shares enough in common 
with Jung's that the two men must be classed in the same intel¬ 
lectual milieu. I hope to reveal the remarkable confluence 
of their Weltanschauungen, as well as of the metaphors upon 
which they rely, in spite of their disparate backgrounds and 
methodologies. 
Interestingly, Heidegger has experienced a fate similar 
to Jung (and to a lesser extent, Freud) in the collective judg¬ 
ment of our time, enjoying initial acclaim, followed by a mea¬ 
sure of disenchantment. Making his debut in 1927 with the 
publication of Being and Time, Heidegger at once rose to pro¬ 
minence as a critic of modern European culture, describing with 
detached reserve the profound misconception of human nature 
and of man's experience in the worlc which had made possible 
the technological nightmare of Worlc War I. Writing in post¬ 
war Germany, Heidegger could not fail to have appreciated the 
deep-seated alienation of a people whose only apparent recourse 
121 
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in the face of disaster was to rebuild once again upon the 
very principles which had set the stage for tragedy in the 
first place. Like Jung, he announced a return to the "true" 
self, and proposed a solution to the dilemma of a dehumanized 
society by recalling men to what it is to be authentically in the 
world. He received immediate recognition from Continental 
philosophers, notably the young Sartre, who in Being and nothing 
ness, a take-off on Being and Time, went on to found the school 
of existential philosophy. Similarly did Ludwig Binswanger 
reconceive a portion of Heidegger's work in his Being-in-the- 
World and thereby begin the school of existential psychoanalysis 
But wherever post-empiricist., analytical philosophy 
has flourished, especially in the United States, Heidegger has 
been regarded in most academic circles as anything from an 
anachronism, a quaint holdover from 19th century transcendental 
philosophy, to a raving mystic, whose presumption to speak 
about what Wittgenstein definitively outlawed as non-discussabie 
relegates him to the status of an illogical, word-mongering, 
fuzzy thinker. (One also hears Jung cast in this same mold 
all too often.) There has been a tendency to purge current 
American philosophy of this dangerous Heideggerian element, 
which threatens to corrupt innocent students. Analytic philo¬ 
sophy — truly a philosophy of inauthenticity in the descrip¬ 
tive sense -- continues to assure us that not only can we no 
longer do metaphysics in the modern era, but that we do not 
need to and thus should not want to. It asserts that all 
relevant problems can be solved by a careful inspection of hjw 
we use everyday words, and if anyone: is left dissatisfied, he 
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will surely, as the malcontent in Nietzsche's "Last Man," 
take himself voluntarily to the madhouse. For naturally, he, 
too, will see how unreasonable his dissatisfaction is . , . 
Likewise is Jung's psychology of the depths dispensed 
with by contemporary psychiatry. Even Freud's depth psycho¬ 
logy has suffered from a certain "refinement." After an initial 
flurry of excitement created by the early Freud's discovery of 
the unconscious, psychiatry slowly but relentlessly moved away 
from its roots in the unconscious, to find refuge in a safer, 
cleaner, more everyday psychology of the ego.1 The unique and 
personal, in the form of dreams and fantasy imagery, ceased 
to interest a new school whose efforts were directed at bol¬ 
stering the patient's defenses and restoring him to the strength 
of the everyday collectivity. And yet today, even that every¬ 
dayness, which at least gave pretense to granting a certain 
basic humanity to the patient, is quickly being replaced by 
a philosophy of the present-at-hand; people are now systems, 
exhibiting modifiable behavior, to be manipulated by rewards, 
environment, drugs and surgery. Dreams have been debased to 
a mere electroencephalographic datum which clinicians are 
warned not to disturb with REM-blocking drugs. But as to their 
meaning? Today, the very structure which alone can re-move 
man from his fascination with the world of television and 
machine, which can throw him back upon his authentic possibility- 
for-Being-in-the-world -- namely, anxiety — has begun to crumble 
before the onslaught of a drug which has come to be the most 
prescribed compound in the world. .Again we hear the echoes 
of the Last Mans 
; it 
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A little poison now and then: that makes 
for pleasant dreams. And a lot of poison at the end, 
for a pleasant death.2 
Who needs Jung and all his irrelevancies? "Show me the data'." 
is the new battle cry, and of course data by definition, as 
Heidegger has shown, requires that we continue to think of 
3 people as present-at-hand. 
One could argue that Jung and Heidegger are most 
valuable in their critique of 20th century culture, and render 
the much needed service of tempering the pretensions of sci- 
entific excess. But that will not do, and implies a superficial 
reading of both thinkers. For it is not just that some iso¬ 
lated instances of depersonalization and inhumanity occur, 
as it were, by accident. Again to quote Nietzsche: 
The time is over, when accidents might still 
happen to me; and what is it that could still happen 
to me now, that would not already by my own?^ 
We must take responsibility for these accidents and admit 
that they derive logically and unavoidably from the most fun¬ 
damental of our presuppositions about man and his life. And 
such an admission can only lead — i.n the honest man -- to a 
re-evaluation of those presuppositions. Such a re-evaluation 
is reflected in Heidegger’s return to "origins" and in Freud’s 
and Jung's return to the forgotten, repressed, "archaic" uncon¬ 
scious. As we shall try to show, what is more remarkable than 
the similarity of Heidegger and Jung in their critique, are 
the points in common which their solutions share. 
* * * 
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Heidegger's doctrine or truth remains one of the more 
controversial ideas in contemporary philosophical debate. Like 
Jung’s positing of an absolutely unknowable unconscious, it 
confronts rationalists with a brazen challenge to the omnipo¬ 
tence of their method, and considerably shrinks their horizon. 
To begin with, Heidegger maintained that human consciousness 
(Dasein), insofar as "it is in such a way as to be its •there',"D 
and hence aware of itself as Being-in-the-world, was best de¬ 
scribed. by the metaphorical imagery of light. Although this 
has its roots in medieval ontology and the lumen naturale, 
Heidegger made the crucial move of collapsing the traditionally 
separated light of consciousness and seat of consciousness into 
one phenomenon: 
To say that [Dasein] is 'illuminated* [erleuchtet] means 
that as Being-in-the-world it is cleared [qelichtet] in 
itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way 
that it is itself the clearing. Only for such an entity 
. . . does that which is present-at-hand become accessible 
in the light or hidden in the dark. . . . Dasein is its 
disclosedness. 
o 
It follows from this that the very possibility of truth itself 
is grounded upon Dasein, which "as constituted by disclosedness, 
is essentially in the truth.Truth is therefore primarily 
tied to Dasein*s uncovering and not to some absolute state of 
affairs that exists independently of man's knowledge. Newton's 
laws, according to Heidegger, were before Newton, but "through 
Newton the la\/s became true." 
It is interesting to note here just how close Jung 
comes in paraphrasing this Heideggerian conception of truth. 
Jung, too, speaks of human existence (Dasein) as the kindling 
9 
"cf a light in the darkness of mere being." Moreover, he ties 
the phenomenon of the world to the unique nature of Dasein's 
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Being-in-the-world: 
The self embodies both the aspect of intrinsic being 
and the aspect of its being known, without which no", 
wotld exists. . , if a man succeeded in extinguishing 
this light [of consciousness], the world would sink 
into nothingness. ^ 
Jung, like Heidegger, therefore envisioned a truth for man. 
Heidegger offers as "evidence" for this conception of 
truth an etymological exploration of the early Greek use of 
the word alethia, which defines the Being™true of logos as 
"taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be 
seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness)."11 What is 
important about this definition for our purposes is the stress 
it lays on the phenomenological, the very visual, roots of our 
everyday experience of the world. For it underscores the fact 
that the whole process of judgment which passes for the cor¬ 
respondence theory of truth nowadays -- the logical assertion 
of an agreeing subject and predicate -- must first and foremost 
be for consciousness in order for the question of correct or 
incorrect agreement to be an issue at all. If, for example, 
we do not see the sexual conflicts of an hysteric, Freud*s 
"primary" truth, we can in no wise judge the "secondary" truth 
of his assertions about such conflicts. Likewise, and. in a 
more comprehensive sense, it echoes the Gestaltist arguments 
of Kuhn in maintaining that the most fundamental characteristic 
of scientific truth is not the whole chain of logical assertions 
which ties a system together, but the paradigm, which, modeled 
IF 
explicitly after visual phenomena, * reveals the object of study 
in a new way. 
This uncovering of truth is not simply a matter of 
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bringing light to dsrkhsss} however0 It involves a thorough— 
going transformation of the object before our very eyes, an 
uncovering of something we always thought we understood. To 
ponder the surprise of someone who after years of seeing a 
rabbit in our rabbit-duck example, now suddenly sees a duck, 
will amplify our meaning here — providing, that is, that one 
• 13 is open to the wonder of the event." 
It may be objected here that the foregoing is obvious 
(if not too oovious?), but that all that really matters for 
the correspondence theory of truth is the logical agreement 
of terms in the assertion, once we are "underway." Heidegger 
blocks this mode of retreat, however, by posing the question, 
"What is agreement?": 
Every agreement, and therefore 'truth' as well, is a 
relation. But not every relation is an agreement. A 
sign points at what is indicated. Such indicating is 
a relation, but not an agreement of the sign with what 
is indicated, ^ 
One cannot escape the problematics of ontology. Agreement 
(between artificial structures of consciousness and nature, 
as in scientific laws, for example) presupposes the more fun¬ 
damental relation of Dasein and World, And that relation is 
precisely Being-in [-the-vorlcl. 
Nov this relation of Being-in is rather peculiar, for 
have we not already claimed that Being-in as conceived by 
Heidegger involves the collapse of the subject and object of 
consciousness into one another? If Dasein is uncovering, how 
can we speak of relation? 
To account for this we must now recall that Heidegger 
makes covering-up equiprimordlal (g.eichursprUnglich) with 
• ' ■ 
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uncovering. Because "to Dasein*s state of Being belongs 
falling . . . its state of Being is such that it is in untruth."15 
Hence logos becomes "that way of being in which Dasein can 
either uncover or cover up. This double possibility is what 
is distinctive in the Being-true of the logos."16 
There are two ways of interpreting this statement. 
First of all it implies the unavoid^^ble degeneration of authen¬ 
ticity into inauthenticity as characterized by the structure 
of falling. The magic of the moment: when even so trivial a 
truth as the "appearance" of the duck is revealed to us can 
never be grasped and kept. Immediately the new perception 
becomes one among many, associates with other experiences and 
is located in a referential net which binds it to the everyday. 
Soon it becomes the way to see the figure, and as such now 
serves in turn to cover-up whatever other possibilities lie 
potentially within that collection of lines. 
Secondly, and harkening back to Nietzsche, one comes 
to regard truth as a perspective, as a sign pointing toward 
what is indicated. As the innumerable (and contradictory!) 
truths of historical Dasein prove only too well, the being¬ 
uncovering of Dasein at any particular time and place in his¬ 
tory has never amounted to more than a partial uncovering. 
Truth is always relative to the perspective of a particular 
Dasein. Newton's physics is no less true for Heidegger than 
Aristotle's or Einstein's, Each one accounts for some aspect 
of reality at the expense of an equally valid experience of 
the world. 
Uncovering as an event primarily presupposes "the hidden" 
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as most primordial and therefore never totally uncoverable. 
This is not to minimize the truth of a particular uncovering 
in any way. But it does insist on the relative nature of that 
truth. And it is in this context that we return to the funda¬ 
mental relation of Dasein's Being-in as uncovering. Dasein's 
Being-in, is Being-in-truth, but that is so only as long as 
one also admits to Being-in-untruth. Being-uncovering is 
inherently perspectival, and in no way can transcend the very 
hiddenness which its perspective creates; Dasein conceals as 
it reveals. 
Thus the relation which we have been speaking of is 
one of truth to untruth, of uncovering to covering up -- and 
if I may be permitted to make the leap —- of consciousness to 
the unconscious. Fundamental to Dasein and consciousness is 
this continuous relating of revealed to concealed, of known 
to unknown. The primordial experience of knowledge does not 
come from the recognition of logical agreements, but from the 
more basic confrontation of consciousness with the opacity of 
nature, an opacity which gives itself to our persistent inquir¬ 
ies only by simultaneously reminding us ever so forcefully of 
just how much it still withholds. 
It Is obvious that the concept of "thinking as rela¬ 
tion" follows from this account, and that logic, natural sci¬ 
ence, and structuralism deal with the ont.ic relationships of 
known entities. And equally obvious is the observation that 
by staying on the known, ontic level, there ceases to be a 
problem of epistemology. But to cor fine oneself to such a 
level constitutes a radical (although at times useful and even 

130 
necessary) evasion of the ground of Dasein’s creativity, the 
source of its aims and purpose, all of which are only first 
constellated in the uncertainty of man’s original encounter 
with the world. Let us not be mistaken here: to elect the 
ontic and avoid the inherent opacity of existence does not 
••free" man from anything. It by no means dissolves the problem 
of ontology, as Wittgenstein initially had hoped it would. 
The choice of covering over man’s Being-uncovering is in 
response to this most primordial uncertainty, and is therefore 
an explicit recognition of such uncertainty, albeit a negative 
one. Even by fleeing the ontological into inauthenticity, 
one succumbs to it in that way, and thereby guarantees its 
primordiality. 
So we see that Heidegger arrives at a similar epistem¬ 
ological roadblock to that described by Kant and Jung. But 
note that this is a similarity of net result only. Although 
both accounts leave man cut off from the absolute knowability 
of the unknown, the explanations differ as to how this comes 
about. For whereas Kant continues the subject-object split 
which tends to alienate man from Being, and so perpetuates 
the scientific "truth" of a transcendental logic grounded in 
the subject's reason, Heidegger gives us a measure of truth 
which is grounded in the world. By defining Dasein as uncov¬ 
ering, Heidegger gives substance tc truth in a way that all 
logical absolutes cannot: he connects uncovering -- Dasein 
to the truth of the world itself. To be sure, it is not all 
the truth, but it is a partial one, and as such a totally gen¬ 
uine revelation and self-disclosure of one piece of the world. 
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Heidegger is a phenomenalogist in the only way that really 
matters: he establishes a ground for man's being in his rela¬ 
tion to the world. Granted that this ground is limited, un¬ 
certain, even mysterious, nevertheless man's experience of 
the world not only cannot be denied to him, but serves as the 
only measure of himself which is appropriate to his existence: 
it is man's truth. 
* * * 
From Heidegger's doctrine of truth, let us turn to 
a second of his themes, the *between,9 das Zwischen. By now 
this concept should have a familiar air about it for the 
reader. It has proved to be one of the most characteristic 
metaphors for the family of thinkers we have been following. 
For Heidegger, too, this intermediate realm exerted a continual 
fascination over the years. Fortunately for us, he did not 
simplify the idea to a formulaic banality, but developed and 
expanded it over the course of his thinking to include a wide 
variety of differing applications and readings. 
It is perhaps to be expected that a phenornenologist, 
especially if concerned with the phenomenology of spatiality, 
would sooner or later be forced to take up the problem of the 
•between.* And sure enough, it is in this context of Casein's 
experience of "here and there" that Heidegger first announces 
the notion of the 'between.' He begins by stating the scien¬ 
tific understanding of'between,• which requires that Dasedn (here) 
and the object (there) both be thought of as something present- 
at-hand. From this perspective we derive the commonsense view 
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of distance as objectively measured space. Regarded in this 
way, "Dasein can subsequently traverse the ‘between' of this 
17 
distance. . ." But this "normal" understanding does not do 
full justice to the actual experience of space. For in fact 
it is an illusion to imagine that Dasein itself ever traverses 
the 'between': a body can close the spatial gap on the object, 
but Dasein may be "closer to" what is far away (the horizon 
it is viewing) than to what is "near" (e.g. its eyeglasses). 
To traverse an objective distance hardly overcomes the 'between,' 
but only now brings clearly into focus the fact that "the dis¬ 
tance itself becomes one which has been desevered*" and is 
therefore "something that Dasein can never cross over." 
Heidegger then offers an alternative explanation of 
the 'between' in the next chapter, when he analyzes Being-in 
as such. Again starting from the scientific understanding of 
subject and object, he asks: 
What else is presented with this phenomenon [Being-in] 
than the commercium which is present-at-hand between 
a subject present-at-hand and an object present-at-hand? 
Such an interpretation would cone closer to the phenomenal 
content if we were to say Dasein is the Being of this ’between. 
But even this Heidegger presents only as a bad metaphor, depen¬ 
dent on sloppy ontology. He offers it to the reader who is 
too caught up in the traditional subject-object split to grasp 
Heidegger's deeper meaning. "What .is decisive for ontology," 
Heidegger goes on to say, "is to pi event the splitting of the 
19 . 
phenomenon." ' For our purposes, however, what is important 
to note is not whether he succeeds in this ontological task, 
but how he harps on the metaphor of the 'between,* when he 
operates within the traditional subject-object context. 
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If this initial formulation of the 'between' is 
spatial, Heidegger's reconception of it at a later point in 
Being and Time is temporal. Heidegger's concern in the second 
half of this book is to ensure "the possibility of bringing 
20 
Dasem into view as a whole," upon which depends the whole 
project of authenticity. But he is now confronted with the 
problem that his method up to this point, founded upon the 
phenomenological bedrock of "the everyday," the zunachst und 
zumeist, seems in itself to bar him from attaining the whole 
which he seeks. For "everydayness is precisely that Being which 
. . 21 
is 'between* birth and death," and thus does not include the 
two ends, without which there cannot be a whole. 
Heidegger rescues the 'between' by re-evaluating the 
temporality of Dasein. Noting his emphasis in Part I on Being- 
towards-death, with its consequent stress on future and possi¬ 
bility, he finds such "facing forward" deficient: 
Not only has Being-towards-the-beginning remained unnoticedi 
but so too, and above all, has the way in which Dasein 
stretches along between birth and death. The 'connectedness 
of life,' in which Dasein somehow maintains itself con¬ 
stantly, is precisely what we have overlooked in our 
analysis of Being-a-whole.^2 
This re-visioning of the 'between* as "stretching along" 
(erstrecken) re-instates the 'between* as a fundamental struc¬ 
ture in Heidegger's system. Ontologically, the possibility 
of Dasein stretching along in such \ way implies that "its 
own Being is constituted in advance as a stretching along: "the 
'between* vhich relates to birth and death already lies in the 
23 
Being of Dasein.” As human beings, birth and death have no 
meaning for us as mere points in time, a then and a when. Bather, 
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"factical Dasein exists as born; and as born, it is already 
dying, in the sense of Being-towards-death." But this is onlv 
possible given the analysis in Part I of Dasein as care: 
As long as Dasein factically exists, both the 'ends* 
and their *between* are, and they are in the only way 
which is possible on the basis of Dasein*s Being as 
care ... As care, Dasein is 'the between.* 
In this manner, Heidegger reverses the connection of every- 
davness and the 'between* with which he opened Part II, and 
instead of despairing at the prospect of the 'between,* now 
ties the 'between* to nothing less than authenticity itself: 
"Only that entity which is 'between* birth and death presents 
the whole which we have been seeking."24 And so once again, 
and in a much less tentative manner than with the analysis 
of spatiality, Heidegger raises the 'between' to the status 
of a fundamental metaphor in his ontology. 
It is in the realm of poetry, however, that the 'between' 
at last finds its ultimate development. By poetry we mean to 
refer not only to Heidegger's investigation of that particular 
branch of literature, but also to Heidegger's own work itself. 
For in his later writing, Heidegger abandons the rigorous ana¬ 
lytical style of Being and Time in favor of a freer immersion 
in the poetic metaphor for its own sake. In the following 
example, taken from the essay "...Poetically Man Dwells,.," (1951), 
the reader will immediately note the dramatic change in style 
and tone that permeates the writing; 
Only in the realm of sheer toil does man toil for 'merits.' 
There he obtains them for himself in abundance. But at 
the sane time, in this realm, man is allowed to look up, 
out of it, through it, toward the divinities. . . . The 
upward glance spans the between of sky and earth. This 
between is measured out for the dwelling of man. We now 
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call the span thus meted out the dimension. . . . The nature 
of the dimension is the meting out —* which is lightened 
and so can be spanned of the between. . . . Man spans 
the dimension by measuring himself against the heavenly. 
Man does not undertake this spanning just now and then; 
rather, man is man at all only in such spanning. . . . 
Measure-taking gauges the between, which brings the two, 
heaven and earth, to one another. ocr 
Zd 
Despite the change in language, this passage repre¬ 
sents a logical progression from the final formulation of the 
•between* of Being and Time. In "...Poetically Man Dwells..." 
the ‘between* is again tied to authenticity, but of a slightly 
different s;>rt. As in Being and Time, the everyday state of 
man is defined as a dispersal of the Self in the world. This 
is "the realm of sheer toil"; it is earthbound and draws our 
gaze down (i.e. fallen). It is the realm of the ready-to-hand 
and of productivity. But man is also that animal who looks up 
from his work, who hears himself called to his true Self, a 
Self which like Nietzsche's finds itself reflected in the sky 
— or what is the same thing in German -- in heaven. ° 
This sky/heaven metaphor recalls the earlier discussion 
about truth, for: it is a powerful symbol of the paradox of how 
revealing conceals. The sky is the most manifest sight we 
encounter uoon lifting our gaze up from the earth, and heaven 
is the dwelling place of God. Hence the sky evokes grandeur, 
vision, and a measure by which man judges his achievements. 
Nevertheless, for Hblderlin, Heidegger tells us, 
God, as the one who he is, is unknown and it is just as 
this Unknown One that he is the measure of the poet. 
[But] how can that which by its very nature remains 
unknown ever become a measure?-,- 
Despite the imminent presence of the' sky, to which we lock 
for guidance while on earth, the sky covers up that which we 
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seek: 
What is the measure for human measuring? . . . The measure 
consists in the way in which the god who remains unknown, 
is revealed as such by the sky. . . . Thus the unknown 
god appears as the unknown by way of the sky4 s manifestness. 
Thus, it is not only God, the unconscious, the thing in itself 
— whatever you care to call it — that remains mysterious. 
God's manifestness as well, the relation of the unconscious 
to consciousness, is just as problematical. For it is just 
those things that we are most conscious of and take most for 
granted that conceal a deeper, but unconscious truth: "What 
remains alien to the god, the sight of the sky -- that is what 
is familiar to man." 
And this insight forms the basis of Jungian symbolism 
as well. It is precisely "in the familiar appearances" of 
conscious imagery that the patient's soul can concoct a meta¬ 
phorical vessel, "fundamentally alien" to the unconscious con¬ 
tent, "to which the invisible imparts itself in order to remain 
■what it is -- unknown." To paraphrase Heidegger, the sole 
necessity of psychoanalysis is to think one's way soberly into 
what the patient's symbols say, in order to learn what is unspoken." 
It is also via this metaphor' of sky/heaven that we gat 
to the interesting transformation of conscience. From that 
bodiless abstraction in Being and Time which calls the Self 
to its Self out of its dispersal in the world, Heidegger has 
created by way of personification a more immediate source for 
the Call; the divinities. After all, what is it that dwells 
in heaven? Clearly, the divinities function analogously to 
conscience, for as Heidegger tells us, "man spans the dimension 
by measuring himself against the heavenly." And what is such 
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measuring if not conscience? 
Last of all, Heidegger continues in this passage to 
emphasize the synthetic, holistic and therefore authentic 
aspect of this poetic existence in the * between': "man is man 
at all only in such spanning"-- again the strict demand for 
authenticity; "measure taking . . . brings the two ... to 
one another" -- again the insistence on wholeness. Thus we 
see that much in his later, poeticized philosophy has its 
foundation in the dry and soberly argued text of Being and Time. 
Why, then, the change of format? What else is Hei¬ 
degger now saying that eluded the style of Being and Time? 
There seems to be something peculiar about this "spanning of 
the 'between*" which is not captured in the analytic mode. 
And that is because such "spanning" is nothing other than poetry. 
If"man is man" only in such poetry, then man is a poet. Ergo 
the title "...Poetically Man Dwells...". 
What, then, does Heidegger mean by poetry? Already 
in 1936 Heidegger had crystalized his thinking on this point 
in "Hblderlin and Essence of Poetry," "In poetry," he tells us, 
man is re-united on the foundation of his existence. , . 
Poetry rouses the appearance of the unreal and of dream 
in the face of the paloable and clamorous reality, in 
which we believe ourselves at home. And yet in just the 
reverse manner, what the poet says and undertakes to be, 
is the real . . . jjPoetryJ is itself essentially estab¬ 
lishment -- that is to say: an act of firm foundation. 
Again we hear the strident emphasis on re-uniting that which 
is split apart from itself, a theme so familiar from Being and 
Time. But now Heidegger is more specific about what is split 
apart in man: man finds himself estranged from his gods -- and 
by way of interpretation — from his unconscious: 
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It is the time of the gods that have fled and of the god 
that is coming. It is the time of need, because it lies 
under a double lack and a double Not: the No-more of the 
gods that have fled and the Not-yet of the god that is 
coming. 
Man as the being that is caught in the chasm of this abysmal 
•between* is truly fallen into it. But man as the being who 
spans this chasm and brings the voices of the gods to mankind, 
such a man is man. And this authentic man is a poet: 
In this way the essence of poetry is joined on to the 
laws of the signs of the gods and of the voice of the 
people, laws which tend towards and away from each 
other. The poet himself stands between the former -- 
the gods, and the latter — the people. He is one who 
has been cast out -- out into that Between, between 
gods and men. But only and for the first time in this 
Between is it decided, who man is and where he is settling 
his existence. 'Poetically, dwells man on this earth.e 
How does the poet accomplish his task? Heidegger tells us, 
harkening back to Nietzsche’s Tragic Artist, that "the writing 
. . 32 
of poetry is the fundamental naming of the gods." Now we 
recognize the significance of that seemingly arbitrary trans¬ 
formation of conscience to divinity.. This is the poetic move 
if Heidegger is right: to personalize the unconscious that we 
may speak with it. 
The poet is characterized by a radical shift of 
consciousness which makes such personalizations possible. 
Poetry, Heidegger tells us, 
concerns the inner recalling conversion of consciousness 
which turns our unshieldedness into the invisible of the 
world8 s inner space. [The poet4s J saying, because it 
concerns the conversion, speaks not only from both realrrs 
but from the oneness of the two, insofar as that oneness 
has already come to be as the saving unification,^ 
This shift in consciousness is most emphatically not some ur- 
disciplined Dionysian self-dissolution in the unconscious. 
The proof of this is that the poet does not become a god, nor 
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evenjholds discourse with them. Instead, he converses with 
a symbo 1, which spans the ‘between' of consciousness 
and the unconscious. Such a symbol or archetype Heidegger calls, 
traditionally enough, an Angels 
This being, for whom borderlines and differences between 
the drawings [of inner and outer] hardly exist any longer, 
is the being who governs the unheard-of center of the 
widest orbit and causes it to appear. 
The Angel, as the symbolic representative of the unconscious 
contents, has the specific function of consciousness making. 
Rilke, from whom Heidegger borrowed the word Angel, makes this 
point himself: 
The Angel ... is that creature in whom the transmutation 
of the visible into the invisible, which we achieve, seems 
already accomplished. The Angel ... is that being who 
assures the recognition of a higher order of reality in 
the invisible. 
Note Rilke's reversal of the usual order of the visible and 
the invisible. In so doing he emphasizes the concealing na¬ 
ture of even the Angel's revelation,. For here, too, it is the 
very manifestness of the daimon which implies something yet 
more mysterious, more hidden. By showing himself in the mask 
of the Angel, the god does no more than fascinate us and cap¬ 
ture our attention. The parallel with Nietzsche here is 
striking, and Heidegger explicitly acknowledges that the Angel 
3 6 
is "metaphysically the same" as Nietzsche's Zarathustra. 
But this personalization is not by itself enough. 
Even assuming a proper attitude toward the unconscious, the 
archetypes cannot be coerced: "the poetic word only acquires 
its power cf naming when the gods themselves bring us to lang- 
37 
uage." The role of the poet is not to be a god. but to 
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await signs from the gods, and "intercepting" them, "to pass 
them on to his own people": 
'In the first signs' the poet catches sight of the com¬ 
pleted message and in his word boldly presents what he 
has glimpsed, so as to tell in advance of the not-yet- 
fulfilled.3g 
Like the Tragic Artist, the poet catches a glimpse of the 
Dionysian unconscious, where everything is in its wholeness, 
("the completed message"). To him falls the task of selecting 
the one form, the one possibility of many, to give expression, 
however incompletely ("not-yet-fulfilled") to what he has 
seen. And he does so by means of symbols, which as Jung says, 
stand for "a relatively unknown thing": relative, that is, to 
gods and men. 
Finally, it also remains for Heidegger's poet to 
interpret a culture's collective symbols in order to assure 
a proper understanding of them. "Sayings are good," says 
Heidegger, quoting Hblderlin, "yet something is also needed 
39 . 
to explain the holy sayings." Sayings, those distilled 
wisdoms of a hundred generations "in which a people remembers 
. . 40 
that it belongs to the totality of all that exists," are 
pre-ontological manifestations of the collective unconscious. 
But like all pre-ontological expressions, they lack that de¬ 
gree of articulation which consciousness lends to true poetic 
symbols. So when a poet interprets a "Saying," Heidegger 
does not mean that he puts it into rational, analytical lang¬ 
uage. Poetic interpretation, like the Saying itself, is sym¬ 
bolic, but with this difference: whereas the Saying is un- 
ref lective, an unconscious production like a dream, poetry is 
self-conscious and broadens the interpretation to include the 
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poet * s own consciousness as well. Thus, like Jung, Heidegger 
makes even the interpretation of symbols a symbolic process. 
* * * 
We must take a moment and reflect on the overall impact 
of Heidegger*s argument. We have demonstrated his indebted¬ 
ness to Nietzsche and his kinship to Jung, Moreover, we have 
highlighted the continuous elements in his thinking, in con¬ 
trast to the usual reading which stresses the turn (die Kehre) 
beginning with the Rektoratsrede. We need to consider now 
what relevance Heidegger's thesis has for depth psychology5 
what claim can we make for the truth — in an everyday sense — 
of his poeticizing? 
If we return to Jung, we find that he, too, was deeply 
influenced by the temptation to speak metaphorically, even in 
clinical matters. But if the reader accepts Kuhn's proposition 
that all scientific description is metaphorical (whether or 
not it chooses to admit it), then we must go one step further 
and say that Jung spoke poetically. By this v/e mean to accen¬ 
tuate the self-conscious manner in which Jung employed poetic 
metaphors. He did not speak poetically for lack of some non¬ 
existent "precise" description, but because he intentionally 
wanted to include all the nuances of a metaphor which v/ould 
fill out his description. Thus, for example, in explaining 
his choice of the name "shadow" to represent repressed uncon¬ 
scious contents, he said: 
The essence . . .has been expressed so trenchantly and 
so plastically in. poetic language . . . that it v/ould be 
almost presumptuous not to avail oneself of this linguis¬ 
tic heritage,^- 
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But Jung did not stop with a mere stylistic enrichment of his 
vocabulary. He took poetic language seriously, and followed 
this viewpoint to its logical conclusion: if poetry expressed 
psychic essences, then poets must be: regarded as quasi¬ 
psychoanalysts. Poetic insight had a validity equal to clin¬ 
ical analysis. Thus, as early as 1908, the fledgling Jung was 
anticipating Heidegger's later line of thought: 
Hitherto we psychiatrists were unable to suppress a smile 
when we read of a poet's attempts to describe a psychosis. 
. . . But if the poet has not actually set out to copy a 
case from a textbook of psychiatry, he usually knows better 
than the psychiatrist.^ 
Despite this affinity to Heidegger, however, Jung 
failed to find anything attractive in the philosopher's work. 
Judging from hints in his Letters, Jung probably did not go 
beyond Being and Time, and it is unlikely that he finished even 
that. In addition, it would appear that much of what he knew 
of Heidegger was by way of direct conversations with Medard 
43 . 
Boss, a prominent member of the existential school of Pagein- 
analyse, which we have already noted as having modified Hei¬ 
degger. Clearly, Jung was not sympathetic to the wordplays 
of Being and Time, relatively modest though they were compared 
to Heidegger's later work. Above all, he did not consider it 
poetry: 
This credulity and entrapment in words is becoming more 
and more striking nowadays. Proof of this is the rise 
of such a comical philosophy as existentialism, which 
labors to help being become being through the magical 
power of the word. People still believe that they can 
posit cr replace reality by words, or that something has 
happened when a thing is given a different name<44 
And there is certainly some validity to this criticism as it 
applies to Being and Time. For as ire have made clear. Being 
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and Time tries to straddle two traditions, traditional trans¬ 
cendental philosophy and poetry, and the result leaves the 
reader with an unresolved tension which can be distracting. 
It is this tension, above all, which Jung found so unpalatable, 
because in it he thought he detected a symptom, rather than 
a philosophy: 
Heidegger's modus philosophandi is neurotic through and 
through and it is ultimately rooted in his psychic crank¬ 
iness. . . . For all its critical analysis, philosophy 
has not yet managed to root out its psychopaths. . . . 
Philosophy has still to learn that it is made by human 
beings and depends to an alarming degree on their psychic 
constitution. . . . Neurosis addles the brain of every 
philosopher because he is at odds with himself. His 
struggle is then nothing but a systemized struggle with 
his own uncertainty.^ 
Jung was objecting to what he regarded as Heidegger's unself- 
consciousness. By couching his arguments in the formalism 
of 19th century transcendental philosophy, Heidegger was rely¬ 
ing on the weight of a customarily accepted method and pro¬ 
cedure to insure the collective validity of his assertions. 
But insofar as he indulged in personalistic word-interpretations, 
he was abandoning any claim for a universal theory. With the 
move to a poetic use of words, Heidegger began to write depth 
psychology, but under the misleading guise of traditional 
philosophy. As a depth psychologist, however, Heidegger was 
committing the worst sin, because by failing to admit the poetic 
nature of his enterprise, he was ignoring Jung's dictum that 
"every psychological theory should be criticized in the first 
46 
instance as a subjective confession " 
Moreover, Jung did not accept what he understood as 
Heidegger's ontology. In no way sympathetic to the Husserlian 
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tradition cf phenomenology from which Heidegger sprang, Jung 
maintained that "in spite of all existential philosophy the 
opposition between ego and world, subject and object, is not 
47 
annulled." This certainly represents a misunderstanding on 
Jung's part, and it seems likely that Jung get this conception 
of Heidegger's ontology by way of Binswanger and his Dilthey- 
esque notion of "understanding," which does indeed suggest a 
radical interpenetration of subject and object. But from 
our foregoing discussion of the 'between,' especially in the 
section on deseverance* and the gap which Dasein can never cross 
over, it should be clear that Heidegger in no way intended to 
imply the possibility of Dasein somehow "dissolving" itself 
into the world. Heidegger's conception was much more subtle 
than that. Dasein is a fundamentally different kind of being 
from the world. Dasein dwells a3.ongsj.de (bei) the world, 
Dasein is at home in the world, but Dasein is not the world. 
When we speak of Heidegger's collapse of subject and object, 
we refer to the phenomenological moment of the 'between,' 
which requires Dasein*s experience of itself as distinct from 
other being. And certainly Heidegger’s doctrine of truth does 
not encourage any misconception about the world's transparency 
to man, either. But it is in his later works, with the unequi¬ 
vocal distinction of gods from men, and of sky from earth, that 
Heidegger most explicitly rules out a willful transcendency., 
by the ego. He accepts neither the Indian project of self- 
dissolution nor the Western alternative of total ego-mastery 
as adequate to the true nature of Dasein. Of the latter 
possibility, which offers the prospect of a harmoniously tech- 
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nologized utopia, he says in particular: 
The peace of this peacefulness is merely the undisturbed 
continuing restlessness of the fury of self-assertion 
which is resolutely self-reliant,A0 
'lo 
Both the traditional Western and Eastern attitudes foster 
what Nietzsche called so aptly the “Spirit of Revenge.” Hei¬ 
degger, on the contrary, elaborated a philosophy of the *between* 
which was a statement of faith in man's ability to accept the 
tension of this middle ground. Understood in this way, then, 
it is hard to imagine that Jung would have found much to dis¬ 
agree with in the ontology of the later Heidegger. 
More than that, however, the later Heidegger corrects 
the "errors” which Jung objected to, The significance of d_ie 
Kehre was the adoption of real poetry, both as theme and form. 
And along with this turn to poetry came the personal "confession” 
which Jung had found so lacking. In speaking of the "untime¬ 
liness” of Hblderlin's poetry, Heidegger is tacitly acknow¬ 
ledging the unique nature of his own thought as well. When 
he regards his work as no longer the; objective forefront of 
academic philosophy, the cutting edge of philosophical "pro¬ 
gress,” but rather as the revelation of one man's confrontation 
with Being, Heidegger has become a genuine depth psychologist. 
In saying this, we mean to imply that depth psychology 
is no mere theoretical enterprise of the mind. Rather, as 
Freud's famous "self-analysis” and Jung's (ofttimes infamous) 
"descent into the unconscious” show,-, depth psychology is prac¬ 
tised by the soul. As such, it is bindingly personal. And 
while depth psychology may be justified in making some general 
observations, it is only because of the collective, archetypal 
Mil. 
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nature of the soul's experience. Depth psychology, moreover, 
is poetry, whether it be the heroic epic of Freud's struggle 
to unravel the Sphinx's riddle, or the lyric inspiration of 
Jung's visions. Finally, to be a depth psychologist reguires 
a commitment to the soul, over and above all conventional 
opinions, as all three men learned with some bitterness. Thus, 
to view Heidegger as a depth psychologist is not so much to 
misinterpret his work as psychology, as to locate the man himself 
in a very special undertaking. 
A different criticism of Heidegger's thinking, more 
well-founded than that of Jung, is suggested by the writings 
of Gaston Eachelard (1884-1962). An improbable concatenation 
of first the philosophy of science, then phenomenology, and 
later depth psychology, this French thinker's work represents 
what is unquestionably the best synthesis of philosophy and 
psychoanalysis as yet accomplished. Unfortunately, working 
out of a French tradition as he did, Eachelard does not readily 
lend himself to an easy integration into our heavily Germanic 
cluster of thinkers. Nevertheless, as a student of Freud, 
Jung and Heidegger, he was fluently conversant with the debate 
which we have been describing. 
BachelarcFs principal objection to Heidegger would, 
we believe, have centered around Heidegger's failure to give 
explicit credit to the concrete ontogenetic aspect of Dasein: 
man develops from the child, and it is in the child that we 
must seek the "myth of origins" which so fascinated Heidegger. 
"Isn't that opening on the world of which philosophers avail 
themselves," asks Eachelard with implicit reference to Husserlian 
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and Heideggarian phenomenology, 
a reopening upon the prestigious world of original con¬ 
templations? But put another way, is this intuition of 
the world, this Weltanschauung, anything other than a 
childhood which dares not speak its name?^g 
Bachelard made the crucial move from phenomenology to psycho¬ 
logy by tying a philosophical attitude to a real, historical 
stage of Casein*s past being. Taking as his cue this question 
of being, he observed: 
Reverie teaches us that the essence of being is well-being, 
a well-being rooted in the archaic being. Without having 
been, how can a philosopher be sure of being? The archaic 
being teaches me to be the same as myself.^ 
But note that Bachelard in no way reduced philosophy to a 
neurotic compensation for unresolved infantile conflicts, as 
, . g-i 
Jung did m the passage above, and as many Freudians would do. 
“’Childhood," Bachelard insisted, "... has a proper phenomen¬ 
ological meaning, a pure phenomenological meaning since it is 
52 . . . 
under the sign of wonder." By recognizing the child in us 
who marvels at the world, Bachelard was making firm, establishing, 
and at the same time valorizing this very special consciousness. 
But one cannot experience the consciousness of the child as 
an adult unless one accepts it for vhat it is in its entirety. 
And such total acceptance is not easy. As Hans Loewald inti¬ 
mates, it is perhaps the sign of the; most developed and mature 
ego that can actively embrace its childhood: 
It would seem that people are more alive (though not 
necessarily more 'stable'), the broader their range of 
ego-reality levels is. Perhaps the so-called fully 
developed, the mature ego is not one that has become fix¬ 
ated at the presumably highest or latest stage of devel¬ 
opment, having left the others behind it, but is an ego 
that integrates its reality in such a way that the earlier 
and deeper levels of ego-reality integration remain alive 
as dynamic sources of higher organization.^ 
I L 
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We may conclude that Bachelard would dismiss Heidegger*s 
etymologizing as forced and unnatural reveries. Bachelard 
felt that most philosophers were too unwilling to abandon 
themselves consciously to “the child within." But the adult 
who cannot freely admit his child, and yet insists on dwelling 
upon him, ends up distorting the child. As Bachelard notes, 
"grown-ups write children's stories too easily. Thus they make 
. . 54 
childish fables." 
If such a critique hits the mark vis-S-vis the early 
Heidegger, nevertheless Bachelard agrees with the later Hei¬ 
degger about the priviledged status of poetry. It is in the 
crucial linking of poetry to childhood, however,that Bachelard 
advances Heidegger one step further; 
By the poet's grace we have become the pure and simple 
subject of the [child's] verb, to marvel. 
Poetry, as conceived by Bachelard, becomes analogous to the 
originary speech of Loewald's earlier ego-stages. As such it 
is not merely to be indulged, but eagerly turned to as a source 
of creativity. Speaking of "reverie" as the consciousness of 
"the child within us," Bachelard explains; 
Poetic values make the reverie psychically beneficial. 
Through poetry, reverie becomes positive, becomes an 
activity which ought to interest the psychologist. . . 
[Such is] the working reverie, the reverie which prepares 
works.cr 
Poetry, then, is the ego's refinement of the child's speech. 
It is that perplexing middle ground in which the unconscious, 
as the archetypal child, creates and renews in concert with 
the freely-willed cooperation of the ego. Far from the repressed 
child who torments us with symptoms, the poetic child, the 
disciplined child, brings new life. And it is partially the 
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object of psychoanalysis to accomplish this transformation 
of the child: "The ultimate cause of a neurosis," said Jung, 
is something positive which needs to be safeguarded for 
the patient . . . The childhood experience of a neurotic 
is not, in itself, negative: far from it. It becomes 
negative only when it finds no suitable place in the 
life and outlook of the adult. The real task of analysis, 
it seems to me, is to bring about a synthesis between 
the two. 
In his grounding of poetry in the archetypal child, 
Bachelard gives substance to Heidegger's poeticizing in a way 
which saves it from becoming empty rhetoric. He thus does 
Heidegger a great service, despite whatever other reservations 
he might have had about the rest of Heidegger's writings. 
. n . 
Moreover, in such a groudmg, Bachelard gives us a clue as to 
A 
how to meet the more fundamental charge of aetheticism which 
we raised in the earlier discussion of Nietzsche. 
Aestheticism, the criticism that the poetic image is 
"mere illusion," haunts our argument like a spirit that 
flaunts all exorcism. Can we never be done with this lurking 
feeling that all these efforts are merely self-indulgent dil¬ 
ettantism, lacking rigor? After all, if Heidegger or Nietzsche 
had really valued the poet, should they not have restricted 
themselves to writing poetry instead of contaminating their 
artistry with wordy philosophizing? We need to explain this 
unappealing mixture of forms. 
We can begin by observing that many of the thinkers 
whom we have mentioned belong to what Philip Wheelwright calls 
the "empathic" trend in philosophy. They exhibit "the tendency 
to interpret the essence of outer things and activities in the 
light of characteristics that we inwardly discern as belonging 
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to ourselves." This is an old tradition in philosophy and 
stems from philosophy's roots in ancient Greece itself, as 
both Wheelwright and Heidegger have pointed out. It is in 
the very ambivalence around, and indifference to, the substan¬ 
tive, verbal, and adjectival forms of a word that we find the 
first hints of the pre-ontological suppositions inherent in 
the ancient Greek language, which pervaded pre-Socratic think¬ 
ing. To use an adjective as a noun., as Heraclitus does when 
he says, "The cool becomes the warm" (Fr. 22), has a precise 
ontological connotation, namely that "for Heraclitus a thing 
is nothing more than the complete set of all the qualities 
59 
and powers that belong to and constitute it." This dropping 
out of the intermediary third, the carrier of these qualities, 
shifts the weight of the experience onto the observer himself, 
while the objective element fades into the background. Know¬ 
ledge is thereby inextricably tied to the body, for it and 
only it makes any qualities possible?. Such an account is sub¬ 
jective, to be sure, because it not only requires that we ex¬ 
perience reality, but also stipulates the way, limiting us to 
the immediacy of our own sensations, On the other hand, whether 
this account must be labeled as merely subjective is another 
matter altogether, and depends on how much in common one wishes 
to credit lasein's experience of Bemg-in-the-world. But 
insofar as we all share the same body, "the images have roous," 
as Bachelaid tells us, and "in following them we adhere to 
o 0 
the world; we take root in the world." 
Now the relevance of this ei.ipathic trend of philosophy 
for contemporary thinking stands or falls upon our evaluation 
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of Heidegger’s doctrine of truth. If the subjective, bodily 
and phenomenological experience of Being-in-the-world is not 
to be minimized as a mere step along the way toward higher 
realities, then we must acknowledge that the Cartesian claim 
for objectivity is indeed founded upon a particular way of 
Being-in-the-world. That decision, of course, we must each 
make for ourselves. 
If one grants Heidegger’s thesis, however, and also 
acknowledges certain universal experiences in the lived body, 
then the conclusion seems inescapable that there are two kinds 
of truth; objective and subjective. Jung himself had intimated 
this already as early as Symbols of Transformation in the intro¬ 
ductory chapter, "Two Kinds of Thinking." Let us take care 
to avoid any confusion on this distinction. No one who has 
responsibly reflected on the enormous progress of post-Cartesian 
science can seriously entertain doubts as to the power of 
objective truth. Of course. And none of the thinkers in our 
colloquy have succumbed to such obscurantism. But it seems 
equally hard to dismiss the urgency of the distress felt by 
an entire culture that has found itself so radically alienated 
from itself. The Cartesian disengagement takes its toll: 
objective truth denies the other truth, the truth of the body. 
And it is because this very bodily truth is ignored that we 
first of ail and most of the time fuel this other truth. We 
feel it as anxiety, as depression, as mania, and above all, 
as pain. It is no accident that Freud discovered the subjec¬ 
tive truth of the unconscious in the. bodily symptoms of his 
first hysterical patients. He rightly characterized such 
. 
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symptoms as the body's mode of "mitsprechen, " speaking back 
to a consciousness that would not otherwise listen. The 
instincts are our body, and insofar as they grab us and claim 
us though the body, we feel their truth. We may not like it, 
and we may seek to avoid it in all manner of ways. But the 
very frenzy with which we seek to escape it only proves how 
fundamental instinctual truth really is. 
Subjective truth, encountered first of all and most 
of the time in our feelings, can be likened to the bodily 
experience of the archetype, or to be more traditional, of 
the da imo n and god. This is to do no more than pursue Freud's 
metaphor and ask, "With whom do we join in conversation (mit¬ 
sprechen ) when we have our bodily symptoms?" It is not at all 
unhelpful, as Heidegger discovered with his Angels, to envi¬ 
sion our affective experience in the world in the body -- 
as the tangible commun1cation of an inescapable reality in 
ourselves. Again we must credit Jung with first identifying 
this connection of man to god as a personified instinctual 
complex. Complaining of the shortsighted pride with which 
post-Enlightenment thinkers claimed to have demythologized 
the world, he remarked: 
But what we have left behind are only verbal spectres, 
not the psychic facts that were responsible for the birth 
of the gods. We are still as much possessed by autonomous 
psychic contents as if they vers Olympians. Today they 
are ca led . . . neurotic symptoms. The gods have become 
diseases. Zeus no longer rules Olympus but rather the 
solar plexus. 
Oftentimes it may seem that subjective truth expresses 
an alien consciousness, especially .if we choose to personify 
it in the above manner. That being so, then the task of ana- 
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lysis is to claim our particular gods as our own. Just as 
St. Paul was blinded (hysterically, to be sure) by his refusal 
to accept Christ as his own god. and as a part of himself, (a 
fact which he could not bear to "see"), so cure came by inte¬ 
grating the split-off complex bade into his ego. Instead of 
repressing it, so dramatically expressed by his persecution 
of the Christians, Paul accepted the complex as belonging to 
him. So we see that subjective truth is not necessarily an 
"obvious" truth. On the contrary, in demanding that we take 
responsibility for what we are conscious of, and more impor¬ 
tantly, for what we are not, we are demanding a radically 
Heideggerian ontology, which has given many people no little 
difficulty! For when Heidegger says Dasein is its disclosedness, 
the emphasis should be on the "is": we are the world which we 
permit ourselves to see and feel. And recalling Nietzsche, 
we must remember that what happens to us is our own, for it 
is we who give it shape and meaning. To disavow hysterical 
paralysis or a psychogenic ulcer as somehow "really" due to 
extrinsic causes, is to give up any personal claim one might 
have to the uniqueness of one's life, and to its meaning. 
Ultimately, of course, the same argument can be extended to 
less transparent examples. A war or natural catastrophe is 
no less our responsibility, insofar as it is our consciousness 
which renders it, to invoke Churchill, triumph or tragedy. 
Subjective truth is visceral: it happens to us as 
physical beings. We believe our eyes, we trust our senses, 
we know in the pits of our stomachs. The various gods and 
daimones inhabit different parts of the body. One especially 

54 
hallowed metaphor for a certain aspect of this subjective, 
feeling truth is the heart. Certainly the iconography of the 
heart in the Western Middle Ages defines it unmistakably as 
the center of eros, of love, passion and feeling. But the 
tradition is much older than even this. Moreover, in anti¬ 
quity this locus of feeling was associated with consciousness. 
As Neumann has noted. 
For the Greeks, the midriff was the seat of consciousness, 
for the Indians and Hebrews, the heart. In both cases 
thinking is emotional, bound up with affects and passions. 
Ths dissolution of emotional components is not yet com¬ 
plete. Only if a thought is a passion that grins the 
heart can it reach ego consciousness and be perceived. ,, 
--- \j z. 
So, too, dees Kundalini Yoga identify the first glimmerings 
6 3 
of consciousness in anahata, the chakra of the heart. 
It is crucial to see here that the truth of feeling 
is not merely the facticity of our passions. We are not try¬ 
ing to valorize "the instinctual life." What is emphasized 
is that feeling, like thought, serves to bring contents to 
consciousness, and that of the two, it is the more primordial 
means of accomplishing this end. Understanding requires both 
knowledge and affect. Knowledge, the objective truth, permits 
the clear articulation and differentiation that communication 
64 
with others requires. But as Jung has stressed, affect, 
the subjective truth of the body, makes possible consciousness 
in the first place. 
Now Heidegger also distinguished between these two 
realms of truth when he announced "the logic of the heart": 
At nearly the same time as Descartes, Pascal discovers 
the logic of the heart as over against the logic of cal¬ 
culating reason. The inner and invisible domain of the 
heart is not only more inward t lan the interior that 
belongs tc calculating representation, and therefore 
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more invisible: it also extends further than does the realm 
of merely producible objects. 
And Bacheiard, following the spirit of this dichotomizing, also 
found himself unable to harmonize these two truths; 
Dreaming reveries and thinking thoughts are certainly 
two disciplines which are hard to reconcile. At the 
end of a jostled culture I believe more and more that 
they aie disciplines of two different lives. ^ 
ob 
The poetical thinking which Heidegger unveils for us 
in What Is Called Thinking? is thinking guided by the logic 
of the heart. In his move away from Cartesian ontology, 
Heidegger sought to reground Dasein's thinking about Dasein 
in the immediacy of his feelings, which are experienced in the 
body: hence his emphasis on earth. Like Jung's old Pueblo 
C. 7 
friend, ' Heidegger accused Western civilization of"thinking 
with its head,'' and reminded it that all original thinking 
is with the heart. 
The truth of poetic thinking does not depend on rational 
verification, although it does not rule that out either. The 
truth of poetic thinking -- and of Jung's symbolic life — is 
tested in the heart, where our feelings, those bodily exper¬ 
iences of the archetypes, will tell us whether or not what we 
imagine is true poetry. And Heidegger makes it quite clear 
that not just any poetry will do: there is authentic and inau¬ 
thentic poetry. The judgment of authenticity is in no way 
arbitrary, however, simply because it is irrational. There is 
a standard for subjective truth: 
Man is capable of poetry at any time only to the degree 
to which his being is appropriate to that which has a 
liking for man and therefore needs his presence. Poetry 
is authentic or inauthentic to the degree of this 
appropriation. 
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This appropriation, again stressing the question of attitude, 
distills the quintessential relationship of ego consciousness 
with the bodily, affective, instinctual realm of the uncon- 
scious, which, as we have said above, ‘ does indeed need mar's 
presence. 
Authenticity constitutes the ethical bedrock of Hei¬ 
degger's thought. To be sure, he disclaims ever so often that 
we should attribute to authenticity a normative function. 
Nonetheless, given that we accept a certain amount of existence 
as irredeemably and perhaps fortunately -- fallen, there 
still remains the question of how each man acts when he hears 
the call of conscience explicitly calling him. In this con¬ 
text it is hard net to give authenticity a pre-eminent status. 
Now authenticity deals with that mode of human exis¬ 
tence in which the whole of a man's life is brought into 
focus as the criterion of any judgment. The difficulty is 
that man is not God, and cannot assume the all-knowing per¬ 
spective which medieval ontology attributed to God: 
Any entity whose Essence is made up of existence 
{ji.e. Ease in] is essentially opposed to the possibility 
of our getting it in our grasp as an entity which is 
a whole. 
Authentic man must therefore insure the whole by spanning the 
'between' of the soul, and he does so with poetry. Authenti¬ 
city, which derives from the German eigen meaning "one's own," 
is therefore tied to the soul's own aesthetics. As we have 
tried to suggest, however, such aesthetics are not "mere illu¬ 
sion," because of the special nature of the soul. The soul, 
which Nietz.sche calls the "I" of the lyricist. 
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. . . sounds from the depths of his being: its •subjectivity* 
in the sense of modern aestheticism is a fiction.7 
Authenticity, founded on the true Self, finds its source in 
poetry because poetry, as the original speech of the soul, is 
the purest expression of the archetypal metaphors of the col¬ 
lective unconscious. In "the images of the lyricist," says 
Nietzsche, 
are nothing but his very self, find, as it were, only 
different projections of himself, so he, as the moving 
center of this world, may say 'I*: of course, this self 
is not the same as that of the waking, empirically real 
man, but the only true existent and eternal self resting 
at the has is of things, through whose images lyric genius 
sees this very basis,. ^ 
Given Nietzsche*s reading, the authentic Self becomes identical 
. 73 
with Jung*s Self. 
It may be objected that authenticity is also charac¬ 
terized by potentiality-for-being-a-whole, the openness to 
the possibility of all possibilities. But here, too our anal¬ 
ogy to the collective unconscious holds. For poetry is the 
originary giving of form to the unformed; but the unformed is, 
by definition, in potentia, all possibility. And what is the 
unconscious if not pot.entia, after all? Even so narrow a view 
of the unconscious as the locus of unfulfilled wishes approx¬ 
imates this view, for a wish is pure possibility. 
By every criterion then, be it body, instinct, whole¬ 
ness, or possibility, the concept of authentic poetry is rooted 
in the unconscious. It is precisely the unconscious which 
grounds authentic poetry and raises it from "mere" to "natural" 
illusion. In this context, therefore, it is but a short step 
to the concept of authentic symbolism, for every measure of 
authenticity by which Heidegger judges true poetry may be 
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equally applied to symbols in the psychological sense. The 
authentic symbol, like authentic poetry, spans but does not 
abolish, the gap of human existence. 
Of course, the unconscious can mislead us, too: it is 
the source of all possibilities. Heidegger's flirtation with 
National Socialism is ample proof of the dangers inherent in 
inspired truth. Therefore, the ultimate test of authenticity 
cannot rest on its feeling connection to the unconscious alone. 
The authentic man must also constantly immerse himself in the 
reality of everyday living, the reality of Being-in-the-vorld, 
On this issue Jung commented wisely; 
Life is the touchstone for the truth of the spirit. 
Spirit that drags a man away from life seeking ful¬ 
fillment only in itself is a false [and therefore 
inauthentic] spirit -- though the man too is to blame 
since he can choose whether he will give himself up to 
this spirit or not.^^ 
This double requirement, that symbolic truth guarantee its 
authenticity both from its sources in the unconscious and 
from its praxis in life, makes a stringent demand upon whom¬ 
ever would seek it. It might in fact turn out to be much 
harder to secure than the everyday commonplaces of objective 
truth. And yet once won, does it not at long last re-found 
man's existence upon the very core of what he is? 

CONCLUSION 

All men by nature desire to know. ... It is 
owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first 
began to philosophize. 
- Aristotle's Metaphysics 
The word "metaphysics" comes supposedly from the 
Alexandrian librarians who first gave a name to Aristotle's 
book on "first philosophy." They named it such, because 
it was the book which came after the books on physics, and 
was hence the next on the shelf . . . 
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is 
called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, 
as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot 
answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. , . . 
The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysics. 
- Kant 
Quand on parle de ce qu'on ne comprend pas et. que 
ceux qui entendent ne comprenent pas non plus, on fait de la 
metaphysique. 
- Voltaire 
Metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate 
effort to think clearly. 
- William James 
Philosophy is the world stood on its head. 
- Hegel 
Metaphysics is an enquiry over and above what-is, 
with a view to winning it back again as such and in totality 
for our understanding, 
- Heidegger 
Though we do not possess a physics of the soul, and 
are not even able to observe it and judge it from some 
Archimedean point "outside" ourselves, and can therefore 
know nothing about it since all knowledge of the psyche is 
itself psychic, in spite of all this the soul is the only 
experient of life and existence. It .is, in fact, the only 
immediate experience we can have and the sine qua non or the 
subjective reality of the world. 
Jung 

CONCLUSION 
In these closing pages, I would like to turn our 
attention to this paper itself. May one not ask with justi¬ 
fication, toward what useful end this tenuous merger of phi¬ 
losophy and psychoanalysis is directed? To be sure, the 
boundaries of psychoanalysis have always been fluid, but the 
movement has heretofore usually involved the arrogant appro¬ 
priation of another field by psychoanalysis, as in the pseudo¬ 
anthropology of Symbols of Transformation or Totem and Taboo. 
But even where psychoanalysis has so rudely imposed itself 
on unwilling subject matter, at least there were always very 
real and practical problems which it was trying to clarify. 
But in our synthesis of philosophy and psychoanalysis —= not 
an explanation of philosophy by psychoanalysis -= we seem to 
be addressing no concrete issue at all. Why then did I write 
this paper? 
The impetus to attempt this synthesis derived from 
my fundamental conviction that psychoanalysis and philosophy 
are two sices of the same coin. Fhilosophy articulates the 
mind’s commentary on life, and psychoanalysis elucidates life’s 
reaction tc the mind. The difference is a question of view¬ 
point. The "cubist” enchantment with multiple perspectives 
which this essay demonstrates, recognizes the limitations on 
knowledae that any one point of view must perforce confine us 
161 
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to. It is based on the value judgment that, to quote Jung, 
it is a good thing to make occasional incursions into 
other territories and to look at our subject throuch 
different pairs of spectacles.. 
Nevertheless, we cannot too lightly dismiss the objection 
that by mixing fields, we vitiate in a crucial way the auto¬ 
nomous insights of each discipline. Kant was particularly 
alive to this danger when he argued that 
we do not enlarge but disfigure the sciences when we 
lose sight of their respective limits and allow them 
to run into one another^ 
We have a three-fold response to this justifiable 
reservation. First, we would argue that the self-conscious 
attitude that permeates this paper -- and of which this 
conclusion is an example — ought precisely to preclude ever 
"losing sight" of the larger context of things. Interdis¬ 
ciplinary thinking need not be myopic. Second, we take re¬ 
fuge in history and note that the whole field of Philosophical 
Anthropology, taking its inspiration from Schopenhaer, repre¬ 
sents nothing less than an extensively developed tradition of 
just the kind of synthesis we are attempting. Moreover, it 
takes its cue from Kant himself, who gave birth to this very 
field, despite his own reservations! So we are not really- 
attempting anything new. It is only in America, where the 
level of philosophical sophisticaticn among otherwise educated 
people is so comically low, that someone in his ignorance can 
even be surprised by such a synthesis. But it is no joke to 
willfully ignore the intellectual efforts directed by some of 
Europe*s greatest minds at the same problems which we today 
couch in psychoanalytic jargon. 
■v 
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Thirdly, and most importantly, we must consider the 
specific content of philosophy and psychoanalysis. We are 
not randomly mixing two unrelated fields of endeavor. Even 
if we suspend judgment for the moment on the larger question 
of perspective, philosophy still speaks to the concerns of 
psychoanalysis insofar as the latter is a form of human 
knowledge, and like any branch of knowledge, is subject to 
epistemological criticism. Psychoanalysis occupies no pri¬ 
vileged status vis-u-vis its theoretical foundations, and it 
would do well to take advantage of the philosophical insights 
which have so radically refined the theory of science in re- 
cent years. As a theoretical system, psychoanalysis is ter¬ 
ribly amateurish and provincial, and its very claim to intel¬ 
lectual respectability is being undermined by this laxity. 
As Paul Pvicoeur observes, 
this epistemology of psychoanalysis is an urgent tasks 
we can no longer content ourselves as we did twenty year 
ago by distinguishing method and theory; we know now tha 
in the human sciences "theory" is not something contingent, 
just added on: it is constitutive of the object itself; 
it is •constituting.•^ 
This summons to self-criticism, moreover, holds regardless of 
one's preference for analytic, linguistic investigations over 
phenomenology, or for Freud over Jung. The issue is not par¬ 
tisan: it is rather a matter of intellectual broadmindedness 
which values the insights of different perspectives, and 
admits the subjectivity of ajry point of view. 
There is really very little choice in the matter. 
Of course, one may choose to ignore one’s limitations, but 
that is a debased choice. If one confronts the challenge of 
n
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perspective squarely, however, the conclusion is inevitable 
that no deep criticism from within is possible. As Heidegger 
warns us. 
No sphere can say by its own methods what it is. History 
will not tell what history is. The essence of the sphere 
is the domain of thinking.^ 
And Nietzsche, too, concluded that "the problem of science 
cannot be recognized in the context of science." with that 
in mind, we begin to see why it is that philosophy might pro¬ 
vide the most relevant critique of psychoanalysis. Statis¬ 
ticians and pharmacologists may comfort themselves as much as 
they please with their "damning" evidence against psycho¬ 
analysis, but the only essential criticism comes from that 
discipline which seeks out the foundations of all forms of 
hurnan knowledge. 
Our only difficulty with this proposition is that 
such fundamental explanations are precisely what psychoanalysis 
thinks it has to offer in turn to philosophy1. This psychol¬ 
ogizing of philosophy would seem to discredit Heidegger's 
claim for the priority of "thinking." To quote Jung, in a 
passage reminiscent of Nietzsche: 
Not only philosophers, but our own predilections in 
philosophy, and even what we are: fond of calling our 
•best* truths are affected, if not dangerously under¬ 
mined, by this recognition of a personal premise. . . 
Can it be possible that a man only thinks cr says or 
does what he himself is?^ 
Such apparently irreconcilable claims to priority 
need not lead to barren estrangement, however. It seems to me 
that by regarding both psychoanalysis and philosophy as two 
different perspectives on the fundamental questions, we can 
find a way to enrich and strengthen each side with the insights 
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of the other. Remember: it is not the perspective of psycho- 
analysis or philosophy which is fun<iamental, but the experience 
of our existence as human beings._it is not the method which 
is prior, but the question which it addresses. 
There is precedent for such an opinion. Nietzsche, 
for one, had no difficulty making room for two kinds of 
deep-thinkers, and afforded equal status to philosopher and 
dream-interpreter: 
Thus the aesthetically sensitive; man stands in the same 
relation to the reality of dreams as the philosopher 
does to the reality of existence; he is a close and 
willing observer, for these images afford him an inter¬ 
pretation of life, and by reflecting on these processes 
he trains himself for life..-, 
And the figure of Gaston Bachelard exemplifies how creative 
the synthesis of these two realms in one man can be! As Jung 
o 
insisted, what is really needed are "philosophic doctors. 
The final charge which we must take up is a curiously 
deflating one. For it may be asked by someone outside of 
both psychoanalysis and philosophy, "Why worry about all this 
talk of fundamentals?" May we not wonder with G.J.Warnock 
9 
whether this quest after foundations is not in fact misguided? 
Who cares, ask the "new" psychiatrists, about the obscure 
roots of a neurosis if we can drug-, modify-, or shock-away 
the symptoms? 
I can only reply to this protestation by indulging 
momentarily in a grander view of human history. Since the 
time of Aristotle, Western culture has progressed on the basis 
of an unchanging ontology which has covered up the "fundamental 
wound of human existence." For the past 2000 years we have 
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not sought out our foundations, but have remained content to 
let culture evolve where it would, in whatever way it "happened." 
Western thought is already well versed in the superficial ac¬ 
ceptance of the everyday: there is nothing new in Warnock's 
suggestion. 
As science began to make its ravaging inroads into 
the sturdy edifice of the "common man," however, its damage 
to him was temporarily minimized by an uncritical reliance on 
supra-personal institutions to shore up his identity. The 
church, the state, society, and the family all were invoked as 
a kind of "natural" bulwark against the encroachments of this 
valueless Leviathan. But today the spectre of technology is 
upon us with avengeance; we can no longer take it for granted, 
or disclaim any responsibility for its course and future. 
There are no more accidents, Technology, as Heidegger says, 
is in the service of being, and with it our being can today 
realize almost any possibility. The problem of coming to terms 
with just what this being is can no longer be dismissed as the 
idle task of a few quaintly irrelevant Greeks. The decisions 
doctors and psychiatrists are making right now require the 
most thoroughgoing definitions of man, and these definitions 
are being made, whether we choose to be aware of it or not. 
Is it not therefore timely, and incumbent upon us, to recon- 
sider consciously just what we human beings are, and what we 
want from our technology? 
The challenge to psychiatry is a real one. And yet, 
we have been started off on the right track already with the 
initial insights of psychoanalysis. As Jung said in praise 
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of Freud, 
It was Freud*s momentous discovery that the neurosis is 
not a mere agglomeration of symptoms, but a wrong func¬ 
tioning which affects the whole psyche. The important 
thing is not the neurosis, but j:he man who has the neurosis. 
We have set to work on the human being, and we must be 
able to do him justice as a human being. Q 
The danger of the new psychotherapeutics is that it threatens 
to throw away this key insight in the rush to "correct malfunc¬ 
tioning systems." People are not machines, and the present- 
at-hand attitude which says they are, and which science fos¬ 
ters, may well be the most pernicious result of that uneasy 
wedding of psychology with medicine. Psychiatry must renew 
its commitment to the human psyche, even at the expense of 
temporary setbacks in "progress." Psychoanalysis has a higher 
responsibility than to the demands of an anxious public or a 
soulless mental health bureaucracy. Psychoanalysis has an 
obligation to authentic man, to guarantee his humanity in all 
its ramifications. Said Jung, 
. t . one cannot treat the psyche without touching on 
man and life as a whole, including the ultimate and 
deepest issues, anymore than one can treat the sick 
body without regard to the totality of its functions, 
or rather . . . the totality of the sick man himself. 
Insofar as philosophy spurs the psychoanalyst on to remembering 
his true task -- the patient*s authenticity — it becomes 
indispensable and integral to his cnm authentic functioning. 
In that spirit, I will be satisfied if this essay encourages 
even a single psychiatrist to reflect for a moment on the 
meaning of his work. At least I am content in knowing that 
it caused a psychiatrist-to-be, its author, to do so. 
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a substance moved in space; it is a concept abstracted from 
relations cf movements. The concept, therefore, is founded 
not on the substances themselves but on their relations. . 
And quoting Nicholas von Hartman, "Energy is relation." Energy 
most emphatically is not to be hypostasized to a force. See 
PT, CW 6, para. 778. 
32 
TP, CW 4, para, 202. This terminology of energy is 
probably at end an unhappy choice. It is a metaphor replete 
with concrete associations which hold our attention as such, 
in spite of Jung’s constant disclaiming of all physical anal¬ 
ogies. (See, for example, PE, CW 8, para. 32.) And as anyone 
who has struggled through the first part of the essay "On Psychic 
Energy" will attest to, the concept is not clearly and rigor¬ 
ously differentiated from the mechanistic metaphor of force, 
which has gotten Freud into so much trouble of late, (See, 
for example, Emmett Wilson, Jr., "The Structural Hypothesis 
and Psychoanalytic betatheory," or Roy Schaffer’s new book. 
The Language of Psychoanalysis.) Indeed, Jung maintains that 
they are" just two different perspectives on the same problem. 
Moreover, in Symbols of Transformation Jung seems to occa¬ 
sionally hypostasize energy to instinct. Will, etc., thus 
vitiating his own meticulous distinctions. For example: "Libido 
is appetite in its natural state." (para, 194); or "Thus far 
our conception of libido coincides with Schopenhauer’s Will." 
(para. 195). 
33ST, CW 5, para. 199. 
34Ibid., para. 195 & 197: "The concept of libido as desire 
or appetite is an interpretation [by] the ego of the process 
of psychic energy, which we experience [in consciousness] pre¬ 
cisely in the form of an appetite . . . This view leads to 
a conception of libido which expands into a conception of 
intentionality in general." 
35 
Taking as the simplest case any two point charges 
separated in space, the potential energy between them is 
described as : , 
k —L_ where k is a constant, q and q* 
r are the charges, and r is the 
distance between them. 
38Which is not to deny that light and heat are still 
forms of the same energy, whose total sum has been conserved, 
37PE, CW 3, para. 88. 
38ST, CW 5, para. 344, 
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39 
Ibid. 
40PE, CW 8, para. 93. 
41Ibid. 
42 
Freud, The Introductory Lectureson Psychoanalysis, 
pp, 336-41. 
43 . 
ST, CW 5, para. 507: "Projection, however, is never 
a cure; it prevents the conflict only on the surface, while 
deeper down it creates a neurosis which allows him to escape 
into illness. In that way the devil is cast out by Beelzebub." 
44 
Consider, for example, Fichte, or a literalistic reading 
of Schopenhauer. The latter, however, was quite explicitly 
referring to perception when he states that "the world is 
my representation" and should not be unjustly saddled with 
the charge of meaningless illusionism. 
45 
F/J Letters, 315J, 17 May, 1912. 
46 
ST, CW 5, para. 508. 
47 
Ibid., para. 329. 
48 
TP, CW 4, para. 317. Jung enunciated this principle 
again in 1935: "... the concept is always a symbol, even 
though it is an expression for something known." (Letters I, 
p. 202.) 
49 
Jung, "The Relation between the Ego and the Unconscious", 
CW 7, para. 353 [Gesammelte Werke VII, para. 3531. 
50 
Although it is another matter with psychotics. It 
would seem from the theory as developed thus far that psychosis 
involves a defect of just this symbol forming capacity. The 
ego is weak, which means that it in some way is incapable of 
cathecting libido to the appropriate representations in pheno¬ 
menal reality. Hence libido regresses, having no adequate 
counter-pole in consciousness. But because the ego is defec¬ 
tive, neither can it deal with libido that is transformed into 
symbols. These threaten to consume the ego (e.g. paranoid 
fantasies) precisely because it has not provided its snare 
in their formation. They are not the result of a collaborative 
effort at communication, but rather a one-sided invasion of 
unconscious contents. They are truly ego 5lien. So perhaps 
the reason why psychotics so often preoccupy themselves with 
God is that God is the one metaphor for a reality which is 
not represented in the everyday world of phenomena that is 
so ego syntonic. 
51PH, CW 8, para. 93. 
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The Religious Question 
1Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 621. 
2_ 
Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy. New Haven, 1970, p. 7. 
3, 
And indeed, in the case of the Miller fantasies, Juno had 
not even met and interviewed the young lady. It was entirely 
an exegesis. 
4 
See note 50 m the preceding section. 
5 
PH, CW 0, para. 91: "Symbols are the manifestation and 
expression of excess libido." 
ST, CW 5, para, 259. 
7TP, CW 4, para. 350. 
8ST, CW 5, para. 259, 
9 
See Theodore Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends for an 
intelligent historical account of thus process’ of "objecti¬ 
fication" as mediated by the Judeo-Christian religions in 
Western culture. 
10ST, CW 5, para. 510. 
i:ltp. CL 4, para. 428. 
12 
James Putnam, " A Plea for the Study of Philosophic 
Methods in Preparation for Psychoanalytic Work", p. 90. 
13 
Putnam, "The Necessity of Metaphysics", p. 307. 
14Ibid. 
15 . 
One gets the sense with this nan that for all his 
"open-mindedness" in accepting as necessary the "dirt" brought 
out of the unconscious in psychoanalysis, he still felt he 
had to atone for this by making sure that the newly refurbished 
psyche was founded on more "wholesome" ground. 
^Freud, "Preface" to Putnam, Addresses on Psychoanalysis, 
p. iv. 
17PE, CW 8, para. 110-111. 
18F/J Letters, 269J, p. 438. 
■^Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, Part II, Lecture I. 
The reader is assured that these vague intimations are merely 
preliminary, and that we will expound at much greater length 
upon the relationship between Jung and Heidegger, and that 
between psychiatry and philosophy in general in the second 
half of the paper. 

Metapsychological Theory 
XIt is well known that following Jung's break with Freud 
in 1913, Jung entered an extended period of introversion which 
in Memories, Dreams, Reflections he called his "Confrontation 
with the Unconscious." During this period he wrote very little 
in quantity, but outlined the fundamental direction that his 
later psychology would take in the Two Essays on Analytical 
Psychology. However, Psychological Types can still be regarded 
as heralding Jung’s return to extroversion, for it was after 
its publication that Jung re-emerged on the European psychiatric 
scene with renewed vigor and vocalness. 
2 . 
Bmswanger quotes Freud saying to him in a private con¬ 
versation: “Man has always known he possessed spirit: I had 
to show him there is such a thing as instinct." in Ludwig 
Binswanger, Being-in-the-worId, New York, 1963, p. 1. 
3 Freud, The New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 
pp. 559-575. (following quotes also). 
4 
Speaking of William James, Jung remarked that his "psy¬ 
chological vision and pragmatic philosophy have one more than 
one occasion been my guides. It was his far-ranging mind 
which made me realise that the horizons of human psychology 
widen into the immeasurable." Quoted from "Psychological 
Factors in Human Behavior", CW 8, para. 262, 
5 William James, Principles of Psychology, p. 700, 
6Ibid., p, 706. 
7IU, CW 8, para. 273 (italic added). 
8CCU, CW 9,i, para, 91. 
SThe example of the yucca moth is Jung’s: IU, CW 8, para, 268. 
1(^Karl Pribram, Languages of the Brain, p. 250, 
1;LCCU, CW 9,i, para. 91 (emphasis on images added). 
12NP, CW 8, para, 417. 
13Ibid,, para. 437: "Of what lies beyond the_phenomenal 
world we can have absolutely no idea, for there is no idea 
that could have any other source than the phenomenal world." 
14Ibid., para. 440. 
15PAMA, CW 9,i, para. 155, 
16Imagine, if you will, a supersaturated solution standing 
in a beaker, It will soon crystalize, but how it does depends 
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on the circumstances. If I touch the beaker, minute crystals 
will form throughout and settle in a fine sand at the bottom. 
Should I chaose to insert a stirring rod, however, the crystals 
will form a massive accretion on the rod that reveals the 
planes of cleavage, retractile properties, etc. The only 
difference between the two situations is the initiating cir¬ 
cumstance. 
17 
The word numen derives etymologically from neuo, which 
means, "I nod or bow my head." The Sanskrit root rnea’ns, 
"to move oneself." 
^But to go to the extreme of envisioning the phenomenal 
world as the Boolean projection of man's dialectical mind, 
as L^vi-Strauss does, reduces reality to meaninglessness. 
See Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, p. 87. 
19 
NP, CW 8, para. 407. Recall that instincts for Jung 
are distinguished both from energy and force. Energy in 
particular can only potentiate instincts. See supra, p. 20. 
20 
Ibid., para. 366. (following quote also). 
21 
Ibid. , paras. 367 A 417, This essay, written in 1946, 
stands along with "On Synchronicity" as the culmination of 
Jung's metapsychological theories. It is only here that Jung 
first uses the word psychoid, and one senses that it was a new 
formulation, not yet fully integrated into his thinking. It 
seems reasonable, given the foregoing explanation, to include 
psychic energy and the Self in this category of the "quasi¬ 
psychic" unknowables. As regards the latter, see below. 
22 
Freud, "The Unconscious," SE 14, p. 177. Note that 
Freud at times seemed willing to allow for distinctions 
between a personal and collective unconscious: "The content 
of the Ucs may be compared with an aboriginal population in 
the mind. If inherited mental formations exist in the human 
being -- something analogous to the instinct fInstinktj in 
animals ~~ ohese constitute the nucleus of the Ucs. Later 
there is added to them what is discarded during childhood 
development as unserviceable, and this need not differ in its 
nature from what is inherited." (p. 195), Note also the 
mythologizing of unconscious contents into "an aboriginal 
population.' At one point Freud even goes so far as to say, 
"The theory of instincts is, so to speak, our mythology." 
(New Introductory Lectures, p. 559.; 
23 
Erich Neumann, "The Psyche and the Transformation of 
the Reality Planes", Spring 1.956, p. 103. 
24 
NP, CV 8, para„ 367ff. 
25 
Letters I, p. 61. 
26 
NP, Cl 8, para. 407. 
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27PT, CW 6, para. 426. 
2 8 
This rendering of sich vorstellen is taken from a 
seminar given by Professor Karsten Harries at Yale College 
in the spring of 1971. 
29 
Freud, The interpretation of breams, p. 96. 
30 
PT, CW 6, para. 687, This clear articulation of the 
concept of attitude underscores our contention that Psycho¬ 
logical Types represents the opening of a new phase of Jung's 
work. For although the roots of this idea can be traced back 
to Symbols of Transformation, the emphasis which it now re¬ 
ceives correlates with the explicitly constructive point of 
view which characterizes his later thinking. 
Compare also the notion of attitude in phenomenological 
psychiatry, as developed in Europe during the 1920's and 1930's, 
Van den Berg says "phenomenology is before everything a meth¬ 
odical adjustment, an attitude as it were." It is the "natural 
attitude" of Husserl somewhat liberally viewed; it is letting 
phenomena speak to us (phenomen - o - logy). See Henrik van 
den Berg, The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry, p. 62. 
31PT, CW 6, para. 688. 
~*2Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 124, 
33Ibid.o p. 8. 
34 
^Ibid.p. 46. 
35PT, GW 6, para. 425 (italics added), 
33Ibid., para. 819. 
37Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, p. 149. Spirit as 
Heidegger uses it is not to be confused with the spirit we 
have discussed earlier in reference to Jung. Spirit for 
Heidegger is rather more like Jung's Self, 
33James Hillman, Revisioning Psychology, p. 15. Hillman 
elaborates on the notion of soul by calling it a perspective 
rather than a substance. Soul, for Hillman, mediates events 
and gives meaning. It turns events into experiences. It is 
communicated in love and has a religious concern. It deepens 
our experience of life, but only by establishing a special 
relation to death. And it is the imaginative possibility, 
fantasy. These characterizations add to, but do not alter, 
what we have already said. From Revisioning Psychology, p. x. 
39Recall Jung's quote from "The Content of the Psychoses" 
(1908). See p. 7, supra. 
"‘°Junq frequently used James' metaphors as well. But he 
does speak of horizon in this sense in NP, CW 8, para. 382. 
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41 
Friedrich HOlderlin, "Patmos", in Gedichte, p. 181. 
Near 
And yet hard to catch hold of is God. 
But where there is Danger, arises 
Salvation as well. 
In Darkness 
Dwell the eagles, and fearlessly 
The sons of the alps cross the chasm 
On fragile bridges. 
Therefore, since all about are massed 
The peaks of time, and the Beloved Ones 
Dwell nearby, wearily 
On most distant mountains, 
So give us water in innocence. 
Oh pinions give us, of that most faithful consciousness, 
In order to cross over and return. 
My translation uses words which correspond to the metaphors 
which we have been exploring. Jung called this first stanza 
of "Patinos" one of his favorite poems. (Letters II, p, 193n.) 
He gives an extensive hermeneutic of the entire poem in 
Symbols of Transformation, ON 5, para. 63Off. 
The Role of Interpretation 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 41. 
2_ Letters I, pp. 31-32. It should be noted that Jung is 
not using the word mystery here in any careless or vague way. 
The roots of both mystery and mystic lead us to the Greek 
iriuo, which means, "i close my mouth," hence, "I am silent." 
3 
Ibid. The metaphor is Jung's. 
^PE, CW 8, para. 402, 
s 
Hblderlin, "Mnemosyne," m samtliche Werke, Vol. 4, p. 225, 
The original is: 
Bin Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos 
Schmerzlos sind wir und haben fast 
Dir Sprache in der Fremde verloren. 
The English translation is from What Is Called Thinking?, 
Part I, Lecture I. 
^Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H176. 
7PE, CW 8, para. 403. 
8FQP, CW 16, para. 252. 

- 179 - 
9 
Rudolf Arnheim, Visual Thinking, p. 120 (italics added). 
10 
Ibid., p. 254. 
11, 
Michael Folanyi, The Tacit Dimension, Lecture I. 
12 
Thomas Kuhn, p. 198. 
13 
Lawrence Kubie, "Unresolved Problems Concerning the 
Relation of Art to Psychotherapy," Am j Art Ther, 2:95, 1973. 
14 . 
We follow Hillman here in stressing the universality 
and necessity of pathologizing. Pain is not always the 
result of illness, and in fact should be given the respect 
that is due a messenger of the soul. To call someone sick 
suggests that we try to get rid of his pain, instead of trying 
to understand its meaning. For a "full account of this point 
of view, see Revisioning Psychology, Chapter II. 
15 Stefan Kbrner, Lectures delivered at Berkeley College 
(Yale University) in the fall of 1976. 
16CP, CW 3, para. 320. 
17 . 
Hillman, p. 192. Hillman notes that therapeut.es meant 
in ancient Greek "one who attends to anything" and "one who 
attends to the sick." It is used by Socrates to denote "one 
who serves the Gods" (see Phaedrus, 252C; Laws, 740B). But 
to serve and to attend to also means to care for. And in 
this connection the reader is directed to Heidegger*s analysis 
of the fable of cura in Being and Time, p. H 197-199. 
Interlude 
^Freud, "The Antithetical Meaning of Primal Words", 
SE 11, pp. 153-161. 
2 
Jung, "Spirit and Life", CW 8, para, 626. Jung began 
his etymological investigations as early as Symbols of Trans¬ 
formation, and even had his wife woiking on them (F/J Letters, 
297J). For examples, see the discussion of "libido" in 
Symbols of Transformation, CW 5, paras. 186-189. 
3 
Ernest Jones, "Theory of Symbolism", Papers on Psycho- 
Analysis , pa. I30ff. 
\s in the Iliad, 4,453 or 5,774. 
5 .... 
All th? following definitions are taken from Liddell 
and Scott's Greek-Bnglish Dictionary unless otherwise noted, 
^Leopoli Stein, "What is a Symbol Supposed to Be?", 
J Anal Psyci, Vol. II, No. 1, Jan. 3957, p. 77, 
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Jung, "A Psychological Approach to the Trinity". CW 9 i 
para. 210. * 2 * 4 5 * 7 8 9 ’ * 
8Stein, p. 74. 
9 
Ibid., p. 77 (italics added). 
10Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 220. 
11Stein, p. 74. 
12„ 
For example, m Fr. 81 Heraclitus says: "Men should 
speak with rational awareness (xuo no) and thereby hold on 
strongly to that which is shared" in common (to xuno) ." Quoted 
from Philip Wheelwright, Heraclitus, p. 120. 
Predecessors 
Hlarie Louise von Franz, "The Library of C.G.Jung", 
Spring 1970, p. 190. 
2 
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, p. 14. 
^Ibid. 
4Ibid., p. 8. 
5 
Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. H 318-321. 
0 
Peter Gay, The Enlightenment, Vol. II, p. 534. 
7 
". , .we must take up these arms again in order to seek 
in the mortal use of [practical] reason, and to base on this, 
the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility 
of which speculation-III•e. theoretical reason] cannot adequately 
prove." Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 292, Note that 
freedom occupies a special place, since Kant argues that of 
these three ideas, only freedom is such that we must know that 
it exists a priori. Yet we cannot give any content to this 
knowledge. See p. 29In. 
8 
Kant, The Critique of Judgment, p. 528. 
9 Ibid, i p. 530 (and the following quotes). 
18>Ibid. , p. 534. 
^Ibid., Introduction to Section III, 
i 2 ■“ Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 
Vol. II, p. 160. 
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13 , . 
Ibid., Vol. I, 
14,., 
Ibid., Vol. II 
loIbid., p. 181. 
16 , . , 
Ibid,, p. 364. 
^Ibid., p. 183. 
, —1 -u -J-o ui. AA-iiiy » Jj veil Cllt: V 6J Ci xJ' 
ulary is the same. For example: Metaphysics Mdiscloses only 
the true understanding of the world lying before it in exper¬ 
ience. " (p. 183) . 
18 
Ibid., Vol. I., p. 51. 
19 
Ibid., p. 52. Cne recalls in this context Jung's concept 
of attitude, especially as he elaborates it with respect to 
the feeling function in Psychological Types, paras. 687ff, 
especially para. 690. 
20 , . 
Ibid. 
21 
Ibid., p. 58. 
^Ibid, , p. 234. 
23 
Ibid. 
24 , . , 
Ibid. 
25Ibid., Vol. II, p. 364. 
2 6 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logicophilosophicus, 
6.32f (italics added). 
^Schopenhauer, Vol. II, p. 364. 
2 8 One should also note at this point Schopenhauer's careful 
definitions of "allegory5' and "symbol," as opposed to Idea. 
Allegory was a work of art signifying something different from 
what it depicts. It always signified a concept, not an Idea. 
A symbol, cn the other hand, is an "allegory" in which there 
is no connexion between signifier and concept. Because it is 
based on a stipulated (but not on that account arbitrary!) 
agreement, the signifier can be forgotten over the course of 
time, and then the symbol becomes "dumb." (Vol. I, para. 50.) 
Note that both allegory and symbol in Schopenhauer's sense 
are explicitly tied to concepts, that is, to a known, expressible 
thing. Herce they recall Piaget's definitions in Play, Drea ns 
and Imitation in Childhood (pp. 168-170), where he defines, 
after de Saussure, a symbol (i.e, Schopenhauer's "allegory") 
as a motivated signifier in which there is a resemblance of 
some kind between it and the thing signified; and a sign 
(i.e. Schopenhauer's "symbol") as an arbitrary signifier, 
related to the signified by social or other convention. It is 
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precisely the unfathomable quality of Ideas, on the other 
hand, which would lead Piaget to classify them as "secondary" 
symbols, which distinguishes them from these other categories. 
We include this observation to emphasize that Schopenhauer 
fully understood the subtleties of his definitions, and was 
not ignoring a whole additional set of refinements which has 
recently captured so much attention. 
29 
Karsten Harries, Lectures delivered on Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche at Yale College in the fall of 1976. The following 
passage from Rilke, quoted by Heidegger, is an eloquent 
example of such an inversion: 
However vast the 'outer space' may be, yet with all its 
sidereal distances it hardly bears comparison with the 
dimensions, with the depth dimensions of our inner being, 
which does not even need the spaciousness of the universe 
to be within itself unfathomable . . . To me it seems more 
and more as though our customary consciousness lives on 
the tip of a pyramid whose base within us (and in a cer¬ 
tain way beneath us) widens out so fully that the farther 
we find ourselves able to descend into it, the more gen¬ 
erally we appear to be merged into those things that in¬ 
dependent of time and space, are given in our earthly, 
in the widest sense, worldly, existence. From "What are 
Poets for?", p. 128. 
20 
Schopenhauer, Vol. II, p. 407. 
O I 
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 235. One recalls here the Arnheim/Kubie 
debate on pp. 69-75 supra. 
3 7 
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 24. 
33Ibid., p. 18. 
34 See Ernst Cassirer's The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, 
Vol. II, in this regard. We will have more to say about 
Cassirer below. 
35Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 38 (original italics). 
36Ibid., p. 73, 
3^Ibid., p. 123. 
38Ibid See Jung on the psychology of "as if" in "The Psy¬ 
chology of the Child Archetype", CN 9,i, para. 265. 
o q 
D^Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 42. Cf. Freud, 
The Interpretation of Dreams, ”p. o67 : "Nothing but a wish 
can”set”our"mental apparatus at work." 
40 Ibid., p. 21. 
' 
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41 
James Hillman, "Demonology: Jungian Self-Knowledge and 
the Pandemonium of Images", Lecture delivered under the 
auspices of the Kanzer Fund at Yale University on 8 November, 1976, 
42 . 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p, 46. 
^3Ibid. , p. 104. 
44 
"Den Gott verhUllt seine Schttnheit: so verbirgst du 
deine Sterne." (translation mine). Also Sprach Zarathustra, 
"Vor Sonnen-Aufgang", p. 414. 
45 
This connection between Narcissism and Nietzsche*s 
account of how consciousness is fascinated by the other who 
looks like oneself, is further developed in Edward Edinger’s 
book, Ego and Archetype (Baltimore, 1973). He explains this 
fascination with one's self-image as one of the first driving 
forces towards an encounter with the unconscious. Naturally, 
as the Narcissus myth shows so well, from the point of view 
of the ego, initial immersion in the unconscious is experi¬ 
enced as a kind of death (drowning). But as the metamorphosis 
into a flower demonstrates, it is a symbolic death only. 
See Edinger, pp. 161-162. 
46 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 233. 
^Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 44. 
^3Jung, Mysterium Conjunctionis, CW 15, para. 129. 
49 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and EvjI, p. 233, Note that 
Nietzsche uses similar imagery in Zarathustra ("Vor Sonnen- 
Aufgang"), when Zarathustra demands that the sky be purified 
of any clouds that would mar the immediacy of Zarathustra's 
relationship with the sky, "das ungeheure unbegrenzte Ja- 
und Amen-sagen." (p. 415). 
50 Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, p, 416. 
51Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 86. 
52Jbid., p. 109. 
53Ibid,, p. 88. 
3^Ibid,, p. 93. 
^3Ibid., p. 34. 
A Contemporary:_Ernst Cassirer 
^Heidegger, "Die Selfostbehaupturg der DeutschenUniversitat", 
p. 11, The examples of 20th century mythologizing in every 
. 
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field of endeavor surpass documentation: Yeats' Irish fables, 
Pound's Cantos, Mann's Faustus and Zauberer, Chagall's visions, 
Stravinsky's Rite of Spring, even the very burgeoning of whole 
disciplines such as ethnography and anthropology. 
2 
Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Vol. II, 
p. 3. 
3Ibid., p. 4. 
4It should be noted that this structuralist alternative 
is implicitly anticipated by Cassierer himself: ’’Even if a 
merely factual unity of the basic mythical configurations 
could be demonstrated beyond any doubt, this unity would still 
remain a puzzle unless it could be referred back to an under¬ 
lying structural form. (p. 19). 
5 Schellmg, quoted by Cassirer, p. 12. 
^Schelling, ibid., 
7 . . . 
Schellmg, ibid. , 
^Ibid., p. 8. 
p. 4 (italics added). 
p. 8. 
'Schelling, ibid., p. 37. 
supra. 
10Schelling, ibid., p. 6. 
Cf. Jung's famous quote on p,28, 
11Schelling, ibid. 
^Ibid,, p. 36. 
^ibid., p, 24. 
14Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, “Attempt, at Self- 
Criticism", sections 6-9. 
l5Cassirer, p. 26 (italics added). 
18Ibid. r p. 203. 
17Ibid., p. 239 (italics added),, Cf. Jung's comment on 
pp. 34-36 supra. 
18Friedrich Jacobi, quoted in Cassirer, p. 254 (italics 
added). 
l9Cf. Ereud, "On Repression", SF 14, p. 152, where affect 
and idea become the representatives of the forever unconscious 
instinct. 
20See Erich Neumann's The_0riglns and History of Conscious- 
ness, p. 2£, where he describes the necessity of emotional in¬ 
volvement in order to bring things to consciousness. See also 
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Jung, "Spirit and Life," CW 8, para. 634, where the affective 
motivation of an idea is emphasized. And of course the idea 
is implicit in the above-mentioned essay by Freud as well. 
The whole problem of feeling is explored further in our dis¬ 
cussion of Heidegger, pp. 15lff. 
21 
This is m contradistinction to Freud and Lacan, who 
place the word in the unconscious. 
22 
Cassirer, p, 78. Note that Cassirer is heavily indebted 
here to Rudolf Otto and his book, Das Heilice (1917). Also, 
it should be pointed out in this context that current thinking 
is no longer so anthropomorphically inclined to reserve all 
the credit for human beings. Lower animals, too, are capable 
of surprisingly sophisticated behavior that transcends mere 
negative stimulus-response modes. See Edward Wilson's Socio- 
biology in this regard. 
^Ibid. , pp. 217-218 (italics added). 
24 
Heidegger, "A Review of Ernst Cassirer's Mythical Thought", 
in The Piety of Thinking, p. 45. Kant, too, would probably 
have classified Cassirer's work as "anthropology." 
Heidegger and the New Ontology 
^Note the wary suggestion from one prominent ego-psychologist 
"The interest of the psychoanalytic psychiatrist is now directed 
toward what motivates each patient to keep material in dis¬ 
sociation and toward the reactions of the patient in response 
to repressed material which mounts into awareness, rather than 
toward its contents per se. , . . As a result, the attention 
of the psychiatrist has recently been focused more upon the 
investigation of the ego-defenses. . . . than upon the scrutiny 
of the contents ..." From Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Principles 
of Intensive Psychotherapy, p. 73 (italics added). 
2 
"Em wanig Gift ab und zu: das macht angenehme Trflume, 
Und viel Gift zuletzt, zu einem angenehrnen Sterben." From 
Friedrich Kietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra, p. 284 (trans¬ 
lation mine). 
3 
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 98-101, Heidegger 
examines here the Cartesian conception of man. It will be 
recalled that it was in Descartes8 century that the idea of 
man as machine took the world by storm. 
^"Die Zeit ist abgeflossen, wo nir noch Zufaile begegnen 
durftenj und was KOnnte jetzt noch zu mir fallen, was nicht. 
schon mein Eigen ware!". Also Sprach Zarathustra, p. 403 
(translation mine). 
5 
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 133. 
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8Ibid. 
7Ibid., p. H 227. 
8Ibid. 
9 
Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 326. 
1QIbid., p. 279. 
11Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 219. It is interesting 
to note that despite initial objections among philosophers to 
Heidegger's etymology of aletheia, recent studies tend to con¬ 
firm his interpretation, at least for the Pre-Socratic use 
of the term. See Paul Friedlander9s Plato, pp. 221-22, in 
this regard. 
12Kuhn, p# in. 
13 . 
Although it would seem that someone as intelligent as 
Wittgenstein was nevertheless not so open to this wonder. See 
his peculiarly misleading discussion of this same rabbit-duck 
figure in Philosophical Investigations, pp, I94ff, in which 
the phenomenon gets lost in his account of "seeing-as," 
14 
"Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 215. One thinks again 
of "Mnemosyne''in this regard. 
15Ibid., p. H 222. 
16Ibid., p. H 226. 
17Ibid., p. H 108. 
paragraph)". 
(and all other quotations in this 
18 
Ibid., P. H 132. (original italics). 
19 
~Ibid. (italics added). 
28>Ibid., p. H 233, 
21 
.Ibid, 
Ibid,, p. H 373. Heidegger borrowed the expression "tie 
connectedness of life" (Die Zusammenhang des Lebens) from Dilthey. 
23Ibid., p. H 374. (and all following quotations up to the 
next notation.) 
2^Ibid., p. H 373. 
25hTeidegger, "...Poetically Man Dwells...", in Poetry, 
Language, Thought, pp. 220-221 (italics added). 
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26 
See Nietzsche's comments about the sky on p. 104 & 106, 
supra. 
27 
Heidegger, "...Poetically Man Dwells...", pp. 222-225 
(and all further quotations in this paragraph; italics added). 
2 8 
The quotation originally ran: "...the sole necessity, 
by thinking our way soberly into what his poetry says, to 
come to learn what is unspoken." "What are Poets for?" in 
Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 96. 
29 
Heidegger, "Hblderlin and the Essence of Poetry", in 
Existence and Being, p. 286 (italics added). 
Ibid., p. 289. 
3lJbid., p. 288. 
32Ibid., p. 287. 
33Heidegger, "’What are Poets for?", p. 133. 
34 
35 
Ibid., p. 134. 
Ibid. 
36Ibid. See pp. 104-106 supra for Nietzsche's discussion 
of masks. 
37Heidegger, "HBlderlin and the Essence of Poetry," p. 237. 
38 Ibid. 
39Ibid., P* 288. 
49Ibid,, (italics added). 
41 
NP, CW 8» para, 409. 
42 
^CP, Cl 3, para. 354. Note that it was in 
that the early psychoanalytic journal Imago was 
the title on Carl Spitteler's novel, 
this spirit 
named after 
43Jung had been instrumental in founding an interdisciplinary 
curatorium in Zurich for the exchange of ideas on psychotherapy. 
He had direct contact therefore with several Swiss existential 
psychiatrists. See Letters, Vol. II, pp. xl-xlv. 
44Letters, Vol. II, p. 261. Jung is clearly referring to 
Heidegger in this passage, 
45Letters, Vol. I, p. 33]-2. 
4^jung, "A Rejoinder to Dr. Bally", CW 10, para. 1025. 
In another passage, Jung expounded on this theme: "We are still 
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far from Nietzsche's view of philosophy and indeed of theology, 
as an 'ancilla psychologiae*, for not even the psychologist 
is prepared to regard his statements, at least in part, as a 
subjectively conditioned confession." in NP, CW 8, para. 344. 
Nietzsche's comments in this regard are as follows: "Gradually 
I have come to realize what every great philosophy up to now 
has been: the personal confession of its originator, a type 
of involuntary and unaware memoirs, , . . There is nothing 
impersonal whatever in the philosopher. And particularly his 
morality testifies decidedly and decisively as to who he is 
— that is, in what order of rank the innermost desires of his 
nature occupy." from Beyond Good and Evil, p. 6. 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Letters, Vol. II, p, xlii. 
Heidegger, "What are Poets for?", p. 116, 
Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Reverie, p* 103, 
Ibid., p. 193. 
51 
The classic example Being Ernest Jones* comment on 
James Putnam's philosophizing, which he assumed was "placed 
in the service of some or other unconscious resistance." 
See Putnam, p. 464. 
52 
Bachelard, p. 127, 
53 
Hans Loewald, "Ego and Reality", Int J Psychoanalysis, 
1951, 32:10-18. 
5ZL 
Bachelard, p, 118. And perhaps this best explains 
Jung's cantankerous put-down of Heidegger, since Jung was 
not hostile to philosophy on principle. 
JIbid. , p. 127. 
56 
Ibid., p. 182. 
57 
RPP, CW 16, para. 564. 
5 R 
Wheelwright, p. 49. Jung clearly belongs to this 
family of empathic thinkers. For e>ample: "We must never 
forget that the world is, in the first place, a subjective 
phenomenon. The impressions we receive from these accidental 
happenings are also our own doing." from TP, CW 4, para. 400, 
Toriginal italics j. 
59 
60 
Ibid., p. 31 
Bachelard, p. 196. 
61 Jung, "Commentary on 'The Secret of the Golden Flower1 
(1929), CW 13, para. 54. 
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62 
Neumann, The Origins and History of Consciousness, p. 26. 
This recalls the "little metapsychology" of" Jacobi on p. 117 
supra. 
6 3 
Jung, "Psychological Commentary on Kundalini Yoga", 
Spring 1975, p. 3Off. 
64 
Jung, "A Study in the Process of Individuation", CW 9,i, 
para. 621. 
65 
Heidegger, "What are Poets for?", p. 127. 
k^Bachelard, p, 177. 
67 
Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p. 248. 
&8Heidegger, "...Poetically Man Dwells...", p. 228. 
69 See page 120, supra. 
70 
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. H 233, 
71 . 
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 49. 
72Ibid., p. 50 
73 . 
Note that Jung himself used the word "authentic" m 
just this sense cf distinguishing between the collective, 
everyday (and super-ego) morality of the they-self, and 
the truly individual morality involved in a decision which 
transcends the confines of conventional conduct. See "A 
Psychological View of Conscience" (1958), CW 10, para. 838. 
74SL, CW 8, para. 647. 
Conclusion 
1F/J Letters, 287J, p. 471. 
2 
Kant, Critigue of Pure Reason, p. 5, 
"3 
Paul Ricoeur, Conflit des Interpretations, p. 107 (trans¬ 
lation mine). 
4 He i d e c:g e r, What Is Called Thinking? , p. 33. 
5 
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 18, 
6PAMA, CW 9,i, para. 150. 
7 
Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p, 34. 
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o 
Jung, "Psychotherapy and a Philosophy of Life", CW 16, 
para. 179. 
9 G.J.Warnock, The Philosophy of Perception, pp. iff. We 
can cite Warnock as someone outside of philosophy if we recall 
with Heidegger that philosophy is metaphysics. And Warnock 
does not dc metaphysics. . . 
^Jung, "Psychotherapy and a Philosophy of Life", CW 16, 
para. 190, 
^Ibid. , para. 175. 
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